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This report addresses the Coast Guard's National security role in the next century by interviewing current and former policy & decision makers involved in the maritime aspects of national security. The report attempts to define the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard in the Post Cold War era when the requirements for the Coast Guard to act as Commanders of Maritime Defense Zones (MDZs) and to provide ASW capable cutters has been dramatically lessened. The author suggests the definition of national security needs to expand and that the Coast Guard provide increased support for US CINCS especially in security assistance and low order crisis response. The role of the US Coast Guard as the force manager/force provider for coastal patrol boats is also studied. The need for a viable national defense role for the Coast Guard is examined, and the implications of a lack of a well-defined, needed role assessed.

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**Center for Naval Warfare Studies
U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI**

**The U.S. Coast Guard's
National Security Role
in the
Twenty First Century**

**Captain Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
U.S. Naval War College
June 1992**

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Disclaimer

This research project is not sponsored nor endorsed by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Transportation (DoT), the Department of the Navy (DoN), or the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The views and opinions expressed in this report reflect those of the author. This study is based upon a survey questionnaire completed by current and former senior level government leaders and policy-makers and other distinguished individuals. The author takes sole responsibility for errors of omission and misinterpretation of their submissions.

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Table of Contents

Dedication	xxi
Foreword by Dr. Robert S. Wood	xxiii
Acknowledgments	xxv
 Executive Summary	
The Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century	xxvii
The Study	xxviii
Future National Security Missions	xxix
Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD	xxxii
Central Finding by the Author	xxxv
Other Significant Findings by the Author	xxxix
Recommendations by Individual Respondents	xlii
Author's Conclusion	xlvi
 Chapter One	
Introduction	1
The Study	2
Study Methodology	6
Organization of the Study	9
 Chapter Two	
Statutory Authorities and National-Level Directives of the U.S. Coast Guard	11

Contents

Statutory Authorities and Coast Guard Mission Areas and Functions	13
National Security Strategy of the United States	30
National Military Strategy of the United States	37
A National Security Framework for Studying the Coast Guard	42
 Chapter Three The Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century	 51
Future Missions	53
Future Requirement for Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) Commands	69
Future Role in Regional Conflicts and Low Intensity Conflicts	78
Future Role as a Force Provider or Manager of Coastal Patrol Boats	89
 Chapter Four The U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with the Department of Defense	 101
Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities in DoD's Force Presentations	102
Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by the Unified Commanders	110
Policy Making Mechanism for Determining the Coast Guard's National Security Role	121

The Utility of the Coast Guard's Military Capability	128
DoD's Role in Coast Guard Platform Acquisition	136
Chapter Five	
Central Finding by the Author	143
A Classification Scheme for Navies and Coastguards	144
What is the U.S. Coast Guard?	147
The Coast Guard's Ambiguous Relationship with the U.S. Navy	151
A Relationship Shaped by Politics and the Budget	160
The National Need to Define this Relationship	165
One Approach for Solving this Dilemma	168
Chapter Six	
Other Significant Findings by the Author	173
The Coast Guard's <i>Ad Hoc</i> Role in Naval Diplomacy and Security Assistance	174
The Lack of Doctrine on the Coast Guard's Roles, Missions, and Capabilities	178
The Coast Guard's Organizational Structure for National Security	183
The Lack of Historical Case Studies on Coast Guard Involvement in National Security	185

Contents

Chapter Seven	
Recommendations by Individual Respondents	189
Who from DoD Provides Policy on the Coast Guard's National Security Role: CNO, CINCs, or C'JCS?	191
Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role	194
Additional Issues for the Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role	198
Coast Guard's Command Relationship with DoD	202
Chapter Eight	
Author's Conclusion	205
A Defining Time for the Coast Guard	206
Endnotes	
Endnotes by Chapter	213
Bibliography	217
Appendix A	
The Survey Questionnaire	A-1
Appendix B	
Admiral Roland's Doctrine	B-1
Appendix C	
The Author	C-1

List of Figures

Executive Summary

Figure 1 - Coast Guard 44 Foot Motor Life Boat in the Oregon Surf	xxvii
---	-------

Chapter One

Figure 2 - Coast Guard-Navy Joint Operations	1
Figure 3 - Number of Respondents	4
Figure 4 - Composition of the Respondents	5
Figure 5 - The Dangerous Deck of a Coast Guard Buoy Tender at Work	7
Figure 6 - Coast Guard Utility Boat Fighting Port Chemical Fire	9

Chapter Two

Figure 7 - Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Overflies Utility Boats	11
Figure 8 - On Patrol: Coast Guard 41 Foot Utility Boats	12
Figure 9 - Coast Guard Multi-Mission Buoy Tender	15
Figure 10 - Buoy Tender Working an Aid to Navigation	15
Figure 11 - Buoy Tender Breaking Ice	16
Figure 12 - Buoy Tender Deploying Oil Spill Containment Containment Boom	16
Figure 13 - Buoy Tender Laying Practice Mines	17

Contents

Figure 14	- Buoy Tender's Motor Surf Boat Launched for a Law Enforcement Boarding or a Search and Rescue Mission	17
Figure 15	- Coast Guard Mission Areas and Functions	18
Figure 16	- Rescue Swimmer from a Coast Guard 44 Motor Lifeboat in Action	19
Figure 17	- Coast Guard Marine Inspector Examines New Ship Construction	20
Figure 18	- Coast Guard Fisheries Law Enforcement Boarding Team at Work	21
Figure 19	- Coast Guard Boat Crew Approaches Aliens Migrating to the U.S.	22
Figure 20	- Coast Guard Personnel Inspect Seized Cocaine	23
Figure 21	- Chart of Major Oil Spills in North America in North America Since 1974	24
Figure 22	- Vice President Quayle on Scene at the at the Valdez Oil Spill	25
Figure 23	- Coast Guard National Pollution Strike Team Member Directs Deployment of Oil Spill Containment Boom	26
Figure 24	- Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker	27
Figure 25	- Coast Guard Security Assistance Training	28
Figure 26	- Coast Guard Interdiction of Caribbean Migrants	29
Figure 27	- Coast Guard Humanitarian Assistance in Korean Airline KAL 007 Shoot-Down	29
Figure 28	- Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix	32

Contents

Figure 29	- U.S. National Security Objectives	33
Figure 30	- Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Lands on BEAR Class Medium Endurance Cutter	36
Figure 31	- Concepts of U.S. National Military Strategy	38
Figure 32	- Coast Guard HU-25B Aircraft Overflies Kuwaiti Oilfields	41
Figure 33	- Location of Representative Coast Guard World Wide Activities	42
Figure 34	- Standard Geographical/Function Listing of Coast Guard World Wide Activities	43
Figure 35	- Listing of Coast Guard World Wide Activities in Support of U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies	44
Figure 36	- Coast Guard Functions that Support U.S. National Security	45
Figure 37	- Coast Guard's National Security Mission	47
Figure 38	- Coast Guard's National Security Mission Viewed Against Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix	48
Figure 39	- Coast Guard Patrol Boat Conducts a Boarding During Vietnam War	48
Figure 40	- Coast Guard HU-25A Aircraft on Patrol	49
Figure 41	- Landing Safety Officer at Work	49
Figure 42	- Cover Story from <i>U.S. News and World Report</i> . . .	50

Contents

Chapter Three

Figure 43	- Coast Guard Law Enforcement Boarding Team Boards a Vessel	51
Figure 44	- Coast Guard Buoy Tender Monitors an Oil Spill from Grounded Vessel	54
Figure 45	- Coast Guard <i>RELIANCE</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter Interdicts Haitian Sailboat	56
Figure 46	- Coast Guard Forward Presence off Colombian Coast Versus Navy	59
Figure 47	- Coast Guard Petty Officer Training Foreign Navy Personnel	61
Figure 48	- Coast Guard Security Assistance Accomplishments	62
Figure 49	- Joint Coast Guard/Navy Boarding Team Approaches a Merchant Ship in Persian Gulf	64
Figure 50	- Coast Guard Security Assistance Capabilities	66
Figure 51	- Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Hoists Its Rescue Swimmer	68
Figure 52	- Coast Guard Rescue Swimmers Take a Break	68
Figure 53	- Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat Provides Security During Loadout of Fast Sealift Ships for Desert Shield	69
Figure 54	- Coast Guard Unit Alongside Fast Sealift Ships	71
Figure 55	- Coast Guard Personnel Monitor Loading of Tanks onto a Fast Sealift Ship	73

Contents

Figure 56	- Coast Guard Utility Boat Conducting Waterside Security	75
Figure 57	- Coast Guard Port Security Unit Smallboat Monitoring Saudi Boats During Desert Storm	76
Figure 58	- Coast Guard <i>RELIANCE</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter Alongside Foreign Navy Ship	77
Figure 59	- Distribution of Replies for Future Role in Regional Contingencies and Low Intensity Conflicts	78
Figure 60	- Coast Guard Personnel from the Persian Gulf Maritime Interception Force Enroute to a Ship . . .	79
Figure 61	- Quote by VADM Arthur, USN, About Coast Guard's Role in the Maritime Interception Force (MIF)	81
Figure 62	- Coast Guard Involvement in the 1983 Grenada Contingency	82
Figure 63	- Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance Cutter Operating with a Navy Amphibious Helicopter Assault Ship	84
Figure 64	- Coast Guard Port Security Unit Smallboat Conducting a Patrol During Desert Storm	85
Figure 65	- Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat Underway at Speed	87
Figure 66	- Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance and <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutters use the Navy's MK75 76MM Dual Purpose Surface Gun	88
Figure 67	- Distribution of Replies for Future Role as a Force Provider or Manager of Coastal Patrol Boats	89

Contents

Figure 68	- Coast Guard <i>POINT</i> Class Patrol Boat and Navy <i>KNOX</i> Class Fast Frigate	90
Figure 69	- Expertise: Alongside Smallboat Operations	91
Figure 70	- Experience: Open Sea Smallboat Transfers of Personnel	93
Figure 71	- Force Mix: Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat on Coastal Surveillance	96
Figure 72	- Coast Guard Personnel Crew Light Surface Weapon	98
Figure 73	- Coast Guard Motor Surf Boat Underway for a Boarding	99
Figure 74	- Coast Guard Resources Excel in Coastal-Littoral Operations	100

Chapter Four

Figure 75	- Navy LAMPS I Helicopter Lands on <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter	101
Figure 76	- Distribution of Replies for Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities in DoD's Force Presentations	102
Figure 77	- Coast Guard Involvement in the 1989 St. Croix "NEO"	103
Figure 78	- Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance Cutter Operating with a Navy Navy Cruiser	104
Figure 79	- Coast Guard Involvement in Desert Shield and Desert Storm	105
Figure 80	- Coast Guard HC-130H Aircraft on Surveillance Flight	107

Figure 81	- Coast Guard EC-130V Aircraft with Rotodome Air Search Radar	109
Figure 82	- <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter	109
Figure 83	- Distribution of Replies for Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by the Unified Commanders	110
Figure 84	- Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat on Search and Rescue Response	111
Figure 85	- Coast Guard Involvement in 1980 Cuban Boatlift	113
Figure 86	- Coast Guard CASA Logistics Aircraft	115
Figure 87	- Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Lands on <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter	117
Figure 88	- Flexible Deterrent Options and the Coast Guard	119
Figure 89	- Distribution of Replies for Policy Making Mechanism for Determining the Coast Guard's National Security Role	121
Figure 90	- Joint Operational Planning by Coast Guard and Navy Personnel	122
Figure 91	- Coast Guard 44 Foot Motor Life Boats Train in the Columbian River Bar	123
Figure 92	- Coast Guard Buoy Tender Works a Monster Open Ocean Buoy	125
Figure 93	- Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance Cutter Fires a Harpoon Missile	127
Figure 94	- Distribution of Replies for The Utility of the Coast Guard's Military Capability	128

Contents

Figure 95	- Harpoon Cannisters on a Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance	129
Figure 96	- Coast Guard <i>RELIANCE</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter Operates with the HH-65A Helicopter	131
Figure 97	- Coast Guard Mobile Training Team at Work with a Foreign Navy	134
Figure 98	- Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat Screens a Former Soviet Warship	135
Figure 99	- Distribution of Replies for DoD's Role in Coast Guard Platform Acquisition	136
Figure 100	- Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter in Flight	137
Figure 101	- Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter in Flight	139
Figure 102	- Coast Guard 327 Foot <i>SECRETARY</i> Class High Endurance Cutter - "The Enduring Cutter"	142

Chapter Five

Figure 103	- Coast Guard Buoy Tender Deploys an Oil Spill Containment Boom	143
Figure 104	- Ken Booth's Functions of Navies and Coastguards	145
Figure 105	- Ken Booth's Geographic Reach Matrix and the Functions of the U.S. Coast Guard	148
Figure 106	- An Average Coast Guard Day for Mission Accomplishments	150
Figure 107	- The Naval Institute Prize Essay of 1884	151

Contents

Figure 108 - Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Lands on the Flight Deck of a <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter	153
Figure 109 - Coast Guard HH-26A Aircraft	155
Figure 110 - Coast Guard Global Engagement Activities in 1991	157
Figure 111 - Coast Guard Presence Operations in the Antarctica	159
Figure 112 - Coast Guard <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance Cutter on Patrol	159
Figure 113 - Coast Guard Port Utility Boat Fights a Pier Fire	161
Figure 114 - Coast Guard National Oil Pollution Strike Team Member Oversees Port Oil Spill	163
Figure 115 - The Consequences of Bad Port Safety Practices	164
Figure 116 - Coast Guard Forward Presence Operations in the Caribbean - Counternarcotics	165
Figure 117 - Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Conducts Hoist Drills with 41 Foot UTB	170
Figure 118 - Helm Watch on USCGC <i>EAGLE</i>	172
 Chapter Six	
Figure 119 - Coast Guard Coastal Small Boat Station	173
Figure 120 - Quote by the President of Mexico	175
Figure 121 - Naval Diplomacy Activities by a Coast Guard Aircrew	177

Contents

Figure 122 - Coast Guard <i>RELIANCE</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter Fights a Major Ship Fire	179
Figure 123 - Coast Guard Coastal Patrol Boat Monitors Large Oil Spill	181
Figure 124 - Coast Guard Offices in Headquarters Responsible for National Security	183
Figure 125 - Coast Guard Buoy Tender at Work	184
Figure 126 - Coast Guard Boarding Team Inspects a Sailboat's Liferaft	185
Figure 127 - Coast Guard 47 Foot Motor Life Boat Replacement	188
Figure 128 - Coast Guard <i>BAY</i> Class Icebreaking Tug is a Multi-Mission Cutter	188

Chapter Seven

Figure 129 - Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter in Flight	189
Figure 130 - Top Down Derivation of the Coast Guard's Functions	190
Figure 131 - Quote by General Colin Powell	192
Figure 132 - Ways to Request Coast Guard Forces	194
Figure 133 - Coast Guard <i>POLAR</i> Class Icebreaker in the Ice	197
Figure 134 - Coast Guard Marine Safety Inspector at Work on Port Facilities	199
Figure 135 - Two Coast Guard Sentinels for the Mariner: <i>HAMILTON/HERO</i> Class High Endurance Cutter and a Lighthouse	200

Contents

Figure 136 - Coast Guard Buoy Tenders Conducting Drills	200
Figure 137 - Coast Guard Mobile Training Team at Work with a Foreign Navy	201
Figure 138 - Coast Guard <i>BEAR</i> Class Medium Endurance Cutter Prepares to Exercise the Coast Guard's Broad Law Enforcement Powers	201
Figure 139 - CINC Versus CNO Interaction When Requesting Coast Guard Forces	203

Chapter Eight

Figure 140 - Where Does the Coast Guard Fit?	205
Figure 141 - Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat Boat With 25MM Chain Gun	208
Figure 142 - Coast Guard Boards a Sailboat	209
Figure 143 - Coast Guard <i>ISLAND</i> Class Patrol Boat Proceeding to a Drug Offload	211
Figure 144 - USCGC <i>EAGLE</i> Underway with Full Sails	212



Photo: Dave Gatley

At the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

Little Gidding
T.S. Eliot

Dedication

This research project is dedicated with much appreciation, respect, and admiration to the survey participants who made this study possible. By candidly presenting their opinions, sharing their insights, and forthrightly declaring themselves on difficult issues, some controversial, these participants, in or out of uniform, set a high standard for commitment and responsibility to serve. Whether in leadership positions or not, they all acted as leaders and set an example for others, especially junior and mid-grade officers, to become involved in discussing the future of their Services and expressing themselves in a thoughtful and constructive manner. Thank you.

Foreword

In the last several years we have witnessed the end of the Cold War and the development of a new United States National Security Strategy to meet the challenges, as well as opportunities, of a changing international security environment. Basic American interests remain--the survival and strengthening of our political and economic institutions in a world favorable to open and democratic societies, free markets, peaceful change and collaboration. Fundamental social and economic trends and the transformation of the geopolitical landscape, however, are causing us to rethink our priorities and institutional arrangement. This monograph on the U.S. Coast Guard's national security role in the twenty-first century by Captain Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG, is one important example of this process of study and reflection.

Unshackled from the focused conflict of the Cold War, the United States is able to attend to the broader aspects of our national security. Issues of littoral warfare, law enforcement, and maritime capabilities are receiving renewed attention, as are the future roles both of the traditional combat services and the Coast Guard. In his exhaustive interviews with officers and officials, active and retired, and his weighing of alternatives, Captain Stubbs finds that while the Coast Guard is well-equipped to contribute to the National Security Strategy in such broad areas as humanitarian assistance, maritime law enforcement, security assistance, port and coastal defense, and environmental protection, it lacks specific national defense tasking and has not been as well integrated with the other components of our military forces as desirable. At the same time, the Coast Guard has important statutory responsibilities in such areas as search and rescue, marine environmental protection, and drug interdiction that would necessarily inhibit any tight integration with the various military commands. Nonetheless, Captain Stubbs points the way toward better definition of the interactive role of the Coast Guard with the other services, such as the Navy and Marine Corps, while maintaining its important traditional missions.

ROBERT S. WOOD
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I especially thank one of the finest moderators at the College, LTC E. Smith, USA, for encouraging and assisting me to begin this project. Dr. Rich Lloyd, my academic advisor, provided wise counsel and much organizational and editorial assistance. Without the help of Dr. Robert S. Wood, this study could not have accessed the broad and diverse group of respondents. Dr. Wood provided unlimited encouragement and support to this research project. I also thank Dr. John B. Hattendorf, CDR James V. Goldrick, RAN, CDR William J. Wilkinson, USCG, and CDR David B. Peterman, USCG, for the many hours they spent reviewing and commenting on the draft versions of this report. They made invaluable contributions.

Miss Nancy M. Bigos, Mrs. Shirley A. Wilkins, and Mrs. Barbara Prisk prepared the drafts, did all the mailings and a thousand other things associated with the production of a study. These ladies also made invaluable contributions as they produced the finest possible products. They too provided much encouragement and assistance for which I am very grateful. Another special lady is Miss Diane M. Cote who prepared error free, camera-ready copy for the printer, despite frequent, last minute changes; Miss Cote did a super job. Miss Gina Vieira also assisted in the final preparation. Mr. Ian Oliver of the College heads one of the best graphics shops in the nation. Mr. Robert E. Hobbs, Jr., designed the splendid cover and did the layout; Mrs. Lynn A. Wilson spent many hours composing the superb graphics used in the study. The high quality of their professional work has added immeasurably to this project. I thank Charles L. Mussi of Foto Consortium and Joe Towers for the kind use of their outstanding photographs. The other photographs that illustrate this study were provided by another group of exceptional professionals, Coast Guard photojournalists.

Finally, I would like to thank my family - Eileen, John, and Sarah - for their patience, understanding, and love that allowed me to work on this study. They never complained, even when they had good reason to do so, instead, they only cheered and inspired me on; they are the best there is. Thank you.

Executive Summary

The Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century



Figure 1: Though a Diverse Multi-mission Service, the Coast Guard Has a Popular Image as a Humanitarian Lifesaving Service - A Coast Guard 44 Foot Motor Life Boat Underway in Heavy Surf to a Distressed Mariner.

Executive Summary

The Study

The purpose of this research project is to help stimulate debate and to further study on the Coast Guard's national security role in the Twenty-First Century. It is based on the premise that the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the planned reductions in the U.S. defense budget have major implications for the U.S. Coast Guard. This report tries to determine what the Coast Guard's national security role should be in response to these emerging realities.

Study Methodology

The report uses interviews as the primary source of information to assess this response. Over a nine month period the author surveyed Navy and Coast Guard flag officers, senior civilian policy-makers, and naval analysts at various centers for advanced strategic studies. These surveys consisted of two phases. In the spring and early summer of 1991 the participants completed a questionnaire on the Coast Guard's relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) and future national security missions. The author analyzed the responses and prepared a draft report. During the second phase the participants commented on the draft report from late fall 1991 to winter 1992. The respondents provided further areas of study, additional comments, and critiques of the draft report. This second phase was also necessary to reflect the significant events that had occurred since the respondents answered the questionnaire in the spring and summer of 1991. Major geopolitical events had occurred, but none more profound than the collapse of the Soviet empire. Additionally there were developments within the Navy and Coast Guard that influenced the first set of replies.

Figures 3 and 4 on pages 4 and 5 show the number and composition of the participants respectively. The sample is limited. However, it is not intended as a public opinion pool to draw inferences as to what its population believes. Rather it is to surface ideas and different points of view.

The responses by the participants were put into the appropriate group and a composite response for that group was determined for each of the seven questions. Once the composite replies were completed, each question now had six separate responses; one from each of the six separate groups. These six responses for each question were, in turn, made into one overall composite response per question that reflected the combined input of the six groups of respondents. It is important to note that these composite replies do not reflect consensus of opinion, but a distillation or a precis of the large amount of information and opinion submitted in the two phases of this study. The composite replies attempt to reflect the range, scope, and the most important aspects of these responses into a manageable whole to bound and frame issues about the Coast Guard. Furthermore it is not the author's intention that the composite reply of each group should be construed as representing the opinions of that group (community) as a whole.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

In some instances the members of a group express similar opinions, and in others hold a wide range of views.

A National Security Framework for Studying the Coast Guard

The Coast Guard has four broad mission areas: (1) safety, (2) law enforcement, (3) environmental protection, and (4) political-military. Using the traditional, historical definition of national security, only the political-military mission area would be considered as supporting national security. Today national security has a much broader meaning to include the social, economic and environmental well-being of a nation's citizens. The Coast Guard's other three mission areas directly support a "strong and healthy U.S. economy and environment" and because of the globally-connected world, these Coast Guard mission areas have international implications as well.

Future National Security Missions

Most respondents indicate that the Coast Guard's future national security role will continue to reside in its current area of expertise. As one respondent notes "many Coast Guard's peacetime missions easily convert into useful military functions during times of conflict." These participants cite the Coast Guard's vast civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise as valuable supporters of the *National Security Strategy of the United States*.

The Coast Guard's national security role will not come just from Navy input, but also will include input from the State Department, Unified Commanders (CINCs), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Suggested new missions include: (1) increasing nation building (security assistance) programs, (2) crewing Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) ships with Coast Guard personnel, (3) assigning responsibility for the "low end" (frigate, corvette, coastal patrol boat and below size vessels) of the high-low mix of naval ships, and (4) responding to environmental terrorism.

The Coast Guard's unique missions and force structure, civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise will be the basis for the Coast Guard's role in national security in the twenty-first century. Of the missions the respondents recommend, the following are in consonance with this assessment:

- (1) Security assistance.
- (2) Regional coastal warfare capability.
- (3) Maritime interdiction.

Executive Summary

- (4) Complementary, non-redundant capabilities for the Navy: port security; harbor defense; coastal sea lines of communications (SLOC) protection; presence in areas of lesser threat; noncombat search and rescue (SAR).

Future Requirements for MDZ Commands

Regarding the need for the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ), a majority believe there is a definite national security need for unimpeded strategic sealift from origin to destination. They believe the MDZ Commands will still provide a valuable service by ensuring the safety and security of sealift at the origin. A large number of these participants also comment that MDZ is universally applicable and should be made an exportable capability.

The continued viability of MDZ commands in the post Cold War world without some significant adjustment has become difficult to image. In December 1991 the Navy-Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board recommended the reduction of MDZ sectors and subsectors in the Atlantic and to revisit the requirement for MDZ two years hence. One analyst indicates that when the Navy's *1992 Mine Warfare Plan* was being researched that "no one would sign up to a threat in U.S. ports and coastal waters." He asks, "What is the real need for MDZ without a global, Soviet-style threat?" Selective MDZ in strategic sealift ports appears to the maximum acceptable level of effort.

Future Role in Regional and Low Intensity Conflicts

There is widespread agreement among the Coast Guard admirals and the Unified Commanders (CINCs) that the Coast Guard has a role in regional conflicts and low intensity conflicts (LIC) operations based on the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and well-suited assets. Others, including principally the Navy active and retired admirals, say no role, beyond port security, maritime interdiction, and harbor defense. The CINCs see with the addition of some simple and reliable combat systems, Coast Guard assets could provide useful and effective service. The Navy admirals and an assistant secretary of defense note that warfare is a Navy, not a Coast Guard responsibility. Many respondents tend to view LIC in purely military terms. They appear not to consider fully the Coast Guard's role in the non-combat aspects of LIC, such as nation building and security assistance. It is the Coast Guard that is more relevant to the majority of the world's navies in terms of force mix and missions. This makes the Coast Guard ideal for small navy security assistance.

There is no disagreement that the Coast Guard can perform some useful functions. The issue is what to use as a base for these functions. Should they be based upon the Coast Guard's non-combat missions (such as port safety and security, maritime law enforcement, and aids to navigation)? Or should they be based upon the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and force structure for a broader range of coastal operations, including coastal warfare? The former viewpoint espouses a Coast Guard role that is primarily an extension of its peacetime missions.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The latter is based upon an opinion that existing Coast Guard forces represent an inherent capability for a full range of coastal or 'green-water' operations beyond the harbor.

A four star Navy Admiral stresses the need for "maximum economy and efficiency" and to "challenge all sacred cows and break counterproductive rice bowls. . . . The Coast Guard offers capabilities that the DoD services do not and must be entered into the equation. Complementary capabilities should be fine tuned: costly redundancies eliminated." Is this very senior Navy admiral ready to support the Coast Guard as a force provider for coastal operations?

He knows the Navy does not have any "redundant" capabilities in duplicating the Coast Guard's security assistance capability (port safety and security, maritime law enforcement, aids to navigation functions). Nor is there duplicative capability in the Coast Guard's patrol boat fleet, notwithstanding the arrival of the Navy's new class of 170 foot coastal gun boats. The Navy's boats are primarily designed to support the requirements of special operation forces (SOF), and as such are essentially fast attack craft (FAC). Whereas the Coast Guard's boats are designed for coastal interdiction and surveillance and search and rescue duties. Coastal operations in a regional conflict will probably require the services of both types of patrol boats. Clearly the Navy boats can also conduct coastal interdiction and surveillance, but at the expense of not supporting SOF operations.

Future Role as Force Provider or Manager of Coastal Patrol Boats

The dichotomy of opinion about the level of the Coast Guard's participation in a naval warfare area is evident in the responses to the proposal to designate the Coast Guard as the DoD's force manager for coastal patrol boats. The majority of Coast Guard admirals and approximately one half the decision maker and naval analyst group believes the Coast Guard's experience, expertise, and force mix as well as reasons of efficiencies and economies justify this designation. However, they recognize that it is "too glaring an incursion into their (DoD's) sandbox" and "not politically acceptable or doable."

The CINCs, the Navy admirals, and the other half the decision maker and naval analyst group says no, principally because the Coast Guard is not part of DoD and that warfare is not a primary Coast Guard function. Recognizing the infeasibility of this designation, one Navy admiral recommends a middle ground position for cooperative efforts under Navy leadership for the Coast Guard to provide some level of patrol boats.

This is a contentious issue that predictably falls along service lines. The Coast Guard prides itself on its patrol boat expertise and vast experience. Many Coast Guard senior leaders believe if there is any warfare resource that the Coast Guard could and should justifiably and logically provide, it is patrol boat capability for coastal warfare. This issue causes a great amount of frustration for them, because they see a better rationale for the Coast Guard to provide this capability than to provide anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipped cutters for ocean convoy.

Executive Summary

Perhaps there is even some irritation that it is another example of a "mission that the Navy doesn't want, but won't let others acquire." Yet, they are not blind to the powerful arguments against this force manager designation vice force provider.

A senior Coast Guard operational commander sums up this attitude of exasperation and displeasure over the current relationship:

The Coast Guard is more experienced in coastal operations in peacetime than is the Navy, and should be able to make the transition to wartime coastal operations readily, as was demonstrated in Operation Market Time during the Vietnam War and in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. In time I'm sure that the Navy could spool up a credible naval coastal force, but why not include the Coast Guard, as was done in the MDZ commands? The Coast Guard can help the Navy fill its void in naval coastal warfare capabilities.

This issue has major implications for the Coast Guard in its present patrol boat replacement acquisition program. The venerable 82 Foot *POINT* Class patrol boat, veteran of Vietnam service, requires replacement. If there are no coastal warfare requirements from the CINCs (or the Navy), there may be no need for the replacement craft to have a military capability. Arming and equipping Coast Guard patrol boats for coastal defense duties in U.S. home waters is highly unlikely in today's defense budget environment.

Coast Guard's Relationship with the Department of Defense

Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities in DoD's Force Presentations

Including the Coast Guard as part of DoD's Base Force and the total naval force package presented to Congress is almost evenly split. All the Coast Guard admirals and one half of the decision maker and naval analyst group says yes, because not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets, understates U.S. defense capability. Since Coast Guard assets are included in the CINC war planning documents, these admirals argue that the Coast Guard assets should be recognized before Congress. One CINC, the Navy admirals, and one half of the decision maker and naval analyst group says no, because Congress would equate "USCG cutters with USN ships, (and) the Navy would lose ships which the Coast Guard would be expected to replace." This loss of autonomy and equating the two services as one appears insurmountable to them.

This is another issue that causes a great amount of frustration for the Coast Guard leadership. As a member of the Armed Forces' team and with such great emphasis on "jointness", it seems unreasonable and inconsistent not to recognize the Coast Guard. Is the inclusion of the relatively minor, but singular, Coast Guard capabilities and forces so threatening to the survival of DoD and the Navy to warrant exclusion? Is inclusion so potentially confusing to Congress that

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Congress would lump the Navy and Coast Guard together? Congress and DoD do a nice job separating and not confusing the two land armies that the U.S. maintains, i.e., the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. They can do the same for the Coast Guard. What did that active duty full Navy admiral say above about it being time to break rice bowls? The explanation that, "The Coast Guard is not in DoD" sounds more like an excuse.

It is difficult not to conclude that this is another example that the Navy wants it both ways; it wants Coast Guard assets, but it does not want to recognize the Coast Guard's contribution because the Navy fears possible increased budgetary responsibility for the Coast Guard's national security. It is difficult to reconcile why Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' contingency plans, but are not recognized as contributing to the national security before Congress and not included in the Base Force.

Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by the Unified Commanders

The majority of participants believe the Unified Commands should include the Coast Guard in their force planning submissions to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. They reason that not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets, understates U.S. defense capability. They also argue that since Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' contingency plans, Coast Guard assets should also appear in the CINCs' submissions. As one participant writes "To plan to use Coast Guard forces and not inform OSD risks redundant tasking and possible unavailability of forces during a contingency . . . not to do so incurs the risk of inadequate funding should use of Coast Guard forces be necessary."

Policy Making Mechanism for Determining the Coast Guard's National Security Role

Though there is widespread agreement that the NAVGARD Board is satisfactory for policy coordination on the Coast Guard's national security role, there is not complete harmony. Some admirals believe that fundamental policy issues between the Navy and the Coast Guard have never really been addressed, while others believe the forum is good only for renewing friendship. There seems to be some underlying uneasiness with the value of this Board that is not being fully admitted. It does not readily appear that fundamental policy issues between the Navy and the Coast Guard are being addressed. For example, a four star Navy active duty admiral writes that once the (Navy-Coast Guard) relationship is defined, "a second generation NAVGARD Board be empowered to resolve doctrinal, procurement, funding, etc. (issues)." This statement from a knowledgeable player indicates that the broader, over-arching policy matters (Navy-Coast Guard relationship) are not being addressed in this forum.

This assessment is reinforced by the Board's recommendation in February 1992 not to continue installation of Harpoon missiles on the Coast Guard's 378 Foot *HAMILTON/HERO* Class high endurance cutters. This decision goes beyond individual weapon requirements for these cutters; the significant policy implications of this decision - what military roles should the Coast Guard

Executive Summary

perform - have not been addressed. Until that fundamental policy is defined, decisions about combat systems will be made only in response to transitory personality dependent relationships and current budgetary needs.

A footnote to the decision to remove Harpoon is what role did the warfighters, the CINCs, play in this decision? CNO, as a service chief and not an operational commander, is responsible for providing trained, equipped, and ready forces to the CINCs via the naval component commanders. Did the NAVGARD Board receive input from the CINCs before recommending substantive changes to the military capabilities of Coast Guard forces?

DoD's Role in Coast Guard Platform Acquisition

There is widespread agreement to include DoD in the selection of Coast Guard platforms for reasons of military utility. The respondents cite interoperability, supportability, efficiencies, and economies for doing so. Final choice would, of course, remain with the Coast Guard and Coast Guard mission requirements would remain paramount, but the "jointness" issues and complementary military roles underscore the need for DoD to be involved. Of interest are the Coast Guard admirals who cite the need for DoD involvement beyond just the need for supporting the military missions of these cutters and aircraft, but also because of the logistical requirements of supporting these assets for their peacetime Coast Guard missions. They appear to imply that developing and maintaining non-DoD logistics systems for major Coast Guard procurements are imprudent.

The Utility of the Coast Guard's Military Capability

The majority of the respondents are not concerned that Coast Guard cutters have not been used in any contingency operations since 1982. However, there is not complete agreement. Seven participants argue either "use it or lose it." Some of the Coast Guard admirals believe non-use is based on "turf issues" rather than utility. This issue of turf causes some poor relations and bad communications between both services. The respondents who are unconcerned argue that there is no adverse effect to the Coast Guard's national security role because the Coast Guard ships were not best suited, were not available, or were too busy elsewhere. In contrast to this widely held view, one Coast Guard admiral predicts that the continued non-use could lead to a significant reduction in the combat capability of cutters. He cites the Coast Guard's role (no cutters were deployed) in Desert Shield and Desert Storm as a paradigm of this outcome.

Of interest is the Coast Guard's participation in the Grenada contingency. All the respondents cite this contingency as an example that Coast Guard forces were not needed for the initial operation. However, according to two knowledgeable respondents, Coast Guard forces were in fact needed, but were turned around before commencing the rescue. The reasons for rescinding the order are not specified, but are described as related to service politics at the Washington level.

Central Finding by the Author

In the process of developing the composite responses to the survey questionnaire, recurring themes about the Coast Guard and its relationship to the Navy became apparent. One finding goes to the heart of this research project, i.e., what is the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard? Until this fundamental question is properly answered, the Coast Guard's national security role will remain a speculative commodity, subject to continuous interpretations and reevaluations.

A Navy four star admiral calls this finding the "most important result of the study", and recommends that, "the relationship must be redefined in light of the new threat scenarios and fiscal realities." A Coast Guard admiral says this theme "is the heart of the issue . . . what do we need and why?" However, a retired Commandant takes an opposite view and says, "There is no real problem here unless one decides the Coast Guard would be better served by having itself designated to 'help' the Navy."

The Coast Guard's Ambiguous Relationship with the Navy

A retired Coast Guard commandant does not believe this relationship can be or should be defined. He offers, "I see no way to spell out a doctrine that can sufficiently deal with the idiosyncracies of the Coast Guard and its myriad duties, nor its relationship with the Navy and all other Armed Forces; there is relationship to be shaped with each." A senior Coast Guard field commander says that DoD views, "Coast Guard forces and the capability they represent as off-budget resources of limited value that may be available, and have no current interest in clarifying that viewpoint or altering it."

The responses indicate two contrasting viewpoints of the Coast Guard's relationship with the Navy, i.e., whether to treat the Coast Guard as a resource-of-opportunity or a naval force-in-being. As a resource-of-opportunity, chance and circumstances determine how the Coast Guard is used in a military role. Those advocating this position see the Coast Guard as an instrument of national security only if its missions and force mix have an application in a crisis, contingency, or an application requiring military forces. The other view sees the Coast Guard as a naval force-in-being with prescribed national security functions that include well defined military missions. These respondents want the Coast Guard to have predetermined national defense roles with an associated, dedicated military capability for these purposes. A retired Coast Guard commandant describes this comparison as the difference between what you get on D-Day versus what you get from a pot-luck approach.

Treating the Coast Guard as a resource-of-opportunity is best described by an assistant secretary of defense, who writes:

Executive Summary

(The Coast Guard) should not be tasked for specific missions . . . (but) could contribute to an overseas operation on an "ad hoc" basis . . . (with its) assets of opportunity . . . (if) the need for these assets . . . would exceed the need for them in their regular mission.

Contrasting this resource-of-opportunity view, is the opinion that the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and force mix have valuable uses in dedicated national defense purposes, but not as a second navy. These participants want to train and equip the Coast Guard for predetermined national defense uses, as opposed to relying on circumstances at the time of a contingency to determine if the Coast Guard can or should participate. A retired Navy admiral considers that "the Coast Guard (is) a force analogous to the Naval Reserve."

More than one respondent notes that naval force-in-being and resource-of-opportunity are not mutually exclusive terms, including a retired Coast Guard commandant. A Coast Guard field commander says that, "We can and should be both. It's important that we recognize that 'national security roles' and 'wartime tasking' are not synonymous. The key point is that we need to better define our national security tasking."

A Relationship Shaped by Politics and the Budget

A Navy retired admiral describes the current relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard as "a marriage of convenience which by tacit agreement by both the Navy and Coast Guard has never really been consummated." According to this flag officer, the Navy and Coast Guard are "two organizations that have been notionally klugged together in the simplest fashion possible at policy levels with no real consideration by the regional CINCs." How the Coast Guard and Navy relate to each other has not been defined for several reasons, the principal one being fiscal.

A Coast Guard district commander states that, "An underlying issue is who will pay for our national security capabilities." A senior policy making Coast Guard admiral notes that, "Our role has been ambiguous for many years and, I think, with reason. Both the Coast Guard and the Navy have benefitted from this loose relationship. It creates headaches for the planners, but it has been workable. Trying to constrain the relationship with a fixed 'role' will mean someone is likely to lose when brought before Congress. This, I think, has been recognized by present and past Service Chiefs and is the reason a more definitive relationship was not established years ago."

A Coast Guard active duty admiral writes that, "The Coast Guard cannot carve out a role and claim a particular naval warfare area without the Navy's agreement, endorsement, and support." An active duty Navy admiral explains that, "If Congress began to equate USCG cutters with USN ships, the Navy would lose ships which the Coast Guard would be expected to replace."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The National Need to Define this Relationship

Fears of budget competition should not prevent defining the Navy-Coast Guard relationship. There are good national security reasons for resolving this matter that benefits the nation and all the Armed Forces. An active duty Navy admiral in the policy making position states that, "Meeting all commitments with a smaller Navy makes cooperation and interoperability with the Coast Guard even more vital than in the past." A geographic CINC says that "the loss of Coast Guard military capability" limits his options when planning contingency operations." Without defining this relationship how does the Coast Guard achieve "cooperation and interoperability" with the Navy and ensures its availability as an option for the CINCs?

DoD doctrine stresses a fundamental policy that "the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated."¹ Unity of effort by the Coast Guard with the other services can not be achieved without defining this relationship. Formal recognition of its national security contributions allows the Coast Guard to plan effectively the use of its forces and to plan replacement programs. What is not "workable" and what should be unacceptable is to change the planning parameters every two or three years or so in response to a change in the players. Resources are too scarce and too expensive, and the outcomes too important to be left to such informal practices that do not have a longer and broader view. As John Collins from the Congressional Research Service says, "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it."² Without a defined role, the Coast Guard's political leadership with their domestic/transportation outlook can not fully appreciate the unique and useful contribution the Coast Guard makes to national security. This leadership tends to interpret too narrowly the Coast Guard's national security role.

One Approach to Solving this Dilemma

Defining the Coast Guard-Navy relationship in this fiscally sensitive environment is difficult. It is made more so in the absence of clearly articulated requirements for a Coast Guard military role, beyond its MDZ command responsibilities. Without more specific national defense tasking, the relationship will be resolved strictly on the basis of chance, politics, and budget battles. Obviously, finding valid, justifiable requirements for the Coast Guard to have a national security role involving national defense must by definition be a non-starter. If there are valid, justifiable requirements to fulfill, then the U.S. Navy with its responsibility for national defense, and not the U.S. Coast Guard, should fulfill them.

Fiscal realities and the readily availability of Coast Guard unique resources no longer make this matter a simple and clear-cut debate about roles and missions between the Navy and the Coast Guard. In this age of billion dollar deficits, is it militarily imprudent and economically unwise to ignore the potential national security/defense capability residing in existing Coast Guard forces? The Navy is faced with reduced budgets, many requirements, and an expensive capital replacement program for submarines, aircraft carriers, tactical aircraft, and surface Aegis-

Executive Summary

equipped combatants. This is a Navy that appears to be moving toward a triad of strike combatants: submarines (*TRIDENT* and *SEAWOLF*), aircraft carriers (*NIMITZ* with stealth aircraft), and Aegis equipped surface ships. It will be a fleet composed of very large, few-in-number, and high-cost combatants, built primarily for blue-water power projection and sea control, that perhaps, in some regional scenarios their use may be restrained.

With the above parameters in mind, defining the Coast Guard-Navy relationship begins by asking the operative questions:

- o What inherent capabilities (statutory and resources) does the Coast Guard bring to the national security arena that are useful, not redundant, and complementary?
- o Since the Coast Guard operates ships and aircraft with trained military personnel, are there cost effective and military advantages to equipping these existing and available platforms with a naval warfare capability, not in response to specific national defense requirements, but for value added reasons and to exploit or to ensure these inherent and unique capabilities are available in a crisis or contingency?

In response to the first question the Coast Guard has unique capabilities to provide: (1) broad maritime law enforcement power; (2) extensive coastal and port expertise, experience, and assets; (3) maritime environmental expertise. In regard to the second question, the Coast Guard is approximately the 10th largest navy in the world today; it has a full range of coastal assets available for operations in the littoral regions. Specifically Coast Guard forces can: (1) support some coastal and brown water regional requirements to provide a naval warfare capability; (2) provide a U.S. "naval" presence in the Caribbean and Latin America to support forward deployments by a smaller sized U.S. Navy; (3) increase its security assistance training to international navies for alliance strengthening; and (4) support reconstitution and regeneration of naval forces. This does not imply that Coast Guard assets currently under utilized, but is based upon premise that the above requirements, though needed, are cost prohibitive given other Navy priorities. However, this proposal does imply that some of the statutory missions performed by some Coast Guard forces in domestic arena may not performed when these forces are assigned to national security duties out of the United States. It depends on national priorities. It is a trade-off; we are entering a new world and not every requirement is affordable. The Coast Guard can be considered a national security bargain, and the budget dollar is maximized by training and equipping an already existing maritime force to be gainfully employed in peacetime and ready for contingency service.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Other Significant Findings by the Author

The Coast Guard's *Ad Hoc* Role in Naval Diplomacy and Security Assistance

One CINC provides the observation that small navies more "readily relate to USCG than to USN (since) . . . the bigger ships overwhelm them." This CINC also discusses an important capability about the Coast Guard. He considers it extremely valuable that "When regional tensions heighten, the presence of a multi-mission Coast Guard cutter or contingent is often less threatening to Host Nation sovereignty concerns than a DoD asset would be simply because it is not perceived as a U.S. 'military' presence. Yet, that presence still demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies and can be an effective deterrent to aggression."

These roles are frequently discussed by the participants. However, there is no indication in the responses that there is a concerted, dedicated, high-level effort to exploit this capability. It appears that this capability is considered important to discuss, but in reality is treated as an *ad hoc* result of the Coast Guard's existence. It also appears that increased and more formal recognition of the Coast Guard's role in naval diplomacy and security assistance may be considered as budget threatening to the Navy in particular and not a "traditional" Coast Guard function by others. Compounding this problem is that the various maritime and transportation related Congressional committees that oversee the Coast Guard do not normally exercise oversight of national security issues.

A Navy four star flag officer comments that this is a " . . . very good point. Coast Guard vessels could perform FON (freedom of navigation), naval presence, diplomatic, military assistance (training) missions" with the nations in my AOR. A second full Navy admiral writes that, "Clearly the Coast Guard can, and does bring significant capabilities to bear. Similar efforts can be expected in the other AORs. Again DoD and DoT must coordinate and fine tune our efforts to provide the best possible product to the CINCs."

Another geographical CINC says that, "The Coast Guard may also have a larger peacetime role to play. Given a volatile and distant AOR, (our) strategy for maintaining peace and stability in the region rests rarely upon maintaining a viable forward presence and providing security assistance to our friends in the area. To this end, the Coast Guard has been instrumental in the continuing . . . operations, in managing our theater . . . program, and in the conduct of . . . training for . . . nations. From our experience, it can be seen that the Coast Guard can play an important role in nation building and naval diplomacy. A cooperative effort to define that role - vis a vis that of the Navy - is warranted."

The Coast Guard's security assistance role need to be defined. But more importantly, this role must be formally recognized by Congress and the DoT and DoD, and become an assigned mission with separate budget authority for program management personnel and training personnel billets and for operational training activities. This is not an issue about whether the

Executive Summary

Coast Guard should be in Budget Function 50 (Defense) and not Budget Function 400 (Transportation). There is unequivocal recognition and acceptance that the Coast Guard should remain in Function 400. The issue is how can the Coast Guard's national security mission receive adequate and correct attention when its present Department, its reviewing section in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and its Congressional committees all have essentially a domestic or transportation perspective.

The Lack of Doctrine on the Coast Guard's Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

A second finding is the lack of doctrine on the Coast Guard's national security/defense role and national domestic role. This lack of common doctrine on "who and what is the Coast Guard" is very evident from the responses. As discussed above there is lack of agreement about whether the Coast Guard is a resource-of-opportunity or a naval force-in-being with prescribed national security/defense missions. As one active duty flag officer states that the "Coast Guard's primary defense role is to support strategic mobility in the ports and waterways of U.S." There is no consensus on such a position. His statement reflects the problem of no authoritative policies and definitions.

How the participants define "specialized service" is also representative of this lack of doctrine. Some of the Coast Guard active admirals define "specialized service" as either expertise, missions, or capabilities. Two Coast Guard retired officers believe that specialized service is a "reference to organizational relationship" and that the Coast Guard is not another "navy". Two CINCs think the definition is purposely vague so as not to lose flexibility when (DoD) uses the Coast Guard. (Conversely, this vagueness also allows the CINCs to remain 'in charge' if the Coast Guard attempts to drive the conversation.)

A Coast Guard district commander states that, "The word 'doctrine' has a strong emotional connotation (and DoD slant). Point is, there needs to be consensus on the Coast Guard's role." A retired Commandant strongly disagrees with the need for doctrine and believes that Title 14 U.S.C. is sufficient. Thomas Watson, famed leader of IBM, wrote that "any organization, in order to survive and achieve success, must have a sound set of beliefs on which it premises all its policies and actions."³ General George H. Decker of the U.S. Army has said it the best: "Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and unity of effort."⁴

The Coast Guard needs a doctrine that addresses its national security role, "specialized service" role, and multi-mission capability. Good doctrine provides a common basis of knowledge and understanding that guides an organization's activities to achieve unity of effort. In essence doctrine provides a knowledge base for decision-making to incorporate consistency and balance over the long term. The absence of a codified doctrine on the Coast Guard hinders the Service. Further this doctrine must be extensively communicated to decision and policy makers, both in and out of the Coast Guard.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The Coast Guard's Organizational Structure for National Security

Five different staffs in Coast Guard Headquarters have national security responsibilities. The Coast Guard lacks a central focal point for developing and coordinating an overall Coast Guard national security program. The present matrix organization accommodates budgetary considerations, but not the integration of related functional duties into common staff groupings. The diverse nature of the Coast Guard's duties and the multi-mission characteristic of its forces, perhaps, prevents such a functional arrangement. Despite this practical limitation, the Coast Guard could benefit from an office with a clear charter to advance and integrate Coast Guard national security efforts.

Such a 'Plans and Policy' office could be established by renaming the Office of Readiness and Reserve, and relocating the Reserve portion of this Office to the Office of Personnel, thereby grouping all personnel matters in one place (a Total Force proposal). Additionally, the International Affairs Staff would relocate as an appendage of the Commandant's personal staff to this new Office of Plans and Policies. This new Office would not exercise oversight of Coast Guard operating programs, and it would still do contingency planning, but it would be tasked to provide coordination and integration of the Coast Guard's total national security role.

The Lack of Case Studies on Coast Guard Involvement in National Security

The lack of Coast Guard historical case studies, reports, and interviews on significant events in the Coast Guard is nothing less than appalling. Without a record, the use of Coast Guard forces in national security activities can not be made known to future generations of Coast Guard leaders, much less studied and assessed. The Coast Guard does not have an accurate list of those instances since 1945 when Coast Guard forces played a role supporting U.S. national security objectives.

For example, the use of Coast Guard forces in the 1983 Grenada incident appears to be widely misunderstood. Though some respondents were aware of the request for Coast Guard forces, disagreement exists as to why Coast Guard forces were not employed and apparently recalled. Without historical case studies of the Coast Guard's involvement in national security, these misunderstandings will continue to confuse decision-makers and prevent a better understanding of the Service. Furthermore, few lessons can be learned about the national and service level decision-making associated with using the Coast Guard in a crisis or a contingency without historical assessments.

The Coast Guard can achieve its own capability by standing up a Coast Guard Reserve Operational Assessment/Historical unit, much like the ones in the Army Reserves. This unit would deploy not only to regional contingencies, but also to major incidents such as the massive Valdez oil spill, the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, or the Haitian alien interdiction operation to collect and analyze the role of the Coast Guard.

Executive Summary

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

The suggestion by a few respondents that this Report not provide "any finding or recommendation not explicitly supported by at least a substantial majority of the survey replies" has merit. The Report does not offer any recommendations; only recommendations made by individual respondents are presented.

Recommendation 1

Who from DoD Provides Policy on the Coast Guard's National Security Role - the CNO, the CINCs, or the C'JCS ?

A Coast Guard district commander says that, "Up until now, the starting point for any analysis of the Coast Guard's national security role has been the statutory provision to transfer the Coast Guard to the Navy Department in time of war. It's now time to reconsider that organizational relationship."

In light of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, this Coast Guard district commander is questioning the role of the CNO and the DoN to determine the Coast Guard's national security role. He believes that instead of the CNO acting as a "broker" between the CINCs and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Chairman, JCS should be the go-between. The respondent is suggesting that the Coast Guard become a "specialized service" in DoD, vice the Navy.

He continues that, "The wartime transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy is a concept which was first made law in 1914, more than three decades before the current unified command structure was conceived. The underlying premise is now 45 years out of date: it's no longer the services which define operational tasking and carry out operations; that's the role of the CINC's. Yet, we continue to labor under the assumption that the Coast Guard's wartime tasking needs to be defined or "blessed" by the Navy. It's time for a paradigm shift; we need to re-examine who should determine the Coast Guard's national security role. Only when we have properly identified the "customer" can we properly identify the "product" we should deliver. The broader issue is whether the Coast Guard and DoD should seek a statutory change to give the CINCs first priority in defining the Coast Guard's wartime tasking. Unnecessarily limiting; the exact nature of command relationships can be worked out after we escape the confines of the 1914 law."

A retired Navy admiral who is now a naval analyst on strategic and naval force matters agrees. The issue is no longer what "specialized service" the Coast Guard can perform for the Navy, but whether this concept of specialized service is still valid. The relationship is based on warfighting capability, but national security has broadened to include more emphasis on economic, environmental, diplomatic considerations than the tradition definition of military concerns of national survival.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

This retired admiral writes, "I think it's time to 'deep six' the old thinking of the Coast Guard as part of the Navy in wartime as if it were just another form of reserves with specialized capabilities for use in augmentation. Instead, we should think of the Coast Guard in the broader context of a comprehensive definition of national security for which it has unique missions in both peacetime and wartime. Those missions do not compete with but complement the missions of the U.S. Navy . . . It is time to accept that the Coast Guard has unique national security missions that require unique training and equipment. Those missions are important for U.S. national security in peacetime and when the nation is at war. To think of the Coast Guard as a part of the Navy in wartime in the twenty-first century is to divert its focus from its real national security mission and to reduce its effectiveness. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard are not competitive organizations in national security. They each have unique capabilities and missions."

Recommendation 2 Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role

There were many recommendations to initiate studies to determine the Coast Guard's future national security role. A Navy retired admiral notes that "The assignment of DoD roles and missions to the Coast Guard is an issue that goes far beyond the military capabilities of Coast Guard vessels -- it goes to the heart of the basic relationship between DoD and DoT." Another retired Navy admiral calls for "a top-down review of such trends (national security and geopolitical events) and (for) a hierarchical set of policies (to) replace trying to revise policy-oriented accommodations such as the MDZ as means to define the USCG's future." In amplification this Navy flag officer recommends:

To determine . . . future USCG roles and capabilities . . . a credible analysis of national security policy, regional strategies, threat evolution and technology is needed.

A retired Coast Guard admiral writes that, "I don't mean to be an alarmist but it is possible that the Coast Guard as we know it could disappear. Privatization and user charges make powerful surface arguments for doing away with government agencies like the Coast Guard. It needs to revalidate its *raison d'être* as it moves into its third century of service. A new Roles and Mission Study with input from the DoD, the CINC's, and the Navy is imperative in my opinion."

A flag officer on the Joint Staff writes that, "The Coast Guard and Navy should jointly examine their respective capabilities, identify areas of duplication, and eliminate or consolidate them. This will allow Navy to focus on military operations, and Coast Guard to concentrate on complementary roles . . . port security and safety, search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental expertise, and aids to navigation, as well as a significant role in counterdrug operations. Accordingly, employment of Coast Guard by or with DoD forces should be

Executive Summary

identified throughout the planning process, to include Unified and Specified Commands' submissions to the Joint Staff. This is in fact the case for several current plans and orders." He continues that, "Coast Guard has unique capabilities to offer joint military commanders. These capabilities, like those for DoD Services, can be thought of as "tools in a box" that are employed as situations dictate. Coast Guard should identify those capabilities, maximize them, and in coordination with DOD, be prepared to employ them both here and abroad.

A combatant CINC supports this recommendation for a study by noting that, "The Navy and Coast Guard work together to more clearly define the Coast Guard's national security role . . . Coast Guard forces contributed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by providing port security and assisting in Maritime Interception Operations. This demonstrated that the Coast Guard can have a role in regional conflicts. Since the requirement for Coast Guard participation in such conflicts can be expected to continue into the future" . . . this review is appropriate.

A current assistant secretary of defense also supports a joint review, but at the cabinet level. He writes that, "The Departments of Defense and Transportation jointly determine if significant changes in the Coast Guard's national security role are both needed and possible." He believes this report is "an excellent starting point for such an effort, and a joint DoD/DoT analysis of current Coast Guard roles and missions would be key to making such a determination."

A combatant CINC supports this recommendation. He writes that, "In today's climate of fiscal austerity there is a need for the Departments of Defense and Transportation to jointly determine appropriate command relationships to ensure the proper integration of the Coast Guard's capabilities in future peacetime engagements, regional contingencies, and crisis responses."

The respondents recommend that this study be conducted either as: (1) an internal Coast Guard project, (2) a joint Navy-Coast Guard project, or (3) a cabinet level (DoD/DoT) project.

This recommendation goes to the heart of this research project, i.e., what is the Coast Guard's relationship with the U.S. Navy? In the author's opinion, until this fundamental issue is defined, the Coast Guard's national security role will remain a speculative commodity, subject to continuous interpretations and reevaluations. If the CINCs plan to use Coast Guard forces, then recognition of the Coast Guard's role in national security should be included in JCS/DoD's submissions to Congress. To deny formal mentioning of the Coast Guard on the basis that it is not in DoD and yet realize (and write about) what a unique contribution the Coast Guard makes to national security is inconsistent.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Recommendation 3

Additional Issues for the Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role

Other issues to evaluate by the study into the Coast Guard's future national security role are: (1) funding the Coast Guard's national security role, (2) Congressional oversight, and (3) the Coast Guard's role in security assistance.

In regard to the first two issues, a four star active duty Navy admiral notes that, "Congress must be made to see and support a viable contingency military role for the Coast Guard short of global declared war. Funding, oversight, and inter-departmental issues must be solved." A Coast Guard field commander writes, "The Coast Guard's unique combination of peacetime and wartime capabilities and responsibilities requires joint oversight at the Department and Congressional levels. The NAVGARD Board provides the joint oversight at the Department level. Joint Transportation-Defense Congressional committees would be appropriate."

A combatant CINC comments that, "the Coast Guard's naval diplomacy, nation building, and national security roles should be defined so that these missions can become assigned missions. The ability of the Coast Guard to perform these additional missions will demonstrate not only continuing improvement in the service provided to the American people, but will also serve to reinforce the requirement for continued funding support within the Department of Transportation." Another combatant CINC writes that, "The Coast Guard may also have a larger peacetime role to play (in security assistance). From our experience, it can be seen that the Coast Guard can play an important role in nation building and naval diplomacy. A cooperative effort to define that role - vis a vis that of the Navy - is warranted."

Recommendation 4

The Coast Guard's Command Relationship with DoD

Two active duty Coast Guard admirals suggest changing the Coast Guard's command relationship to the CINCs by making the Coast Guard a either a sub-unified or specified command. This recommendation does not have widespread support by any of the respondents, and probably reflects Coast Guard disaffection that the present arrangement that does not adequately receive CINC input.

A Coast Guard admiral in Headquarters writes that, "I would foresee a great deal of resistance to this idea, since it potentially detracts from peacetime missions, subjugates the Coast Guard to DoD during peacetime, and possibly injects inter-service competition between the Navy and Coast Guard." A retired Coast Guard admiral with long experience in this area notes that, "I concur with the basic recommendation that something must be done in this area. But, I believe that it would be a mistake for the Coast Guard to become a part of the CINCs organization. I fear that it might jeopardize the unique relationship of the Coast Guard - its white cutters can do things that a gray ship can not do. The Coast Guard is different and should remain so."

Executive Summary

A four star Navy admiral writes that, "Under no circumstances should the Coast Guard venture into the Joint Arena without Navy sponsorship/support." A combatant CINC agrees. He writes that, "Having DoD and DoT jointly determine the USCG role appears to have merit. However, making the USCG a sub-unified command would have no apparent value/added impact on operations."

A flag officer on the Joint Staff believes that the legislative and executive branches can best address the Coast Guard's command relationship. He adds that, "As we progress into the decade of the 1990s and beyond, the concept of Total Force Policy will be central to the operations of our Armed Forces. Our response to developing regional crises will consist of a variety of measured responses, some of which may include Coast Guard forces and resources. As demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a declaration of war need not precede the employment of Coast Guard forces in roles other than those traditionally assigned. The President may employ the Coast Guard in response to a crisis whenever he feels it is in the best interest of national security. Recognizing this fact, the Coast Guard is involved in virtually every major military exercise conducted by the Joint Staff. We are applying the lessons learned from these exercises and are constantly improving and defining the relationships between the Coast Guard and the Services. Falling under the Department of Transportation jurisdiction allows the Coast Guard to perform many missions which would require extensive legislation or Presidential action if it were under the Department of Defense. The current command relationships allow the National Command Authority significant flexibility in dealing with developing crises."

A second flag officer on the Joint Staff notes that, "The Coast Guard's current command relationship, when properly exercised, appears adequate. However, in most multi-organizational operations where Coast Guard is or has been involved, no lead agency has been designated. This results in parallel chain-of-command with no one in charge. Thus, it is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure clear command relationships are established during inter-agency operations."

Author's Conclusion

The Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement, maritime environmental, safety, and political-military functions will continue to support significantly the national security of the United States in the Twenty-First Century. Requirements for a U.S. Coast Guard will continue; there will be many opportunities for the Coast Guard to demonstrate its important contributions to national security. There will also be dangers to the Coast Guard's continued existence in its present form.

There will be no justification for the Coast Guard's large cutters, medium and high endurance, to retain combat systems, sensors and weapons. Coastal defenses requirements for the CONUS-based MDZ commands will not generate the need for combat systems for these cutters, or justify

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

the present personnel levels for the Coast Guard Reserve program. Furthermore, the Navy may not expect these forces to deploy to a regional conflict on short notice. The Coast Guard's patrol boats have utility in regional conflicts as coastal patrol and interdiction assets. If the Navy decides that it has no requirement to deploy them to such a conflict, these cutters too will have no need for combat systems. The only requirement for a weapon system will be law enforcement duties (deterrence and disabling fire) and low-order confrontations with other nation-states. Basically Coast Guard cutters will become a family of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and possibly lose their naval auxiliary status.

With the end of the Cold War, the calculus for justifying the Coast Guard's current military capability has dramatically changed. The Coast Guard may be in the process of losing its military capability, and without that status it will inadvertently position itself to become a civilian agency. The Coast Guard needs to maintain some level of military utility because its status as an Armed Force underwrites its unique ability to conduct a wide range of disparate missions in both the domestic and national security arenas. Without it the Coast Guard becomes another domestic agency and lose its multi-mission flexibility, and may even lose more.

If the Coast Guard does not provide a needed military capability and does not need to deploy its platforms to regional contingencies, it need not subject its personnel to the requirements of world-wide military assignment. It should be able to provide longer tours with increased geographical stability and greater skill specialization of its personnel. And if this occurs, it could well become subject to efforts to transition from a military service to a uniform, civil service to reduce the high personnel costs associated with military retirements, medical, permanent change of station moves, and benefits. A civil service force may have overtime costs, but it does not have 20 year retirements, frequent transfers, and an expensive personnel support infrastructure. Today many emergency organizations - police, fire, and ambulance - along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Maritime Administration (MARAD), National Oceanic Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), and U.S. Customs Service, successfully provide similar type functions as the Coast Guard without being a military service.

Despite the change in the national security landscape, there are national security requirements and valid military needs that the Coast Guard can fulfill in the next century. The Coast Guard, in addition to its traditional functions, can:

- (1) Support some coastal and riverine regional requirements for a naval warfare capability (coastal forces for maritime interdiction and surveillance). For example, the Coast Guard can deploy on short notice 8 *ISLAND* Class Patrol Boats along with a *HAMILTON/HERO* Class WHEC to act as the force/support commander.

Executive Summary

- (2) Provide a U.S. "naval" presence in the Caribbean and Latin America to support forward deployments by a smaller sized U.S. Navy.
- (3) Increase its security assistance training to international navies for alliance strengthening. The Coast Guard has more in common - force mix and missions - with the majority of the world's navies than the U.S. Navy.
- (4) Support reconstitution and regeneration of naval forces (e.g., ASW cutters, long range surveillance aircraft, over-water combat search and rescue, and mine counter-measure vessels.) The key is to provide space and weight reservations for modular combat systems. Examples:
 - o Retrofit a mine counter-measure capability (MCM) (space and weight to operate remote control MCM submersibles) to its new fleet of 38 coastal and ocean-going buoy tenders to offset the cancellation of the Navy's Craft of Opportunity (COOP) MCM program.
 - o Retrofit a naval coastal warfare capability (space and weight) to its new class of patrol boats to replace the 82 Foot *POINT* Class.
- (5) Expand the range of Flexible Deterrent Options available to the CINCs by using the Coast Guard's unique mission capabilities and force mix and by exploiting the advantages of its non-threatening, humanitarian image.

In summary the dangers the Coast Guard faces are not insignificant. The Coast Guard needs to articulate its national security in clear, rational themes, define an acceptable level of military capability, and communicate this role to the American public, the Administration, and Congress. The recommendation by some of the respondents for a new "Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role" is timely. A cabinet-level study is urgently needed.

Chapter One

Introduction



Figure 2: Coast Guard-Navy Conduct Joint Operations for Counter Narcotics Purposes. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

Introduction

Section I The Study

The purpose of this research project is to help stimulate debate and to further study on the Coast Guard's national security role in the Twenty-First Century. It is based on the premise that the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the planned reductions in the Defense budget have major implications for the U.S. Coast Guard. This report tries to determine what the Coast Guard's national security role should be in response to these emerging realities.

The report uses interviews as the primary source of information to assess this response. Over a nine month period the author surveyed Navy and Coast Guard flag officers, senior civilian policy-makers, and naval analysts at various centers for advanced strategic studies. These surveys consisted of two phases. In the spring and early summer of 1991 the participants completed a questionnaire on the Coast Guard's relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) and future national security missions. The author analyzed the responses and prepared a draft report. During the second phase the participants commented on the draft report from late fall 1991 to winter 1992. The respondents provided further areas of study, additional comments, and critiques of the draft report. In the spring of 1992 the author incorporated those responses into the final report.

Survey Questionnaire

A survey questionnaire is the primary source of information for this research because data sources in the literature or elsewhere are limited. Few official U.S. policy papers currently exist to help define the Coast Guard's role in national security. National directives do not present a comprehensive interpretation of the Coast Guard's statutory duty under Title 14 U.S. Code 2. This Federal statute directs the Coast Guard in part to "maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities." No authoritative definition of "specialized service" exists. The few directives available, such as the National Military Strategy, lack sufficient guidance on the Coast Guard's duties and functions.

Survey Participants

This questionnaire was sent to Navy and Coast Guard flag officers, both active and retired, and to current and former civilians at the assistant secretary level and above in the Departments of Defense (DoD), Transportation (DoT), and Navy (DoN). Additionally, the survey was sent to highly respected civilian naval analysts at various centers for strategic studies. All respondents were chosen for the insight into national-level issues that they could provide to this research. In the fall of 1992 the draft report was sent for review and comment to the same persons who

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

has received the questionnaire as well some additional individuals who had not participated in the initial survey.

Numbers and Composition

For both events the participants were assigned to one of the following groups: (1) Coast Guard active duty admirals, (2) Coast Guard retired admirals, (3) Navy active duty admirals, (4) Navy retired admirals, (5) current Commanders-in-Chief of U.S. Unified Commands, and (6) current and retired civilian DoD, DoN, and DoT senior level policy and decision makers, civilian naval analysts, and selected retired Navy and Coast Guard captains. The captains were selected because their active duty assignments, usually working directly for flag officers, involved them with the questions raised in this study. These six groups are referred to by their description, e.g., Navy active duty admirals. However, the sixth group, because it is composed of three different sub-groups, is referred to as the "decision maker and naval analyst" group.

Figure 3 shows the number of responses per group per mailing to the survey questionnaire in the spring of 1991 and to the draft report for additional comments in the winter of 1992. With the exception of the U.S. Navy active duty admirals group, all other groups have fairly good representation, especially the U.S. Unified Commanders. The U.S. Navy active duty admirals group does improve its representation in the second phase of this study, when two full admirals provide comment on the draft report. Figure 4 depicts the composition of the groups.

Introduction

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS

Event	Survey Questionnaire Spring 1991	Additional Comments Winter 1991
Group		
1. U.S. Coast Guard Active Duty Admirals	10 out of 20	9 out of 23
2. U.S. Coast Guard Retired Admirals	8 out of 15	6 out of 16
3. U.S. Navy Active Duty Admirals	3 out of 16	4 out of 19
4. U.S. Navy Retired Admirals	8 out of 17	4 out of 20
5. U.S. Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs) and Joint Staff (Winter 1992)	4 out of 6	5 out of 7 (CINCs) 2 out of 2 (Joint Staff)
6. Decision Makers & Naval Analysts	18 out of 40	10 out of 48
Totals	51 out of 114	40 out of 135

Figure 3: Number of Respondents.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Composition Group	Survey Questionnaire Spring 1991	Additional Comments Winter 1991
1. U.S. Coast Guard Active Duty Admirals	8 District and Area Commanders 2 Headquarters Office Chiefs	6 District and Area Commanders 3 Headquarters Office Chiefs
2. U.S. Coast Guard Retired Admirals	2 Former Commandants 1 Former Vice Commandant 3 Former Area Commanders 1 Former District Commander 1 Retired Reserve	2 Former Commandants 1 Former Area Commanders 3 Former District Commanders
3. U.S. Navy Active Duty Admirals	1 OPNAV Flag 1 Flag with MDZ Duties 1 Reserve Flag	1 OPNAV Flag 2 Full Admirals 1 Operational Flag
4. U.S. Navy Retired Admirals	2 Former CNOs 1 Former VCNO 2 CINCPACs 3 OPNAV VADM's	1 Former CNO 2 OPNAV VADM's 1 OPNAV RADM
5. U.S. Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs) and Joint Staff (Winter 1992)	4 U.S. Unified Combatant CINCs	5 U.S. Unified Combatant CINCs 2 Joint Staff Flags
6. Decision Makers & Naval Analysts*	1 Former SECNAV 1 Asst Sec DoD 9 Analysts 2 Senior Aides DoT 4 Retired Captains 1 Senior CG Civilian	1 Former SECTRANS 1 Asst Sec DoD 4 Analysts 1 Naval Historian 3 Retired Captains
Totals	51	40

Figure 4: Composition of the Respondents.

Introduction

Section II Study Methodology

The First Phase - Survey of the Participants

The survey questionnaire contains seven questions designed to collect information concerning key issues related to the Coast Guard's role as a "specialized service" in the twenty-first century. One question asks if there is still a valid need for the Navy's MDZ commands in the post Cold War era. Another addresses DoD's maritime capability for regional wars and low intensity conflicts. A third question inquires about using the Coast Guard as DoD's platform manager for coastal patrol boats. A follow-on question wonders if the non-use of active duty Coast Guard cutters in recent contingency operations undermined the rationale for providing the Coast Guard a military capability for a national security role. The fifth question explores DoD's role in Coast Guard programmatic decisions for replacement platforms and asks if DoD should include Coast Guard assets when testifying before DoD Congressional oversight committees. A sixth question asks about the present mechanism for determining joint policy between the Navy and Coast Guard. The final question delves into the relationship between the Unified Commands and the Coast Guard. (Appendix A lists the questions contained in the survey questionnaire.)

The Survey Questionnaire: Advantages and Disadvantages

This method of research has several advantages. In the absence of a codified body of policies and literature on the Coast Guard's role in national security, senior decision and policy makers become the primary source for research into this subject. Short of personal interviews, there are few practical ways to collect information from these people. Furthermore their replies are for non-attribution and are closely held to promote candid and frank responses.

The survey questionnaire also has some disadvantages. Were the right questions asked? During the process of developing the composite responses, critical information could be misstated, generalizations could become too sweeping, or views could be omitted. As the reader knows, selective use of quotations can be used to support any point of view. Finally, subjective judgment or preconceived positions could influence the writing of the composite replies. It is hoped that the conscious steps taken to recognize these pitfalls and the editorial review procedures employed have eliminated these biases to the maximum extent possible.

Three analysts at an institute for advanced studies are skeptical about relying on anonymous responses. One recognizes that the survey is probably appropriate given the sensitivity of the issues. But, all are troubled by the small sample sizes, the "subjective judgments inherent in developing the composite replies, and the lack of an analytical or statistical cross-check on the validity of the individual findings." The sample is limited. However, it is not intended as a

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

public opinion pool to draw inferences as to what its population believes. Rather it is to surface ideas and different points of view.

In retrospect and with the benefit of closer examination of the issues raised in this study, it is clear that the survey focused upon too narrow a definition of national security. The questionnaire centered more upon national defense matters involving the Coast Guard than the much broader definition of national security that includes diplomatic, political, and economic considerations, as well as military. The focus on national defense in the questions resulted from attempting to gather data on what "specialized service" means.




Figure 5: The Dangerous Deck of a Coast Guard Buoy Tender at Work.

A former CNO believes that this is a "significant failing that can distort the report's utility rather substantially . . . (since) the bulk of the Coast Guard operational requirement is dedicated to peacetime activities in support of other national interests." He is concerned that the responses do not reflect the day-to-day national security tasks confronted by the Coast Guard, though he acknowledges that the "project itself is directed quite explicitly" at this more narrow national security role.

Introduction

He is correct in his assessment; yet this national defense focus inherent in the questionnaire does not make the report any less useful. Despite the thrust of the questions, the respondents provide a large amount of information that can be applied to the full range of Coast Guard's national security missions. (This former CNO also writes that "The report is certainly interesting and brings out all of the relevant issues I ever confronted working with the U.S. Coast Guard.")

The Responses

The responses by the participants were put into the appropriate group and a composite response for that group was determined for each of the seven questions. Once the composite replies were completed, each question now had six separate responses, one from each of the six separate groups. These six responses for each question were, in turn, made into one overall composite response per question that reflected the combined input of the six groups of respondents. It is important to note that these composite replies do not reflect consensus of opinion, but a distillation or a precis of the large amount of information and opinion submitted in the two phases of this study. The composite replies attempt to reflect the range, scope, and the most important aspects of these responses into a manageable whole to bound and frame issues about the Coast Guard. Furthermore, it is not the author's intention that the composite reply of each group should be construed as representing the opinions of that group (community) as a whole. In some instances the members of a group express similar opinions, and in others hold a wide range of views.

The Second Phase - Participants Review the Draft Report

In a crude approximation of the Delphi methodology, the composite replies were distributed to the original participants and additional persons for review. The review comments provided more information, beneficial critiques, and a validity check about the range of opinions on the issues. This second phase was necessary also to include the significant events that had occurred since the respondents answered the questionnaire in the spring and summer of 1991. Major geopolitical events had occurred, but none more profound than the collapse of the Soviet empire. Additionally there were developments within the Navy and Coast Guard that influenced the first set of replies. Perhaps, in response to the end of the Cold War, the Coast Guard and Navy service chiefs, after the December 1991 meeting of the Navy-Coast Guard (NAVGAARD) Board, recommended reductions in the number of Maritime Defense Zone commands in the Atlantic Fleet Commander's area of responsibility. They also approved a recommendation to revisit the need for MDZ in two years time. The second iteration of this research was needed to account for these events. The comments from the draft report were incorporated into the study during the winter and spring of 1992.

Section III

Organization of the Study

This study is organized as follows. The introductory chapter discusses the study's purpose, the survey questions, respondent group composition, and methodology of research. The second chapter is a discussion of the national level directives and the statutory authorities of the Coast Guard's national security role. Chapter Three is a fully developed discussion on the Coast Guard's future national security missions based on the responses to the survey questionnaire. Next comes a chapter on the Coast Guard's relationship to the Department of Defense, again based on the responses. Chapters Three and Four do not refer to the responses by their question number, but incorporate the responses into thematic discussions. These two chapters are divided into sections, and after a discussion of the composite replies, the author comments with his assessment. Chapter Five and Six present the author's central and significant findings from the responses respectively. The responses contain recurring themes that influence or drive the Coast Guard-Navy relationship or affect the Coast Guard's national security role. Chapter Seven provides a list of recommendations concerning future courses of action that the respondents include in their replies or comments. The final chapter presents the author's conclusion.



Figure 6: Coast Guard Utility Boat Fighting a Port Chemical Fire.

Chapter Two

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives of the U.S. Coast Guard



Figure 7: Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Overflies Utility Boats.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

This chapter discusses the federal statutes and national directives that assign duties and responsibilities to the Coast Guard. It also provides a framework for assessing the Coast Guard's role in national security along with definitions of basic national security terms. The Coast Guard's role in national security is placed in context against an overview of the *U.S. National Security Strategy* and *National Military Strategy*.



Figure 8: On Patrol: Coast Guard 41 Foot Utility Boats.

Section I
Statutory Authorities and Coast Guard
Mission Areas and Functions

Congress established the United States Coast Guard in 1915. It is the functional successor to the Revenue Marine established in 1790 as a federal maritime agency responsible for the enforcement of customs laws. The Coast Guard was transferred from the Treasury to the Department of Transportation (DoT) in 1967, and its normal operations are presently conducted in that Department.

The Coast Guard has a lengthy list of statutory authorities that oblige the Service to conduct diverse duties. It derives many of its functions from Title 14 U.S.C. Under this Title the Coast Guard is a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times, not just in wartime or when the President directs. 14 U.S.C. 2 states in part that the Coast Guard on the high seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction (in some cases under and above these waters) shall:

- o "enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable Federal laws . . . ;"
- o "administer laws and promulgate and enforce regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property . . . covering all matters not specifically delegated by law to some other executive department;"
- o "develop, establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety . . . ;"
- o "pursuant to international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States;"
- o "maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities."

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

Under Section 3 of Title 14 the Coast Guard's relationship to the Navy Department is modified to allow the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy upon the declaration of war or when the President directs.

Essentially, the Coast Guard provides the nation a capability for conducting federal maritime services. It is the only Armed Force located in DoT, and, unlike the other four Armed Forces, 'defense of the homeland' is not the Coast Guard's primary *raison d'être*. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission agency with four broad, general mission areas in the maritime arena:

- (1) Safety.
- (2) Law enforcement.
- (3) Environmental protection.
- (4) Political-military.

Each of the four mission area is composed of several functions or operating programs. These mission areas do not have sharp, clear-cut separations. Some of the functions benefit more than one mission area, such as the Coast Guard's port safety and security function. This function supports three mission areas: safety, environmental protection, and political-military. The Port Safety and Security function is representative of an enduring Coast Guard quality. Versatile, multi-mission Coast Guard resources perform more than one function, and therefore to alter one function affects the other functions in both obvious and unseen ways much like a Rubick's Cube, such as portrayed on the cover of this report.

This relationship makes analysis of the Coast Guard's duties not as easy as one might think. The classic example of this complex relationship is the Coast Guard's buoy tenders. These ships are misnamed; they should be classified multi-mission cutters. Besides setting buoys for the safe navigation of mariners, these cutters deploy oil containment booms, break ice for domestic maritime traffic, conduct naval warfare, as well as search and rescue, and law enforcement. They provide a full range of federal maritime services, both in the domestic arena and in the national security arena. Figures 9 through 14 depict this versatile multi-mission capability; a capability that comes only from the effective integration of various functions into a synergistic whole. Though the buoy tenders are perhaps the best model for this Coast Guard comparative advantage - flexible resources for a wide mix of missions - all Coast Guard forces have this unique Service characteristic.




Figure 9: Coast Guard Multi-Mission Buoy Tender: One Cutter - Six Missions.



Figure 10: First Mission: Aids to Navigation.



Figure 11: Second Mission: Domestic Ice Breaking.




Figure 12: Third Mission: Environmental Response - Deploying Oil Spill Containment Boom.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century



Figure 13: Fourth Mission: Naval Warfare - Laying Practice Mines.




Figure 14: Fifth and Sixth Missions: Law Enforcement and Search and Rescue - Small Boat from Buoy Tenders Used for Boardings and Assistance.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

Despite its small size relative to the other Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is a complex organization that has many facets and can be approached from many different perspectives. For the purposes of this study Figure 15 shows one convention for arranging the Coast Guard mission areas and functions that are discussed below.




Figure 15: Coast Guard Mission Areas and Functions.

National Maritime Safety Mission Area and Functions

In the early nineteenth century, Federal marine safety efforts focused on developing aids-to-navigation systems (fixed devices such as light houses) and assisting mariners in distress. In view of the current Administration's emphasis on voluntarism, the latter capability was ahead of its time since it depended on volunteers for many years (such as the Massachusetts Humane Society). Over the years, the maritime safety emphasis expanded to include mishap prevention by enactment and enforcement of safety regulations. Today the Coast Guard maintains a wide variety of function to promote a safe, viable national marine transportation system. The principal functions of this mission area are:

- o Aids to Navigation.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o Recreational Boating Safety.
- o Commercial Vessel Safety.
- o Search and Rescue.
- o Waterways Management.
- o Domestic Ice Operations.
- o Port Safety and Security.



Figure 16: Maritime Safety: Rescue Swimmer from a Coast Guard 44 Motor Lifeboat in Action.

The Coast Guard maintains a system of rescue vessels, aircraft and communications facilities to carry out its function of saving life and property. Maritime and aviation transportation require continuous navigation services. The Coast Guard operates the U.S. national maritime aids to navigation system which includes lighthouses, buoys, beacons, fog signals, marine radiobeacons, and long-range radionavigation aids (including LORAN-C and Omega). General statutory

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

authority for the maritime safety mission area is set forth in Title 14 and additionally in Titles 33 and 46 of the U.S. Code. Under these authorities the Coast Guard:

- o Responds to calls for assistance throughout the maritime regions.
- o Reduces the loss of life and property through boating safety and other programs.
- o Operates marine aids to navigation and vessel traffic management systems.



Figure 17: Maritime Safety: Coast Guard Marine Inspector Examines Construction of a New Ship.

- o Acts as the lead agency representing the U.S. at the U.N.'s International Maritime Organization (IMO) and other international maritime forums.
- o Regulates construction of commercial and recreational vessels and offshore marine platforms.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o Regulates operation of commercial vessels engaged in U.S. trade.
- o Promotes the safe transportation of petroleum and other hazardous materials.
- o Operates the nation's domestic icebreakers.

National Maritime Law Enforcement Mission Area and Functions

As the primary maritime law enforcement agency for the United States, the Coast Guard enforces or assists in the enforcement of applicable Federal laws and treaties and other international agreements. The Coast Guard enforces all federal laws on the high seas and waters under U.S. jurisdiction.



Figure 18: Maritime Law Enforcement: Coast Guard Fisheries Boarding Team at Work.

The principal functions of this mission area are to:

- o Interdict smugglers moving drugs, illegal aliens, and contraband into the U.S.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

- o Enforce Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) relating to fisheries and other resources out to 200 miles at sea.
- o Inspect domestic and foreign fishing vessels to ensure compliance with U.S. law.
- o Assist other law enforcement agencies.



Figure 19: Maritime Law Enforcement: Coast Guard Boat Crew Approaches Aliens Migrating to the U.S.

The Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement role traces its roots to its inception as the Revenue Marine in 1790. General statutory authority for the Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement program is set forth in Title 14. There are also various Executive Orders that generate responsibilities, such as dealing with the interdiction of undocumented Haitian aliens. Besides Executive Orders, a few National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) bear on the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has the authority to board any vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction to make inspections, searches, inquiries, and arrests. This is an extremely powerful police authority that the Coast Guard employs with prudence. Protection of marine resources comes primarily from the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) of 1976. Additionally the Coast Guard enforces many international fisheries agreements involving the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

U.S., such as the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific. Today, the Coast Guard's maritime interdiction of illegal drugs is recognized as a national security task.



Figure 20: Maritime Law Enforcement: Coast Guard Personnel Inspect Seized Cocaine.

National Maritime Environmental Mission Area and Functions

The Coast Guard's role in the marine environment and resource protection dates from the 1820s. Today, this mission area receives much attention because of increasing national and global interest in the environment. There is growing concern over ocean dumping of solid and medical waste, coastal and riverine pollution, as well as oil spills such as the Exxon Valdez incident. Protecting the American environment has a prominent place on the national agenda. Figure 21 shows oil spills occurring in the North American hemisphere since 1976.

The principal basis for the Coast Guard's maritime environmental mission area are: (1) Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, (2) Federal Water Pollution Control Act, (3) Clean Water Act of 1977, and (4) Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). Collectively these Acts, among other things, direct the Coast Guard to prevent marine pollution, respond to polluting discharges, and assess penalties. OPA-90 is perhaps the single biggest Congressional mandate ever given to the




Figure 21: Maritime Environmental: Major Oil Spills in North America Since 1974.

Coast Guard. It includes approximately 50 tasks for the Coast Guard such as new regulations for oil tanker double hulls and drug and alcohol use by merchant mariners, vessel traffic systems (VTSS) upgrades, and expanded national pollution response teams.

Under these authorities the U.S. Coast Guard protects the marine environment by:

- o Preventing the discharge of oil, chemicals, and other hazardous materials into the marine environment.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o Ensuring the quick, effective detection and cleanup of discharges which do occur.
- o Regulating shoreside and offshore material handling facilities.
- o Coordinating spill response and cleanup operations.
- o Representing U.S. interests at national and international forums on the marine environment.



Figure 22: Maritime Environmental: Vice President Quayle Inspects Clean-up Efforts at the Valdez Oil Spill with the Coast Guard Officers.

Portions of the Coast Guard's port safety and security function also address the Service's environmental responsibilities by focusing upon the prevention of accidents through inspections and regulatory means. The port safety and security function was not derived as a result of environmental legislature, but from the catastrophic explosion of an ammunition ship in Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia, in 1917. U.S. authorities did not want a second Halifax accident in an American munitions port. The Espionage Act of 1917 (50 U.S.C. 191) which Congress had enacted in June of 1917 shifted responsibility for anchorage regulations and vessel movements

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

in a port from the Corps of Engineers to the Coast Guard. Using this law as the basis to prevent a Halifax-type disaster in the U.S., the Coast Guard was directed to assign officers to serve as captains of the port (COTP) to oversee anchorages, explosive handling, and vessel movements.¹

From this wartime emergency, Coast Guard port duties have grown today to include many additional responsibilities that cover both safety and security beyond the confines of ports. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 codified the original port duties to the Coast Guard and obliged the service to prevent damage, destruction, or loss of any vessel or structure in or adjacent to U.S. navigable waters. The Port And Tanker Safety Act of 1978 broadened the COTP's authority from the port to include the U.S. 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone and gave the Coast Guard oversight of the transportation of bulk cargoes. Another important piece of legislation is the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975 which made the Coast Guard responsible for the safe transportation of hazardous cargoes through port areas. By addressing the requirements for the safe operation of ports, facilities, and vessels, the port safety and security function also protects the U.S. maritime environment. Title 14 U.S.C. was modified to become the basic authority for the portion of the port safety and security function involved with the prevention of sabotage.



Figure 23: Maritime Environmental: Coast Guard National Pollution Strike Team Member Directs Deployment of an Oil Spill Containment Boom.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

National Political-Military Mission Area and Functions

The Coast Guard currently conducts no military operations as a single service, but does have operating forces participating in naval, joint, and combined operations. As required by Title 14, the Coast Guard maintains a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war and has command responsibilities for the MDZ. MDZ commands belong to the U.S. Navy. They are third echelon commands headed by the Coast Guard Pacific and Atlantic Area Commanders, who report to the Commanders of the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets respectively. These commands are principally concerned with naval threats to the U.S. coast and ports; as such, they concentrate on port security, harbor defense, and coastal warfare. In addition to MDZ command responsibilities, Coast Guard forces can perform a range of naval warfare duties for the Navy, for example: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), convoy escort, search and rescue, salvage, surveillance and interdiction, and aids to navigation.




Figure 24: Political-Military: Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Provides U.S. Presence at the Poles.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

The Coast Guard operates the nation's polar icebreakers to project U.S. national presence and protect national interests in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The polar vessels also support the research requirements of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and DoD's requirement for resupply of their facilities in the polar regions.

As mentioned, the Coast Guard's port safety and port security function overlaps into three mission areas: maritime safety, maritime environmental protection, and political-military. Under the political-military mission area, Coast Guard port safety and security units plan and coordinate emergency port preparedness functions. Port safety and security functions also include supervising cargo transfer operations, both storage and stowage, boarding of Special Interest Vessels, conducting harbor patrols and waterfront facility inspections, establishing security zones as required, and the control of vessel movement, including the operation of vessel traffic services. In contingencies COTPs assure the safety and waterside security of ships in military deployments from strategic seaports. The Coast Guard also plans for maritime terrorist incidents, as the initial agency on scene to contain and stabilize the incident, and then to support the lead Federal agency, either the FBI or DoD.

Due to the Coast Guard's humanitarian image and less threatening military presence, the service has supported the nation's foreign policy goals and protected national interests in a number of instances. Small navy security assistance, crisis response, and humanitarian aid are examples of using the Coast Guard's singular capabilities to attain national objectives. Figures 25 through 27 depict recent instances of the unique advantages and skills of Coast Guard forces.



Figure 25: Political-Military: Coast Guard Security Assistance Training - Majority of World's Navies Resemble Coast Guard in Force Structure and Mission Mix.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 26: Political-Military: Coast Guard Forces Used Extensively in Crisis Response to Haitian Coup of December 1990.




Figure 27. Political-Military: Coast Guard Crisis Response and Humanitarian Assistance in Korean Airline KAL 007 Shoot-Down.

Section II National Security Strategy of the United States

National security is a collective term that historically has encompassed only the national defense and foreign relations concerns of a nation. Today that is no longer the case. Kaufman, McKittrick, and Leney in their book, *U.S. National Security - A Framework for Analysis*, discuss the lack of an accepted definition on national security. They write:

In spite of its wide usage, national security is a term that is ambiguous and thus has come to mean different things to different people. Traditionally national security has been defined as protection from external attack; consequently it has been viewed primarily in terms of military defenses against military threats. This view has proved to be too narrow, however; national security involves more than the procurement and application of military forces. Furthermore, such a view can delude one into believing that the way to increase security is merely to increase military power. Although military power is a very important component of security, it is only one facet

Today a much broader definition of national security is needed, one that includes economic, diplomatic, and social dimensions, in addition to the military dimension. Arnold Wolfers gives such a description: '*Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.*' An analysis of this definition reveals important ideas that serve as a backdrop for the study of national security policy. (Author's italics.)

First, although security is directly related to values, it is not a value in its own right. It is a condition that allows a nation to maintain its values. Actions that make a nation a more secure yet degrade its values are of little utility. Second, it is extremely difficult to measure security in any objective fashion. Therefore security becomes an evaluation based on perception of not only strengths and weaknesses but also the capabilities and intentions of perceived threats. Uncertainty about the true level of threat leads us to plan for the worst case, due to the drastic consequences of a security failure. Even if perceptions are accurate, security defies absolute measurement because it is a relative condition. We measure security relative to existing and potential threats, and since we cannot achieve absolute security against all possible threats, we must determine what levels of insecurity are acceptable. Last, it is important to realize that national security is not a static condition that exists in a vacuum. It is determined

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

in the context of both the international and domestic environments, both of which are changing constantly.²

National security does have a much broader meaning. The condition of a nation's citizens and their well-being is a national security matter. We live in an age when almost all activities of a nation, besides its traditional military and diplomatic efforts, affect not only its adjacent neighbors, but the global community of nations. We have become globally interconnected over a wide range of matters that affect the well-being of the citizens in a nation state.

Mass migration from the nations of the southern hemisphere into the more economically developed nations of the northern hemisphere affects the well-being of the developed nations and is a growing national security concern. The interconnected global economy, along with the modern international corporation, has greatly increased its influence in shaping the well-being of countries spread across several continents and separated by ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. World-wide environmental issues such as global warming, resource exploitation, and ocean pollution, also affect the well-being of countries in ways never considered. Illicit drug production and smuggling have global implications as do health issues like AIDS to the well-being of a country. Though many of the world's countries still consider national survival as their primary and in some cases only national security concern, the nations of the West have a more comprehensive definition that addresses a wider range of political, economic, and social interests.

Strategy relates means to ends. At the national level, national interests or basic goals are the "ends" and the instruments of national power (economic, political, diplomatic, and military) are the "means". National interests determine national objectives and, in turn, drive national strategy; they are "the most important wants and needs of a nation."³ Professor Richmond Lloyd of the Naval War College writes:

The overriding national interests are normally stated in terms of national survival and well-being. Preservation of our territorial integrity, freedom, independence, political institutions and honor are fundamental to our survival as a nation. Maintenance of the economic well-being and overall quality of life of the American people are also important national interests. Another national interest is the survival of our allies. We are a nation whose national survival is inextricably linked to that of our allies by historic, political, economic and cultural ties.⁴

The broad, enduring national security interests and objectives, articulated by the President in his *National Security Strategy of the United States* provide a basis for defining national security. In this document President Bush states the U.S. national interests:

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

- (1) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
- (2) A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
- (3) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
- (4) A stable and secure world, where political and economical freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish.⁵

NATIONAL INTEREST MATRIX				
INTENSITY OF INTEREST				
BASIC INTEREST AT STAKE	SURVIVAL	VITAL	MAJOR	PERIPHERAL
DEFENSE OF HOMELAND				
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING				
FAVORABLE WORLD ORDER				
PROMOTION OF VALUES				

Figure 2d: Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

According to Donald Neuchterlein, some national interests are more important and can be distinguished from the others by his model shown in Figure 28. Neuchterlein's framework also shows that different national interests are responsive to different national security instruments.⁶ Neuchterlein categorizes national interests into four broad groupings with an approximate descending order of importance: (1) defense of the homeland; (2) economic well-being; (3) favorable world order; and (4) promotion of values. He ranks the "intensity" of each interest according to a range of values from high to low: (1) survival, (2) vital, (3) major, and (4) peripheral. Intensity measures the importance of each interest to the U.S.

He defines national survival when the "physical existence of a country is in jeopardy due to attack or threat of attack. Clearly, this is the most basic interest the state has. If a state cannot survive, no other interest matters." Vital interests "are circumstances when serious harm to the nation would result unless strong measures, including the use of force, are employed to protect the interest." Examples are the re-emergence of an imperialist Soviet-style Russia threatening America's NATO allies and a resurgent Iran or Iraq threatening U.S. access to energy resources in the Middle East.⁷ Both Neuchterlein and Lloyd believe that, "A vital interest means it is so important that the nation is willing to use military force to guarantee it, although force may not be necessary if other available means are more appropriate and effective."⁸ Essentially a vital interest is one which the nation is unwilling to compromise.




Figure 29: U.S. National Security Objectives.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

Major interests "are situations where a country's political, economic, or social well-being may be adversely affected but where the use of armed force is not deemed necessary to avoid adverse outcomes." The final category is peripheral interests, "which are situations where some national interest is involved but where the nation as a whole is not particularly affected by any given outcome."⁹

The Coast Guard tends not to be focused on survival interests of the Nation, but directly supports interests that are major and peripheral to the economic, social, and environmental well-being of the nation.

National interests generate national objectives. "Whereas national interests define the basic, non-negotiable needs of a nation, national objectives 'spell out what a country is trying to do.' National objectives are the specific goals that a nation seeks in order to advance, support or defend its national interest. They are generally described in three broad categories - economic, security, political-diplomatic) - although other categories such as social, ideological, technological, (or environmental) are also used."¹⁰

President Bush, besides stating national interests, also provides national objectives in his *National Security Strategy*. The national objectives that directly relate to the Coast Guard include the following.

- (1) The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.
 - o Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States its allies and - should deterrence fail - repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies. (Coast Guard has only a supporting or contributing role.)
 - o Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism. (Coast Guard has only a supporting or contributing role.)
 - o Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- (2) A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad.
 - o Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space.
 - o Achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all.
- (3) Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
 - o Strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress.
- (4) A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.
 - o Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes. (Coast Guard has only a supporting or contributing role.)
 - o Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking.¹¹

As mentioned above strategy relates means to ends. In his *National Security Strategy*, President Bush summarizes three broad, integrated strategies -political, economic, and military - to achieve the national objectives, or national goals. The political strategy has three components that directly relate to the Coast Guard: (1) Economic and Security Assistance, (2) Illicit Drugs, and (3) Immigrants and Refugees. The economic strategy has two components that relate to the Coast Guard: (1) Energy (when discussing the need to limit the harmful effects of the transportation of oil products) and (2) The Environment. The military strategy has four components, or "foundations", three of which the Coast Guard supports: (1) Forward Presence, (2) Crisis Response, and (3) Reconstitution.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives




Figure 30: Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Lands on BEAR Class Medium Endurance Cutter.

According to John Collins of the Congressional Research Service a successful national strategy "fuse(s) all the powers of a nation, during peace as well as war, to attain national interests and objectives. Within that context, there is an overall political strategy, which addresses both international and internal issues; an economic strategy, both foreign and domestic; a national military strategy; and so on. Each component influences national security immediately or tangentially."¹² The U.S. achieves its national objectives through a combination of political, economic, military, or diplomatic means, which are also referred to as instruments of national power. *In this broader context, it is unquestionable that the Coast Guard is an instrument of national security.* (Author's italics.)

Section III

National Military Strategy of the United States

Though there are national economic and national political strategies, none are published under such a collective title, but are found in a variety of national directives. (Two such national directives are the *National Drug Strategy* and the *National Transportation Strategy*, both of which the Coast Guard directly supports.) However, there is a published *National Military Strategy of the United States* that has strong roots in the President's strategy. Based on the President's *National Security Strategy*, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has developed the *National Military Strategy* with the following objectives:

- o Deter or defeat aggression, singly, or in concert with Allies.

Deter military attack by any nation against the U.S., its allies, and other countries whose sovereignty is vital to our own, and defeat such attack, singly, or in concert with others, should deterrence fail.

- o Ensure global access and influence.

Protect free commerce: Enhance the spread of democracy; guarantee U.S. access to world markets, associated critical resources, air and sea lines of communications, and space; and contribute to U.S. influence around the world.

- o Promote regional stability and cooperation.

Contribute to regional stability through military presence, mutual security arrangements, and security assistance, and discourage thereby, in concert with other instruments of national power, policies and objectives inimical to U.S. security interests.

- o Stem the flow of illegal drugs.

Stem the production and transit of illegal drugs and their entry into the U.S.

- o Combat terrorism.

Participate in the national program to thwart and respond to the actions of terrorist organizations.¹³




Figure 31: Concepts of the U.S. National Military Strategy.

This Military Strategy consists of twelve interrelated strategic concepts. Acting in unison these concepts (four are called strategic foundations and the remaining eight are titled strategic principles) provide the way the military services intend to use its forces to achieve its goals. The strategic foundations are: (1) strategic deterrence and defense, (2) forward presence, (3) crisis response, and (4) reconstitution. The *National Military Strategy* uses eight strategic principles to build upon the four foundations to round out the guidance for the employment of U.S. forces. These principles are: (1) readiness, (2) collective security, (3) arms control, (4) maritime and aerospace superiority, (5) strategic agility, (6) power projection, (7) technological superiority, and (8) decisive force.¹⁴

Only three strategic foundations relate to the Coast Guard:

- o Forward presence.

The routine presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to U.S. national interests makes a major contribution for averting crisis and preventing war. U.S. forces engaged in regional areas demonstrate credible U.S. commitment, strengthen alliances,

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

encourage regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while providing means for U.S. influence and access. Forward presence operations including the following activities:

- * Operational training and deployments.**

Routine overseas deployments, foreign port calls, and joint/combined training exercises such as the West African Training Cruise (WATC) and United Americas (UNITAS) provide clear signs of U.S. commitment to its alliances and to regional stability.

- * Security assistance.**

Security assistance has a two fold purpose: it aids our friends and allies by meeting their needs, and it strengthens the bonds of our collective security, particularly with lesser developed nations. U.S. security assistance programs demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build upon bilateral relations, and provide a moderating influence vital to regional stability and cooperation. The use of U.S. equipment, training, and professional military education can increase U.S. influence, foster interoperability, and build relationships which help create the sympathetic global infrastructure crucial to effective crisis response.

- * Protecting U.S. citizens abroad.**

These are the traditional protection responsibilities of U.S. forces to conduct a wide range of operations to defend U.S. citizens.

- * Combatting drugs.**

The President has tasked the Department of Defense to deal with this threat as a danger to U.S. national security. DoD is charged to attack the supply of illegal drugs from overseas both in transit and at the source principally by using its detection and

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

monitoring capabilities and other specially trained forces.

* Humanitarian assistance.

The U.S. is one of the few nations that can respond effectively and rapidly to disaster both home and abroad. Such humanitarian assistance in disaster relief produces a great amount of good will for the U.S.

o Crisis response.

There is no longer a threat of global war with the former Soviet Union. Because U.S. world wide national interests have remained unchanged, the need to respond to regional crises is an essential element of the National Military Strategy. Possible contingencies are diverse and probably short-notice. A full range of military capability is required to respond effectively.

o Reconstitution.

To offset the reduction of U.S. forces in response to the demise of the Soviet threat, the U.S. needs a credible capability to rebuild its military forces to deter any would be aggressor or if deterrence fails to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution involves activities such as forming, training, and fielding new units; cadre-type, laid-up assets, mobilization, and activation of the industrial base.¹⁵

Only two of the eight strategic principles of the *National Military Strategy* relate to the Coast Guard:

o Maritime and aerospace superiority.

Besides acting as a deterrent in peace, this capability in a crisis is critical to protect extended supply lines for unimpeded flow of resources. Once in conflict, the ability to establish superiority quickly increases combat effectiveness.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

o Power projection.

This is the means to provide forces where needed, both from forward deployed organizations and from the United States. It provides the backbone to deterrence, regional stability, and collective security. The U.S. requires this capability to offset the loss of overseas presence and to support regional activities.¹⁶



Figure 32: Coast Guard HH-25B Aircraft Overflies Kuwaiti Oilfields - Equipped with SLAR these Aircraft Supported U.S. Crisis Response by Monitoring the Persian Gulf Oil Spill Caused by Iraq in the Recent War.

Section IV

A National Security Framework for Studying the Coast Guard

It is with the framework presented in this Section that the Coast Guard's role in national security is assessed in this study. As discussed, the Coast Guard has four broad mission areas: (1) safety, (2) law enforcement, (3) environmental protection, and (4) political-military. Using the traditional, historical definition of national security, only the political-military mission area would be considered as supporting national security. Today national security has a much broader meaning which includes the social, economic and environmental well-being of a nation's citizens. The Coast Guard's other three mission areas directly support a strong and healthy U.S. economy and environment and because of the globally-connected world, these Coast Guard mission areas have international implications as well. Figure 33 shows the location of typical Coast Guard activities conducted world-wide on a daily basis. Figure 34 lists these activities and places them in an unstructured format, which is the usual fashion when Coast Guard functions are arranged.




Figure 33: Routine Coast Guard World Wide Activities.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

① PACIFIC: C-130 DROPS PUMP TO SINKING JAPANESE CONTAINER SHIP.	⑫ PORTUGAL: CG STRIKE TEAM PROVIDES TECHNICAL SUPPORT AT MAJOR OIL SPILL.
② ANTARCTICA: ICEBREAKER ENROUTE.	⑬ PUGET SOUND: STRIKE TEAM ON SCENE OF GROUNDING TANKER.
③ MIDWAY: CUTTER CONDUCTS ASW EXERCISE (OCEAN VALOR).	⑭ ALEUTIANS: JAPANESE FV SEIZED FOR ILLEGAL FISHING.
④ LIBERIA: OMEGA TEAM VISIT.	⑮ MEXICO: CG ATTACHE OVERSEES TRANSFER 2 PATROL BOATS TO MEXICAN NAVY.
⑤ RUSSIA: TALKS ON LORAN, SAR, AND RUSSIAN STUDENTS AT CG ACADEMY.	⑯ WEST AFRICAN: M.T.T. COMPLETES 4 WEEK MISSION.
⑥ VENEZUELA: CUTTERS CONDUCT PORT CALL AND TRAINING VISIT.	⑰ AUSTRALIA: CG EXCHANGE OFFICER ON RAN PATROL VESSEL.
⑦ TURKEY: LORAN STATION.	⑱ LONDON: CG REPRESENTS U.S. AT UN MEETING ON MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT.
⑧ HONG KONG: BUOY TENDER AT INTERNATIONAL SAR EXPO.	⑲ SINGAPORE: CG OFFICE INSPECTS U.S. FLAG VESSELS.
⑨ PERSIAN GULF: LEDET IDENTIFIED CONTRABAND ON A MERCHANT BOUND FOR IRAQ.	⑳ NORTH ATLANTIC: CG CONDUCTS INT'L ICE PATROL.
⑩ WINDWARD PASSAGE: 4 CUTTERS INTERDICTING MIGRANTS.	㉑ CENTRAL PACIFIC: CG CUTTER PATROLS U.S. EEZ.
⑪ CARIBBEAN: CG LEDET ON USS TICONDEROGA FOUND 1500 POUNDS OF COCAINE ON COLOMBIAN SHIP.	㉒ NORTH WEST PASSAGE: CG ICEBREAKER CONDUCTS RIGHTS OF TRANSIT DEPLOYMENT AND POLAR RESEARCH.

Figure 34: List and Explanation of Coast Guard World Wide Activities.

Figure 35 shows these same activities against the framework of the *National Security* and *National Military Strategies*. As can be seen, much of what the Coast Guard does on a routine basis supports both these Strategies.

The political-military mission area essentially has its roots in the wartime use of the Coast Guard. Beginning with the Quasi War with France in 1798 and continuing to the Persian Gulf War and with every war in between, the Coast Guard has fought the enemy and served the Nation. After the Second World War this mission area expanded its primary focus from the military employment of Coast Guard forces to new uses of the Coast Guard to achieve national objectives (e.g., polar presence, illegal drug and alien interdiction, and security assistance). This change in emphasis reflected not only new Coast Guard responsibilities, but also the changed strategic environment in the last half of the Twentieth Century. While the political military mission area developed from the military use of the Coast Guard in the Nation's wars, the other three mission areas trace their lineage to the domestic maritime needs of the Nation. Until quite recently the Coast Guard historically has not considered these three mission areas as contributing to national security. This assessment is gradually changing as the broader definition of national security - supporting the well-being of the U.S. with a healthy environment, a strong economy, and a drug-free society, etc. - gains wider acceptance. Using the definition of national security discussed in Section II, the Coast Guard's national security mission can be defined as a combination of all four mission areas. Figure 36 depicts this definition.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY	NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● A HEALTHY AND GROWING U.S. ECONOMY TO ENSURE OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIVIDUAL PROSPERITY AND RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL ENDEAVORS AT HOME AND ABROAD. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ① LIBERIA OMEGA TEAM VISIT ② LONDON CG REPRESENTS U.S. AT UN MEETING ON MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT ③ SINGAPORE CG OFFICE INSPECTS U.S. FLAG VESSELS ④ NORTH ATLANTIC CG CONDUCTS INT'L ICE PATROL ★ ENSURE ACCESS TO FOREIGN MARKETS, ENERGY, MINERAL RESOURCES, THE OCEANS AND SPACE. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑤ ANTARCTICA ICEBREAKER ENROUTE ⑥ ALEUTIANS JAPANESE F.V. SEIZED FOR ILLEGAL FISHING ⑦ CENTRAL PACIFIC CG CUTTER PATROLS U.S. EEZ ⑧ NORTH WEST PASSAGE CG ICEBREAKER CONDUCTS RIGHTS OF TRANSIT DEPLOYMENT AND POLAR RESEARCH ★ ACHIEVE COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO KEY ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES, ASSURING THE SUSTAINABILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY OF THE PLANET AS WELL AS GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑨ PORTUGAL CG STRIKE TEAM MEMBERS PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AT MAJOR OIL SPILL ⑩ PUGET SOUND STRIKE TEAM ON SCENE OF GROUNDING TANKER ⑪ LONDON CG REPRESENTS U.S. AT UN MEETING ON MARITIME SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ SECURITY ASSISTANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑫ MEXICO CG ATTACHE OVERSEES TRANSFER 2 PATROL BOATS TO MEXICAN NAVY ⑬ WEST AFRICAN M.T.T. COMPLETES 4 WEEK MISSION ★ MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑭ RUSSIA TALKS ON LORAN SAR AND RUSSIAN STUDENTS AT CG ACADEMY ⑮ AUSTRALIA CG EXCHANGE OFFICER ON RAN PATROL VESSEL ★ OPERATIONAL TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑯ VENEZUELA CUTTERS CONDUCT PORT CALL AND TRAINING VISIT ⑰ HONG KONG BUOY TENDER AT INTERNATIONAL SAR EXPO ★ HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑱ PACIFIC C-130 DROPS PUMP TO SINKING JAPANESE CONTAINER SHIP ● COUNTERNARCOTICS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑲ CARIBBEAN CG LEDET ON USS TICONDEROGA FOUND 1500 POUNDS OF COCAINE ON COLOMBIAN SHIP ● CRISIS RESPONSE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ⑳ PERSIAN GULF LEDET IDENTIFIED CONTRABAND ON A MERCHANT BOUND FOR IRAQ ㉑ WINDWARD PASSAGE 4 CUTTERS INTERDICTING MIGRANTS ㉒ TURKEY LORAN STATION ● RECONSTITUTION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ㉓ MIDWAY CUTTER CONDUCTS ASW EXERCISE (OCEAN VALOR)

Figure 35: List of Coast Guard World Wide Activities as They Relate to the U.S. National Security and National Military Strategies.

The Coast Guard's national maritime environmental functions and national maritime safety functions support U.S. national interests by ensuring a strong and healthy economy and environment for growth and opportunity for all. The Coast Guard also helps to "achieve cooperative international solutions to key (maritime) environmental challenges" thereby fostering the "sustainability and environmental security of the planet". The Coast Guard accomplishes this goal through its: (1) national maritime search and rescue system, (2) national/global maritime navigation system, (3) national maritime safety program for ships, crews, and port facilities, and lastly, its (4) national maritime environmental program. The collective, resultant outcome of these systems and programs furthers the U.S. economy, protects the U.S. and global maritime environment, and supports the well-being of U.S. citizens.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 36: Coast Guard Functions that Support U.S. National Security.

The national maritime law enforcement functions support U.S. national interests by reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, by ensuring access to the oceans, and by ensuring the well-being of U.S. citizens. The Coast Guard achieves these objectives as it: (1) enforces U.S. laws and international treaties and agreements, (2) protects U.S. maritime resources, (3) ensures U.S. maritime sovereignty, (4) provides U.S. maritime presence, (5) oversees U.S. water-space management, and (6) conducts maritime interdiction operations for aliens, narcotics, and contraband on the high seas, U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, and U.S. territorial waters.

The last mission area, national political-military functions, supports or contributes to a variety of U.S. national interests from U.S. national survival, economic well-being and overall quality of life of the American people, to "cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations" and to a "stable and secure world". Coast Guard capabilities accomplish these multiple national interests by:

- o Providing U.S. maritime polar presence.
- o Conducting forward presence operations.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

- * Security assistance.
 - * Operational training and deployments.
 - * Humanitarian assistance.
 - * Counter-narcotics.
- o Acting as U.S. lead agency for international maritime safety and environmental matters.
- o Supporting crisis response.
- o Providing a naval warfare capability.
 - * MDZ commands.
 - * Port safety and security capability.
 - * Coastal warfare capability.
- o Conducting maritime interdiction operations and acting as the U.S. maritime law enforcement authority.
- o Supporting reconstitution and regeneration of naval forces.

In short, almost all the functions of the Coast Guard, except perhaps recreational boating safety and bridge administration, can be considered as supporting national security. In its own right the Coast Guard is a national security instrument of the U.S. with special and unique skills and forces. Figure 37 shows this definition. Figure 38 depicts the Coast Guard's national security mission against Neuchterlein's categories of national interests and their intensities. (One of the interesting things about this depiction is that none of the Coast Guard functions have an intensity greater than "major". If the U.S. Navy's functions - sea control, power projection, etc. - were placed on this same figure, their intensity would be at the "survival" or "vital" level. This is a good visual demonstration of how the Coast Guard complements the Navy and does not compete with it.)

It is clear, in hindsight and with the benefit of conducting nine months of research, that the Coast Guard's national security role is much broader than was implied in the survey questionnaire. The questionnaire centered more upon national defense matters involving the Coast Guard than the much broader definition of national security that includes diplomatic, political, and economic considerations. The focus on national defense in the questions resulted from attempting to gather data on what "specialized service" means.

A former CNO believes that this is a "significant failing that can distort the report's utility rather substantially . . . (since) the bulk of the Coast Guard operational requirement is dedicated to peacetime activities in support of other national interests." He is concerned that the responses




Figure 37: Coast Guard's National Security Mission.

do not reflect the day-to-day national security tasks confronted by the Coast Guard, though he acknowledges that the "project itself is directed quite explicitly" at this more narrow national security role.

He is correct in his assessment; yet the deficiency inherent in the questionnaire does not make the report any less useful. Despite the thrust of the questions, the respondents provide a large amount of information on the full range of Coast Guard's national security missions. The majority of the Coast Guard's daily functions - aids to navigation, pollution response, search and rescue, and commercial vessel safety - conducted in domestic coastal waters contribute to a "healthy and strong economy (and environment) with opportunity for growth and resources for all." These contributions along with polar operations were not the subject of separate questions in the survey, and they have not been extensively addressed and developed in this study. When assessing the Coast Guard's future national security role in the next century, such activities must be included for a more comprehensive view of what the Coast Guard offers the Nation. Many respondents recognized this, and in their replies indicate (See Chapter Three) that the Coast Guard's future national security role will essentially continue in its present form based on its current area of expertise. They all refer to the Coast Guard's vast civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise as valuable supporters to U.S. National Security Strategy. What is missing in their assessments is the emphasis that these individual, traditional missions will receive in the next century. That assessment is beyond the scope of the current study.

Suffice to say it is highly unlikely that these traditional missions will lessen in their contribution to national security. It is highly probable that they will increase in importance as the need for naval warfighting capabilities lessens and competition for world maritime resources intensifies along with concerns for global maritime pollution.

Statutory Authorities and National Level Directives

MATRIX OF U.S. COAST GUARD'S NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL INTERESTS				
BASIC INTEREST AT STAKE	INTENSITY OF INTEREST			
	SURVIVAL	VITAL	MAJOR	PERIPHERAL
DEFENSE OF HOMELAND NATIONAL POLITICAL/MILITARY FUNCTIONS				
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING NATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY FUNCTIONS NATIONAL MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL FUNCTIONS NATIONAL MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS				
FAVORABLE WORLD ORDER NATIONAL MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS NATIONAL POLITICAL/MILITARY FUNCTIONS				
PROMOTION OF VALUES				

Figure 38: Coast Guard's National Security Mission Viewed Against Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix.



Figure 39: Coast Guard Provided Patrol Boats and Large Cutters for Coastal Warfare Operations During the Vietnam War.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 40: Coast Guard HU-25A Aircraft on Patrol. (Photo by Joe Towers)



Figure 41: Landing Safety Officer at Work.




Figure 42: Recent cover story from *U.S. News and World Report* underscores the U.S. Coast Guard's significant role in the management and oversight of the world's oceans. Copyright courtesy of *U.S. News and World Report*.

Chapter Three

The Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century



Figure 43: Coast Guard Law Enforcement Boarding Team Boards a Vessel. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Since the beginning of work on this report in the spring of 1991 the world has experienced fundamental changes to its geopolitical structure. Two of the more important events have been the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States in its place. There no longer is a Soviet threat. In the wake of this collapse, the United States national defense budget and its standing military forces are being drastically reduced.

One respondent writes, "I am sure every respondent would have a different 'spin' on how they answered the initial questionnaire due to subsequent events." The fallout from the demise of the Soviet Union and increased pressures for even greater reductions in the defense spending has reached the Coast Guard. He cites the Navy-Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board recommendation in December 1991 to reduce the number of Maritime Defense Zone sector and subsector commands, the Coast Guard cancellation of its 120 Foot *HERITAGE* Class patrol boat, and the way Congress views domestic versus defense appropriations in the Coast Guard budget. (Some Congressmen believe all Coast Guard military functions and equipment along with the costs for the Coast Guard Reserve should be paid by DoD.)

If surveyed now, the respondents might answer some of the questions differently in light of events in Europe. The participants have, however, presented their views and opinions on a range of subjects that are not critically dependent on timeliness. Their replies remain extremely useful for the insight they give on the Coast Guard's future national security role.

The issues raised in this and the next Chapters are certainly not black and white. Readers should know that views to the contrary are not "dismissed as inconsistent with quoted opinions on the Coast Guard's military utility or as possibly motivated by . . . budget-protection concerns." These views have been included. Those with opposing ideas have "their own assessments of the Coast Guard's potential contributions", and I agree that, "it seems unlikely that any would concede that his or her vote was based on ignoble motives."

One instance is especially illustrative. The discussion in Chapter Four (Section 1, page 102) on whether to include the Coast Guard in the force planning submissions to Congress is almost evenly split by the respondents, with the opposing viewpoints providing valid rationale. There is no clear majority. My assessment to include the Coast Guard in DoD's Base Force and in a total naval force package is just that, my assessment; it is based upon the reasons that I put forth in a section titled, "Author's Assessment". These Author's Assessments are an analysis of the various replies and viewpoints presented in each issue. The replies speak for themselves; the Author's Assessment reviews and critiques these replies to provide an interpretative and thematic commentary to this research project.

Section I Future Coast Guard National Security Missions

Summary

The majority of respondents indicate that the Coast Guard's future national security role would continue to reside in its current area of expertise. These participants cite the Coast Guard's vast civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise as valuable supporters to the U.S. National Security Strategy.

The responses are based upon the survey question one: "What 'specialized service' could the Coast Guard perform for DoD in the next century . . . is there a gap in DOD's capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?"

The respondents recommend a wide range of future missions:

- (1) Consolidating the Navy's naval control of shipping mission into the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) command structure.
- (2) Increasing participation in security assistance programs.
- (3) Evaluating Coast Guard personnel to crew Ready Reserve Fleet ships.
- (4) Assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships, if the Navy continues current force structure."
- (5) Developing a coastal defense capability (littoral naval warfare) for regional conflicts from MDZ commands.
- (6) Coordinating the response to environmental terrorism.
- (7) Providing capabilities for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources: port security, harbor defense, coastal sea lines of communications (SLOC) protection, presence in areas of lesser threat, noncombat search and rescue (SAR). Depending on circumstances, include UN peacekeeping operations and maritime intercept operations.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- (8) Extending peacetime duties only: environmental safety and protection, port security and safety, law enforcement, aids to navigation, and possibly merchant marine safety.



Figure 44: Coast Guard Buoy Tender Monitors an Oil Spill from Gounded Vessel.

Discussion

U.S. Coast Guard Views

There is widespread agreement among both the active duty and retired Coast Guard admirals that current Coast Guard missions will continue to be valid and useful. They believe that the Coast Guard "fills a unique niche" in capabilities that does not exist elsewhere in the defense establishment.

Seven active admirals write forcefully that the functions and missions performed by the MDZ commands are exportable to regional conflicts, low intensity conflicts, and in-theater ports. MDZ has "universal application". Six retired admirals feel that MDZ will continue to be the Coast Guard's major role as a "specialized service" for the Navy. One admiral states that the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

patrol boat expertise such as used in Operation Market Time (coastal interdiction of enemy shipping during the Vietnam war) remains an applicable and legitimate model for the 21st century. Collectively these flag officers suggest that the naval control of shipping mission come under MDZ commands as well, an expansion of security assistance, Coast Guard crews for the Ready Reserve Fleet, and assumption of responsibility for the low end of the high-low mix of ships.

A district commander regards the recommended missions as a "fishing trip". He thinks the broader questions of "what is the nature of the Coast Guard and its national security role" should be answered before evaluating any "new" missions. However, his cautions are not echoed by others. Another district commander believes the NAVGARD Board's decision to explore the Coast Guard's role in a "deployable littoral defense force" underscores the potential value of "exportable MDZ commands". He judges the Coast Guard's expertise gained from its MDZ operations makes the Service extremely valuable to any U.S. Unified Commander (CINC) for a regional coastal warfare capability. He says this is a clear lesson learned from Desert Storm. Another lesson learned from that war is the current rewrite of NWP-39 (*Coastal Warfare Doctrine*) to include a maritime interdiction mission area with the use of Coast Guard boarding teams as a matter of routine. Their omission in U.S. Central Command's operational plans highlighted this shortcoming.

A third district commander sees the Coast Guard doing more than crewing the ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet. He sees, "a natural role, a strategic role, for the Coast Guard as the military manager of the National Defense Reserve Fleet." The Coast Guard is better equipped, more familiar with crisis management, and better able to mobilize. In regard to the naval control of shipping mission, one Coast Guard field commander notes that "better yet, give the whole mission to the Coast Guard who already tracks and controls vessel movement in peacetime." Two active duty Coast Guard admirals strongly support an increased role in security assistance. One comments that "The annual United Americas (UNITAS) and West Africa Training Cruise (WATC) . . . serve as a model for further Coast Guard efforts in this area." However, the other adds that clear tasking is required. (Both UNITAS and WATC are considered operational training deployments under the National Military Strategy.)

Two admirals agree that responding to environmental terrorism is an appropriate mission for the Coast Guard and cite this as "another example of a peacetime mission transferrable to wartime." A third says, "Interesting, but not necessarily a new role. Needs to be sorted out with the FBI and other non-DOD agencies; doesn't fit in the Coast Guard-Navy arena." Taking responsibility for the low end of the Navy's high-low mix of the naval surface forces strikes one admiral as a bad idea. "We're struggling with how the Coast Guard peacetime assets can be used in wartime. This would leave us in the role of trying to use over-specialized wartime assets in peacetime."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

One retired flag officer sounds an alarm bell. He does not believe the Coast Guard will be able "to maintain its traditional role of a 'specialized service in the Navy' in wartime or when the President directs." He believes, with the Soviet threat diminished, that the Navy's budget will significantly decrease and consequently does not see DoD or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) supporting a national defense (naval warfare) capability for the Coast Guard. He holds that the Coast Guard's national security role will only be an extension of its peacetime duties: some form of environmental safety and protection, port security and safety, law enforcement, aids to navigation and possibly merchant marine safety. He also concludes that the Coast Guard could conduct some of these functions (in consort with other countries) for the United Nations (U.N.) on a reimbursable basis, because of the Service's leadership in global maritime environmental protection and law enforcement. He is especially concerned about exploitation of the deep ocean sea beds and the Antarctic continent.

A retired commandant does not support the Coast Guard crewing Ready Reserve Fleet ships nor assuming responsibilities for "the low end of the high-low mix of ships" for the Navy.




Figure 45: Coast Guard RELIANCE Class Medium Endurance Cutter Interdicts Haitian Sailboat. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

U.S. Navy Views

The active duty Navy admiral in the senior policy making position comments that the Navy may task the Coast Guard to export any of its peacetime functions or specialized expertise to other regions, including hostile environments. According to this admiral "the Coast Guard . . . has significant expertise in small boat operations; potentially a critical aspect of LIC." He observes that "One great value of the Coast Guard is its ability to provide a capability for which the Navy does not have sufficient resources, i.e. port security, harbor defense, coastal SLOC protection, presence in areas of lesser threat, noncombat SAR, etc. Other potential roles, depending on circumstances, include security assistance training, UN peacekeeping operations, and maritime intercept operations."

Another Navy admiral submits that "The Coast Guard's specialized service to the Navy resides almost exclusively in its current areas of expertise . . . unlikely this expertise will be eliminated or change radically." A third Navy admiral concludes that "the Coast Guard should be shaped to protect CONUS ports and be prepared to operate in foreign ports."

One Navy four star admiral notes in regards to future missions that "All armed services, including the Coast Guard, will answer to the Unified CINCs' requirements. These requirements will be based on a combination of the threat and service capability." He adds that, "As DoD downsizes, opportunity exists to improve quality and capability. This demands maximum economy and efficiency; we must challenge all sacred cows and break counterproductive rice bowls. The Coast Guard offers capabilities that the DoD services do not have, and they must be entered into the equation. Complementary capabilities should be fine tuned; costly redundancies eliminated."

A second Navy four star flag officer states that he does "not agree with (Coast Guard) crewing Ready Reserve Fleet (since) Coast Guard does not have steam-turbine powered vessels. What is the value added?" He also states that "Red Adair was the real response to Saddam Hussein's environmental terrorism. Coast Guard can mount a limited command and control effort against waterborne pollution but industry must carry the fight."

Another Navy flag officer notes that "Of all the capabilities mentioned, I believe the Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement interdiction capabilities will play an ever increasing role . . . The reliance on economic sanctions vice armed conflict to resolve international disputes could raise the use of the Coast Guard as a first response by exerting enforcement of existing national and international sanctions." Two retired Navy flag officers state that future roles are a continuation of present. Two other Navy retired admirals offer contrasting views, summed up by "I can not see any specialized service that could be better performed by the Coast Guard than the Navy."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

A retired Navy admiral who is now a naval analyst on strategic and naval force matters writes, "Coast Guard missions relate directly to the title of the organization - i.e. guarding the coast of the United States. One of the major threats to be faced by the United States in the twenty-first century will be the growing illegal introduction of weapons, people and dangerous substances into the nation. This requires a Coast Guard primarily equipped for command and control, surveillance, interdiction and law enforcement functions. Such a Coast Guard must be fully integrated with intelligence and internal security organizations . . . FBI, DEA, Customs, (etc.). It is more important to think of the Coast Guard in these terms when talking of national security."

He sees no Coast Guard role in naval warfare such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or anti-air warfare (AAW). These functions require heavy investments in equipment, personnel, and training. Furthermore, they are principally blue-water wartime missions only and are inconsistent with Coast Guard missions. "Concentration should be focused instead on surveillance, interdiction, law enforcement, environmental and security functions in harbors and coastal areas out to the limits of the continental shelf. Since these same functions are important to most of the coastal states of the world, as well, the Coast Guard should be available to U.S. diplomacy for providing advice and assistance to those states which have coast guard missions whether such missions are carried out by their navies or separate coast guard organizations. It is time to accept that the Coast Guard has unique national security missions that require unique training and equipment. Those missions are important for U.S. national security in peacetime and when the nation is at war. To think of the Coast Guard as a part of the Navy in wartime in the twenty-first century is to divert its focus from its real national security mission and to reduce its effectiveness."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

Among these unified commanders there is widespread agreement that the Coast Guard's "vast civil responsibilities and coastal water expertise" will continue to support U.S. national security strategy. Four warfighting CINCs state that the Coast Guard's unique platforms and capabilities have valid application today and in the future. One CINC states that "many of the Coast Guard peacetime missions easily convert into useful military functions during times of conflict."

Another CINC comments that Coast Guard specialized services play a key role and are important; he writes that "port security on both ends plays an important part in regional contingencies . . . need to stop sabotage and ensure safe on and off loads." He also states that law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) and environmental expertise are valuable services. A second CINC believes that DoD can use the Coast Guard's unique law enforcement capabilities that *Posse Comitatus* constraints prohibit DoD from doing. Another CINC notes that "The Coast Guard could augment . . . in three mission areas: coastal/riverine patrol and interdiction, combat SAR, and counter-narcotics." He believes there are enough resources in the DoD inventory now for regional conflicts. However, he adds that "depending on the level of effort




Figure 46: Coast Guard Forward Presence off Colombian Coast Versus Navy.

required to perform assigned missions, additional resources may be necessary to augment DoD forces during a conflict." One of the CINCs discusses another important capability (crisis response) about the Coast Guard that he considers valuable:

When regional tensions heighten, the presence of a multi-mission Coast Guard cutter or contingent is often less threatening to Host Nation sovereignty concerns than a DoD asset would be simply because it is not perceived as a U.S. 'military' presence. Yet, that presence still demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies and can be an effective deterrent to aggression.

He also observes that small navies more "readily relate to the Coast Guard than to the Navy" since the bigger ships overwhelm them. A Joint Staff flag officer writes that, "Coast Guard's national security role in the next century should be to continue executing the unique missions and functions it presently performs, rather than expanding its efforts into more defense oriented roles."

A combatant CINC writes that, "It seems to me the strongest, most supportable position the Coast Guard can take in today's budget climate is to exemplify its contributions made in the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

traditional areas of marine safety, harbor and coastal operations, and maritime law enforcement. There is a real necessity for a continued strong, modern Coast Guard with the capability to meet its traditional responsibilities under the Department of Transportation (DoT) umbrella. Having defined the peacetime mission, the goal, as I see it, should be to demonstrate that the Coast Guard is capable of accomplishing that mission better than any other agency. As Deming would say, 'know your customer (in this case, the customer is the American public) and constantly work to improve the services you provide to that customer.' In this example, the improvement would be represented by the ability of the Coast Guard to assume additional roles, as required above and beyond those traditionally assigned."

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

A former secretary of the Navy does not agree with the Navy admirals, retired or active, or the CINCs. He writes that:

(The Coast Guard) . . . should be trained and equipped to carry out national security requirements in coastal waters, rivers, and bays. It should be the repository of small boat doctrine and expertise. In the event of military conflicts near or far the Coast Guard should be used for tasks involving small boat coastal and riverine warfare.

Five other respondents from the decision maker and naval analyst group agree with the majority of participants that Coast Guard traditional missions will continue to be important in the next century. One writes that "the need for port security and harbor defense, expertise in interdiction operations, and oil spill management will always be important factors in planning for and executing responses to future crises."

Author's Assessment

Despite widespread agreement that the Coast Guard's future national security functions will reflect its present missions, two respondents offer counsel. One suggests that naming functions without widespread agreement on the broader issues of the Coast Guard's core competencies and its role in national security is premature. The other maintains that geo-political events have so re-shaped the world that there is no longer any need for the Coast Guard to have a military capability. The NAVGARD Board's study on the role of MDZ commands in deployable littoral defense will certainly be a strong indicator of the future direction of the Coast Guard's military capability.

The comments by the active duty Navy admiral in the senior policy making position are significant. He views the Navy tasking the Coast Guard to export any of its peacetime functions, and he stresses that the Coast Guard complements the Navy with capabilities absent



Figure 47: Coast Guard Petty Officer Training Foreign Navy Personnel - Coast Guard and Small Foreign Navies Have Much in Common.

from his service. Other Navy flag officers and CINCs place great emphasis on the Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement capabilities (no *Posse Comitatus* constraints) for first use in economic sanctions and interdiction operations.

The Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement mission will provide an increasingly important national capability. By the next century the Coast Guard's present level of drug operations should be significantly reduced in response to more than three decades' worth of demand and supply reduction efforts. The nation simply cannot continue to sustain such a large, devastating social problem for so many years without dramatically reducing illegal drug use. In 2010 the nation's drug problem should be much less of a problem than it is now. This future reduction in Coast Guard drug operations does not mean an end to the Coast Guard's law enforcement activities at sea.¹

The Coast Guard will play a major role in the interdiction of a growing number of alien migrants continuing to enter the U.S. by sea. Additionally, fisheries law enforcement in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) will remain at its present level, with emphasis on oversight of domestic fisheries. Law enforcement activity will expand as maritime resource




Figure 48: Coast Guard Security Assistance Accomplishments in Regions Sensitive to DoD Presence.

development occurs on the continental shelf and as commercial exploitation moves farther seaward.

The full Navy admiral raises an interesting issue when he discusses the role of the CINCs. By declaring that all services will answer to the needs of the CINCs and that Coast Guard capabilities must be considered, is this Admiral suggesting that the CINCs rather than the CNO should directly task the Coast Guard? A greater Coast Guard role in security assistance has support, especially when a CINC remarks upon the close resemblance the Coast Guard has in force mix and missions to many foreign navies. However, the absence of tasking is an issue not discussed.

In the next century the Navy's MDZ commands and the absence of any specific defense mission tasking will not support a military capability on future Coast Guard cutters nor justify the Coast Guard Reserve program. A recent Navy study, informally titled *NAVY-21*, has significant implications for the Coast Guard. Though the Coast Guard is not directly mentioned, this study assessed the implications of advancing technology on force structure for naval warfare forty years hence. To operate with the Navy's surface forces, such as currently done by the *HAMILTON/HERO* class, future Coast Guard cutters will require stealth technology and

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

precision guided weapons. They will need very long legs to operate without the usual logistic support from overseas U.S. bases. These cutters also will require adequate combat systems to survive and operate in the multi-threat environment with friendly forces widely scattered and unable to provide mutual support. To participate under these conditions the Coast Guard will not be operating cutters with a military capability, but full fledged naval combatants with a "cutter capability" instead.²

The revolutionary changes in naval warfare may prevent the traditional practice of providing a military capability to future cutters. Surface battle group operations will no longer be a realistic warfare scenario for a replacement cutter. Major Coast Guard cutters will not operate with the surface Navy in the next century unless they are built from the keel up as naval combatant vessels. Yet, despite *NAVY-21*'s predictions concerning future blue-water naval warfare, there are other warfare requirements that a replacement cutter could fulfill, if constructed with flexible mission capabilities. For instance, it is very possible that future major cutters could operate with Navy forces in some regional conflicts requiring a coastal combatant capability or in the protection of selected sea lines of communications.³

The Coast Guard's unique missions and force structure, civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise will be the basis for the Coast Guard's role in national security in the twenty-first century. Of the missions the respondents recommend, the following are in consonance with this assessment:

- (1) Security assistance.
- (2) Regional coastal warfare capability.
- (3) Maritime interdiction.
- (4) Complementary, non-redundant capabilities for the Navy: port security; harbor defense; coastal SLOC protection; presence in areas of lesser threat; noncombat SAR.

The above mission assessment could serve as a framework to re-orient the Coast Guard's efforts in national security for the next century. For example, the Coast Guard presently operates twelve 378 Foot *HAMILTON/HERO* Class high endurance cutters that have a shallow water ASW capability with their hull mounted sonar. The Navy is currently retiring its *KNOX* Class open ocean ASW fast frigates to the "mothball" fleet. The Navy is also transferring many of its *PERRY* Class fast frigates along with the majority of its P-3 maritime patrol ASW aircraft squadrons to the Naval Reserves. In this environment the Coast Guard's ASW capability represents a redundancy that should be removed from its cutters under the guidance of this framework.



Figure 49: Coast Guard/Navy Joint Boarding Team Approaches a Merchant Ship in the Persian Gulf.

Another common Navy-Coast Guard capability that may or may not be redundant is maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The Coast Guard's HC-130H aircraft and the Navy's P-3C ASW aircraft both conduct long range surface surveillance of open ocean areas, though the P-3C is optimized for ASW. The Coast Guard uses its MPA resources to detect drug smugglers, to find distressed mariners (search and rescue), to locate the icebergs (International Ice Patrol), and to patrol U.S. sovereign waters, the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone and certain areas of the high seas. Presently the Navy devotes many P-3C flight hours, not to ASW, but to support the detection/surveillance function of the counter-narcotics mission by searching for ships smuggling drugs.

With the loss of the Soviet submarine threat, the Navy's ASW mission is fast going to the bottom of the Navy's priority list. P-3C squadrons are being eliminated or converted to Reserve status. There is still a need for the Navy to maintain some level of capability in fixed-wing airborne ASW. However, since there is a very reduced submarine threat, maintaining P-3C capability strictly for a diminishing ASW threat may not be fiscally prudent or operationally sound. Perhaps these dedicated ASW Navy aircraft could become multi-mission and be tasked with the Coast Guard's surface surveillance requirements to broaden justification for these aircraft. In effect they would do much the same mission as they are doing now for drug interdiction, only they would also perform all the surveillance needs of the Coast Guard. In the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

event of a contingency requiring an ASW capability, these aircraft would shift their priority to that requirement. While waiting for that contingency, the P-3C would support the Coast Guard. Are there national economies for the Navy's P-3s, in lieu of possibly duplicative Coast Guard MPA aircraft, to conduct these duties?

In much the same vein, can employment of DoD space surveillance sensors be increased in conjunction with an expanded use of Navy MPA to eliminate the need for Coast Guard to detect icebergs for the International Ice Patrol? Is it time for Congress to direct DoD to declassify some of the capabilities of U.S. space sensors and use them in non-military application? In these fiscally constrained times, is it in the national interest to maintain two naval air arms for ocean surveillance and detection and not to expand the use of national overhead technology to non-military roles?

A third shared capability between these two naval services is the resources for harbor defense. The Coast Guard Reserve provides port security units (PSUs) for the waterside physical security of ports and harbors. The Navy Reserve provides Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare (MIUW) units for port, harbor, and anchorage security. Whereas the Navy MIUWs essentially have sensors for enemy detection and no boats, the Coast Guard PSUs essentially have armed Boston Whaler-type small boats for patrol duties and no sensors. As the Navy draws down, it will deactivate some of its MIUW units. In lieu of deactivation, the Navy could convert these MIUW resources into PSUs and replace the need for the Coast Guard to provide this capability. Besides producing economies, such action would streamline command and control functions for the Navy by making harbor defense more of a single service responsibility. Furthermore, the Navy has the infrastructure to more readily support and administer the overseas deployment of personnel when compared to the Coast Guard.

While this mission assessment would indicate that possibly some redundant capabilities should be removed from the Coast Guard, other capabilities should be maintained in the Coast Guard. An example is the capability resident in its coastal patrol boats, which the Coast Guard will continue to operate in the next Century. The Coast Guard's extensive expertise and its significant experience with patrol boats in coastal operations will remain a core competency for the Service.

With its skills, involvement, and force mix, the Coast Guard has a comparative advantage in patrol boat operations; whereas, the Navy has a comparative advantage in large warship operations. Based on the Coast Guard's comparative advantage, DoD should recognize the Coast Guard as the major patrol boat provider for coastal patrol/interdiction duties in regional contingencies. These duties are different from the almost pure warfighting duties that call for fast attack craft (FAC) and special warfare boats. Such recognition would ensure that the Coast Guard's present level of readiness for this duty is maintained into the next Century. Providing Coast Guard patrol boats with space and weight for combat systems is prudent by not only building defense capabilities upon a service's comparative advantages, but also for reasons of




Figure 50: Coast Guard Security Assistance Capabilities.

economies by having one platform capable of multiple duties. These and other similar types of reassessments need to be conducted to eliminate redundancies and recognize complementary capabilities between the Coast Guard and Navy.

The majority of the Coast Guard's daily functions - aids to navigation, pollution response, search and rescue, and commercial vessel safety - conducted in domestic, coastal waters contribute to a "healthy and strong economy and environment with opportunity for growth and resources for all." These contributions along with polar icebreaking operations must be included when assessing the Coast Guard's future national security role for a more comprehensive understanding of what the Coast Guard offers the nation. Most of the respondents believe that the Coast Guard's future national security role will continue in its present form based on its current area of expertise. They all refer to the Coast Guard's vast civil responsibilities, law enforcement powers, and coastal waters expertise as valuable supporters to U.S. National Security Strategy.

Suffice to say it is very unlikely that these traditional missions will lessen in their contribution to national security. It is highly probable that will increase in importance as the need for naval warfighting capabilities lessens and competition for world maritime resources intensifies along

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

with concerns for maritime pollution. At the Conference on Multi National Naval Cooperation held at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, London, in December 1991 speakers warned of resource conflicts as countries seek to protect their seabeds and marine resources. The United Nations representative discussed the tension that will possibly arise between countries using the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to restrict freedom of navigation to protect their ocean resources and their marine environment and those countries objecting to the loss of navigation freedom. In discussing the future utility of navies Booth in his book, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, writes:

Policing the immediate coastal zone has always been an important, if usually undramatic role for naval forces. Order is maintained in a constabulary rather than a military sense, in furtherance of the interests of sovereignty, good order, and resource enjoyment. For a large number of the world's navies, the coastal policing role is the over-riding task. And because of increasing economic importance of coastal zones (not to mention the expanding definition of this concept) there is a widely held view that offshore maritime policing will become a more prominent task for many navies. Because of economic importance of resources in contiguous seas, a number of the more modern navies (such as Britain and Canada) have somewhat reoriented their sights in this direction. The task of promoting resources has resulted in calls for relevant planning and training for low-level confrontation. This view has been strengthened in Britain because the vulnerability of oil rigs to terrorists created a political mood in which at least some gesture had to be made to protect the country's maritime resources.

The value of warships for coastal policing is self-evident. While strategists debate the utility of major warships acting over-there' and taxpayers bemoan their cost, few are likely to question either the value or cost of the lesser amounts of money spent in the attempt to prevent unwanted egress or ingress, to control shipping in coastal areas, to maintain access and surveillance over fixed installations, to prevent smuggling, discourage pollution, and soon. In this sense navies (sometimes organized as a separate coastguard) are simply a seaward extension of national police forces, and the utility of the latter is not questioned: indeed, in many countries, the requirement is likely to be for more rather than less law-enforcers. The utility of these activities is evident for all states, from the oldest maritime powers to the newest of countries: the latter, if they are coastal, are especially sensitive about sovereignty, and they will provide themselves with at least a few patrol boats *The future of many navies will lie in the carrying out of a variety of coastguard functions in those areas of water over which a degree of national jurisdiction is claimed.*⁴ (Author's italics.)



Figure 51: Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Hoists Its Rescue Swimmer. The Coast Guard's Aviation SAR Forces Can Support Over-the-Water Combat SAR During Crisis Response. (Photo by Joe Towers)



Figure 52: Coast Guard Rescue Swimmers Take a Break.

Section II

Future Requirements for Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) Commands

Summary

A majority believe there is a definite national security need for Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) Commands based on the requirement for unimpeded strategic sealift from origin to destination. They believe the MDZ Commands will still provide a valuable service by ensuring the safety and security of sealift at the origin. A large number of these participants also comment that MDZ is universally applicable and should be made an exportable capability. However, a well informed naval analyst believes otherwise for good reason.

The responses are based upon the survey question one: "What 'specialized service' could the Coast Guard perform for DoD in the next century . . . is there a gap in DOD's capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?"



Figure 53: Coast Guard ISLAND Class Patrol Boat Provides Security During Loadout of Fast Sealift Ships for Desert Shield.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Six active duty and six retired Coast Guard admirals cite the need for MDZ to ensure unimpeded sealift for the U.S. to secure its national interests. Both groups recognize that the Russians may not have the intent, but the Russian capability remains. One retired admiral sums up for all when he says that "Surface movement . . . (is) the backbone of sustainability . . . (and) port security . . . (is) an essential supporting requirement (The) portion of MDZ duties associated with safe loading/unloading of ships will be important." Though the admirals could not cite any nation as a threat, most refer to terrorists, ideological/dissident groups, or unfriendly nations conducting low-cost operations to interrupt sustainability. One active duty admiral notes that "as long as any nation has the capability to threaten our ports, (the) MDZ concept continues to be viable."

A district commander provides some additional and informative background on the formation of the MDZ commands. He takes issue with the retired captain who suggests the motive for MDZ was Admiral Hayes' objective to get closer to the Navy. "The initial effort was a 'Wartime Tasking Study' which led to the formation of the NAVGARD board and the MDZ commands. This represents the only genuine strategic thinking about our national security role in our history." The MDZ concept "gained support in the Coast Guard because it gave us a national security mission during the Reagan buildup (and may have forestalled some cuts) and was accepted by the Navy because it was acknowledged that the Navy needed help in planning for coastal defense and it did no harm to support this effort. The establishment of the MDZ had an unforeseen benefit in that it later gave Congress an excuse to divert money from (budget) function 50 (national defense) to (budget) function 400 (transportation)."

A senior Coast Guard field commander reminds readers that the Navy did not transfer "its MDZ responsibilities to the Coast Guard in order to . . . divest itself of these responsibilities. MDZ commands remain Navy organizations with commanders who happen to be Coast Guard vice admirals reporting directly to the FLTCINCs."

Though the respondents indicate that a valid need for some level of MDZ exists, some emerging indicators question this requirement. One Coast Guard admiral in a policy making position writes that we are "determining if the MDZ has, or can have, relevance in today's threat environment." A district commander writes that despite the NAVGARD Board reaffirmation in December 1991 of its continued viability, "MDZ has clearly lost some relative importance." (The NAVGARD Board also decided to reduce the number of MDZ sectors and subsectors (substantially) and to revisit this requirement in two years time.)

U.S. Navy Views

A U.S. Navy active duty admiral in a senior policy making position does not appear fully committed to a Cold War MDZ level of effort. He writes that "While Soviet threat remains,

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

decreased likelihood may relegate MDZ to a plan maintained on the shelf. The need for interservice cooperation remains. This could mean a reoriented MDZ with an emphasis on the broader potential of terrorism, or some new organization that marries USN and USCG assets into deployable teams capable of performing MDZ type functions wherever needed." This admiral also comments that a joint study group has been formed (December 1991) to determine the feasibility of making portions of the MDZ deployable.



Figure 54: Coast Guard Unit Alongside Fast Sealift Ships During Port Loadout for Desert Shield.

A four star admiral writes that a recent joint Navy-Coast Guard study in August 1991 on the role of MDZ commands concluded that the organization is viable. He says that "with some modification--particularly in implementation-- (MDZ) represents a needed capability to meet future contingencies. Exportability is a possibility being examined." Another full admiral submits that "MDZ is only one of the many diverse mission areas in which the Coast Guard can assist the Navy. Unfortunately, MDZ has become synonymous with a mental picture of the Coast Guard's only military utility."

A retired Navy admiral also supports the need for MDZ but approaches the requirement for MDZ differently. He says that the real issue is the priority that the funding for MDZ will receive in a very constrained fiscal environment. This admiral gives what he believes is the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

actual reason for MDZ commands. He considers "the transfer of MDZ responsibilities to the Coast Guard by the Navy is one of the all time smoke and mirror drills . . . Navy had no intention of clearing up the glaring deficiencies in its harbor and coastal programs; what better way to avoid trouble with Congress, than to divest itself of these responsibilities?" A retired captain adds that MDZ was "set up to provide a structure and rationalization for the Navy-Coast Guard relationship and to help the Coast Guard justify acquisition for their military missions." He believes that "short of nuclear war there was no threat to U.S. ports."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

Two CINCs agree that there is still a valid need to protect shipping. One states that "Regardless of the present world situation, the U.S. will always need a coastal defense capability. If you accept this premise, there will always be a need for: port security and safety, aids to navigation, naval control of shipping, and coastal blockade." Another CINC comments that even though the threat of global war has diminished, the Coast Guard's MDZ role is adaptable to any number of enemies to include terrorists and third world threats. A third combatant CINC states that "Discussions on the MDZ are outdated since the MDZ is likely to be deactivated soon."

Another CINC points out that, "In this era of uncertainty, with fewer assets forward deployed, we must ensure our capability to move forces safely from our home ports. In the case of seaports, we must ensure uninterrupted port operations, movement from the ports to open water, and security of passage on the high seas to the theater of operations or theater of war. In recent history, the MDZs have proven during joint exercises their capabilities in the security of home ports and coastal waterways. In the future, some designated element, such as an MDZ, will still be required, and its importance will increase. Currently, the USCG MDZs seem best suited to the task. Perhaps contingency MDZs may be required for deployment to the theater of a supported Unified Commander to support the arrival of contingency forces in coastal waterways and arrival ports in theater. This must be evaluated from the perspective of requirements to support the National Security Strategy vice arguments over Navy and Coast Guard operations and operating distances from the coast."

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

Supporting the Coast Guard admirals' assessment is the view of one of the naval analysts from the decision maker and naval analyst group. (His view also reflects the position of three other respondents in his group.) This analyst comments that:

(MDZ focuses) on protecting ports and their approaches from limited but highly disruptive threats such as submarines, swimmers, saboteurs, and minelayers. Such threats are early and cheaply mounted, requiring principally that an adversary make some limited advanced preparations. Had Iraq, for example, covertly chartered a large ocean-going ship and stocked it with sea mines prior

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

to 2 August 1990, their response to the operations of the maritime interception force could well have been extensive seeding of Chesapeake Bay or New York's harbor.




Figure 55: Coast Guard Personnel Monitor Loading of Tanks onto a Fast Sealift Ship.

In the second phase of this research, a naval analyst indicates that in the development of the Navy's *1992 Mine Warfare Plan* that, "no analyst or agency . . . (would) agree on a terrorist threat to CONUS ports, especially a mine threat. Failing this . . . notional scenarios alluding to historical examples of clandestine mining during peacetime (were developed) It proved a difficult problem - without the threat, why have the capability? I suspect the Coast Guard will have similar difficulties (with MDZ)."

Author's Assessment

The respondents make a strong case for the continued need for some level of MDZ commands. They stress the need to ensure unhindered strategic sealift from origin to destination for rapid response capability to regional crises. The Navy and Coast Guard are presently conducting a formal evaluation of MDZ's potential contribution to regional coastal warfare. A senior Coast Guard field commander says it best:

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The value of MDZ is its capability to enfold multiple coastal warfare tasks (such as port security and safety, harbor/coastal defense, mine warfare, combat search and rescue, salvage, submarine continuity of operations) under one command and control structure. These missions, which were conducted piecemeal under multiple command and control (C2) structures during Desert Shield/Storm, could have been conducted more effectively under a single focus C2 command structure. MDZ is designed to optimize operational effectiveness, in accordance with NWP-39 (*Coastal Warfare Doctrine*), and MDZ units are deployable and transportable.

Yet storm flags are at the dip, despite a CINC's comment that "the U.S. will always need a coastal defense capability." Throughout U.S. history, coastal defense has contracted and expanded, but mostly contracted, in response to the rise and fall of threats. Needing and funding a coastal defense capability are two different matters, unless the need is self-evident and acute. It is difficult to conclude that coastal defense of the continental U.S. (CONUS) will remain a requirement for DoD to support while it conducts a monumental down-sizing in an ever more fiscally constrained environment. While CONUS coastal defense may face the chop, the need for coastal warfare capabilities out-CONUS may in fact increase because of regional requirements. Current DoD and Navy strategic documents on future missions and force structure consider the littoral regions as the "strategic geographic focus" for future naval operations in regional conflicts.

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the respondents' assessment of the future need for MDZ may have altered. The participants in the survey questionnaire generated their replies during the spring of 1991, before the breakup of the Soviet Union and the advent of even larger defense budget cuts. The continued viability of MDZ commands in the post Cold War world without some significant adjustment has become difficult to image. (In fact, it has already partially occurred. In December 1991 the NAVGARD Board recommended to reduce the number of MDZ sectors and subsectors and to revisit the requirement for MDZ two years hence.) Congressional attention has not focused on MDZ requirements because the mission has never been considered critical by them. The cost is very insignificant, just a few million dollars, and there are much larger, more costly and important matters to decide right now. However, once the fights are over on the size of the Base Force, Pentagon planners will look at all requirements, including MDZ commands, for resources to cover such traditionally underfunded, but critically important, accounts as spare parts and training. Notwithstanding the possible need for regional coastal warfare capability and support demonstrated in this study, MDZ requirements for CONUS will fall low on the priority list. Furthermore, Congress might not understand the wisdom of the Navy-Coast Guard leadership maintaining MDZ commands while standing down the American global war capability.

A close examination of some of the functions of the MDZ commands in CONUS may not warrant the Coast Guard's current level of participation or even the services of a military



Figure 56: Coast Guard Utility Boat Conducting Waterside Port Security.

organization. Such duties as inspecting armored and tactical vehicles for excessive fuel levels and unauthorized ammunition storage during port loadouts do not require any specialized Coast Guard expertise. Guarding piers, waterside facilities, and adjacent waters do not require Coast Guard forces. Naval Reserves could conduct this physical security duty, and for that matter, the guard force could even be commercially contracted from private industry for protective services during a crisis response. Many DoD installations, some highly sensitive, successfully use civilian businesses for their guard force. Furthermore, unlike Vietnam, DoD did not request any Coast Guard safety supervisory teams for explosive and fuel handling in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) during Desert Storm/Shield. This could well be a precedent for the future requirement of Coast Guard forces. If they were not needed in the KTO, are they needed for the next regional conflict and, for that matter, are they needed in CONUS? (Figure 79 on page 105 depicts the Coast Guard's support to Desert Shield and Desert Storm.)

Undoubtedly the Coast Guard and Navy do provide a useful command and control infrastructure and interface for the myriad of state and federal organizations and agencies operating in U.S. ports. The need for MDZ commands to include operational considerations beyond the sea-buoy in their planning is almost negligible. The focus has shifted to those few strategic ports - selective MDZ - that would support vessel loadouts for regional conflicts. The threat has

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

become almost terrorist in nature. It is difficult to conclude that MDZ commands generate substantial justification for a Coast Guard national security role, and especially a military capability for its platforms. Furthermore, the demise of MDZ will profoundly affect the personnel requirements of the Coast Guard Reserve program.




Figure 57: Coast Guard Port Security Unit Small Boat Monitoring Saudi Boats During Desert Storm.

The fundamental shift to focus MDZ operational considerations primarily on activities occurring between the pier and the sea-buoy, and terrorist acts as the principal threats to these selective ports, affects Coast Guard forces that operate beyond the sea-buoy. Coast Guard patrol boats, buoy-tenders, and high/medium endurance cutters do not need combat systems such as the 76mm dual purpose guns, close-in-weapon systems (CIWS), chaff dispensers, sophisticated electronic countermeasures, or even chain guns for non-existent combat requirements in CONUS coastal waters. The 'MDZ threat', if present, will be inside the harbors. Carrying such combat gear for potential combat in U.S. waters is pure overhead, unless the intention is to deploy these cutters to a regional conflict. The requirement for military capability on these 'coastal cutters' will only come from the need to provide complementary Coast Guard forces to the Navy for regional contingencies. Global war reconstitution requirements for such a Coast Guard capability will not suffice. The need for Coast Guard cutters to have a minor calibre gun (40 mm or less) for maritime law enforcement purposes (deterrent and disabling capability) and

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

possible low-order confrontations with other states remains valid. More sophisticated combat systems are not needed for Coast Guard purposes.

One naval analyst suggests that with the recent demise of the Navy's Craft of Opportunity (COOP) program, that the Coast Guard should emphasize its collateral mine countermeasure (MCM) and port clearance potential. However, he notes that this suggestion would run into considerable opposition from the Naval Reserves. (A strange predicted reaction by the Naval Reserves that cannot receive funding for all its vessel requirements, yet does not want to see another organization with suitable vessels used.) Despite this possible negative reaction, MCM and port clearance is a perfect military role for the Coast Guard's new fleet of buoy-tenders without incurring the cost of new construction of a fleet of MCM vessels and single purpose crews. The Coast Guard's multi-mission concept lends itself to this type of application. (Perhaps the solution is for the Naval Reserves to provide modular MCM kits and personnel to the Coast Guard cutters when there is a contingency or regeneration MCM requirement.)



Figure 58: Coast Guard RELIANCE Class Medium Endurance Cutter Provides Training and Technical Support to a Foreign Navy Ship.

Section III

Future Coast Guard Role in Major and Lesser Regional Conflicts and Low Intensity Conflicts

Summary

There is widespread agreement that the Coast Guard has a role in major and lesser regional conflicts, but there is no common agreement on the extent of that role. While some want to build upon the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and force structure for a full range of coastal operations, including warfare, others see a more narrow role based on the Coast Guard's traditional functions of port security, maritime interdiction, and harbor defense. It is interesting to note that the CINCs believe that, with the addition of some simple and reliable combat systems, Coast Guard assets could provide some additional useful and effective service.

The responses are based upon the survey question two: "Is there a role for the Coast Guard in regional contingencies?" The figure below shows the distribution of replies.

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE						
SPRING 1991						
RESPONSES GROUP	MEMBERS	YES	YES, BUT	NO	NO, BUT	NO RESPONSE
1 U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10	10				
2 U.S. COAST GUARD RETIRED ADMIRALS	8	7	1			
3 U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3				3	
4 U.S. NAVY RETIRED ADMIRALS	7	3	1	3		
5 U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS	4	3	1			
6 DECISION MAKERS & NAVAL ANALYSTS	18	14		3	1	
7 TOTALS	50	37	3	6	4	

Figure 59: Distribution of Replies for Future Role in Regional Contingencies and Low Intensity Conflicts.



Figure 60: Coast Guard Personnel of the Maritime Interception Force Enroute to Board a Ship in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Ten active duty and seven retired Coast Guard admirals state that the Coast Guard has a role in LIC because of the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and unique capabilities, especially in patrol boats for coastal defense operations and port security. Their principal reasons are:

- o "A cost effective approach, not economically sound for Navy to maintain a fleet of such boats."
- o "No duplication, multi-mission platforms."
- o "Provides USN augmentation capabilities "
- o "Best designed and manned patrol boats in the world."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

One respondent indicates that Coast Guard "interdiction skills and equipment could play an important role . . . patrol boats could perform very well." One Coast Guard retired admiral agrees to a LIC role but "only if sealift is involved".

A Coast Guard flag officer writes that, "Both the NAVGARD Board's exploration into a deployable role for the Coast Guard and the CNO's inclusion of maritime interception force (MIF) in coastal warfare doctrine are carving out clearly defined roles for the Coast Guard in LIC in the twenty-first century." However, he believes that the recent budgetary decision to eliminate the two patrol squadron staffs seems to be backing the Coast Guard away from patrol boat involvement in major regional conflicts (MRCs) and lesser regional conflict (LRCs). He does add the caveat that the Coast Guard can still deploy patrol boats, but is no longer able to maintain the promised reaction time. Furthermore, the cancellation of the 120 Foot *HERITAGE* Class replacement patrol boat may weaken any Coast Guard's arguments for a patrol boat role in regional conflicts.

Another field commander states that, "Most of us agree that the Coast Guard should have a role to play in regional conflicts and LICs. We disagree on what precisely that role should be. My position is that the Coast Guard is a force-in-being which can and should complement naval forces to its fullest potential. The Coast Guard should be equipped and trained to operate with Navy forces to conduct offensive and defensive operations."

He argues that, "Shrinking defense budgets require that we seek to do more with less, to utilize our existing assets to their fullest potential. Presently, I believe that the Coast Guard's military potential is underutilized. This is not cost-effective. As a nation, we cannot afford to continue purchasing new forces when existing forces can be upgraded to meet our needs at lesser cost. Already we are moving in that direction. DoD forces, for example, augment law enforcement agencies in their counter-narcotics efforts by conducting surveillance, detection and monitoring of drug-smuggling activities. Likewise, the Coast Guard, which exists primarily for its maritime statutory missions, should have its military capabilities expanded to more fully augment the Navy."

U.S. Navy Views

The three active duty and three retired Navy admirals say no. The admiral in the policy making position sums up their collective position that, "There is little, if any, need for USCG forces in regional conflicts beyond maritime interdiction, port security, and harbor defense. In LIC scenarios, the Coast Guard can be of greatest value in the nation building or presence phase."

The retired flag officers say that a warfare mission area is not a Coast Guard responsibility. One notes that, "It is the Navy's responsibility for . . . combat at sea." This admiral submits that Vietnam showed coastal forces can be acquired, trained and equipped on very short notice; while he also argues that it is uneconomical to maintain them in a ready status even in the Naval

**"THE SUCCESS OF THE MARITIME INTERCEPTION FORCE
OPERATIONS WAS DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO THE
EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING PROVIDED BY THE COAST
GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS. . . . THEY
WERE INVALUABLE."**

**VADM S. R. ARTHUR, USN
COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL FORCES, CENTRAL COMMAND
MARCH 1991**

Figure 61: Quote by VADM Arthur, USN, About Coast Guard's Role in the Maritime Interception Force (MIF).

Reserve. Another flag officer believes that regional threats are too sophisticated - citing smart weapons, especially missiles - to use lesser capable Coast Guard forces and that host countries or regional allies can provide low mix forces.

The three retired admirals in favor of a role cite Coast Guard patrol boat expertise. One admiral suggests that in regard to operations in the Persian Gulf "patrol boats would have been ideal to intercept Iraqi minelayers and would also be good as pickets against small boat attacks in an amphibious objective area (AOA) or in narrow waters." The other admiral says that building a (Coast Guard LIC) capability does not make sense when the number of Navy vessels is decreasing. He argues that the Coast Guard should complement Navy capabilities, not compete. A Navy four star admiral says, "Coast Guard units will never supplant, only augment a true Navy combatant. But in LICs an augmentation resource functioning within its stated capabilities can be a force multiplier of significance."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

The three CINCs who believe there is a role have the following to say:

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o "Brown water operations with enhanced combat suites on the 110 foot patrol boats are realistic scenarios in which cutters could prove useful and effective."
- o "In a climate of decreasing budgets and the perception of a diminished threat, it is increasingly important that Coast Guard cutters be able to function as naval combatants."
- o "A simple, reliable point defense system, a simpler and smaller ASCM (anti-ship cruise missile) than Harpoon, and a simple, reliable ESM (electronic surveillance measure) sensor would do much to enhance the *BEAR* and *RELIANCE* Class cutters."
- o "Definite role for Coast Guard in regional or LIC similar to that seen during Operation Desert Shield and Storm." Coast Guard proved "invaluable".




Figure 62: Coast Guard Involvement in the 1983 Grenada Contingency.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The fourth CINC who gives a qualified no response states that, "once the new craft (thirteen 170 foot coastal patrol boats) are in the inventory, Naval Special Warfare forces will have a strong and flexible coastal patrol boat capability well into the next century." However, this CINC considers the Coast Guard "as a augmenting force. Should the scope of the conflict exceed DoD capability (too much coastline, not enough assets, etc), Coast Guard patrol boats could be employed."

One warfighting CINC adds that, "Since the USCG works in the riverine and coastal environments, its associated skills and craft inventory provide potential capabilities to support both major and lesser regional conflicts or participate in peacetime engagement activities. However, it should be highlighted that there are no laws or directives that would preclude the USCG from playing an active role in either operational spectrum."

He also asks, "If the Coast Guard is to support regional conflicts and increase its role in peacetime activities, established capabilities would have to be exercised periodically to ensure readiness and interoperability with DoD forces. The bottom line is: Can the Coast Guard assume more responsibilities given its present employment schedule?"

Another combatant CINC says that Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated that the Coast Guard has a role in regional conflicts and that "the requirement for Coast Guard participation in such conflicts can be expected to continue into the future . . ."

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

The majority of decision makers and naval analysts believe that the Coast Guard has a role and that its mix of assets is well suited to perform duties in coastal scenarios. The former secretary of the Navy says it most strongly, "The Coast Guard should carry primary responsibility for regional conflicts/low intensity conflicts involving coastal and riverine maritime operations." Others add that:

- o (Coast Guard) ships are well suited for the tasks involved, and the personnel trained and experienced. Tailor made for Coast Guard seamanship skills and background, and a mission the Navy has paid relatively little attention to compared to others.
- o (Coast Guard) contribute(s) to U.S effectiveness . . . by supplementing and complementing other U.S. military capabilities. In regional conflicts the Coast Guard can conduct interdiction operations and port security and harbor defense operations either independently or in conjunction with naval forces.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 63: Coast Guard-Navy Joint Operations.

Four respondents do not agree. The DoD assistant secretary states that the Coast Guard should "not be tasked for specific missions . . . (but) could contribute to an overseas operation on an 'ad hoc' basis . . . (with) . . . assets of opportunity, . . . (if overseas) need . . . would exceed the need for them in their regular mission."

A retired captain argues that the assignment of what is considered a traditional Navy role could lead to the absorption of the Coast Guard into the Navy. A third respondent, a naval analyst, notes that, "If the U.S. Navy finds it difficult to justify the need for small combatants, how will the Coast Guard do so? The idea of equipping the Coast Guard to better perform such a role because the Navy can no longer afford to do so seems untenable."

This naval analyst goes on to say that, "Foreign entanglements remain the primary responsibility of the U.S. Navy. Coast Guard detachments on board Navy ships, as was done during the maritime interception force operation against Iraq, makes much more sense than equipping and training the Coast Guard for carrying out Navy missions."




Figure 64: Coast Guard Port Security Unit Small Boat Conducting a Patrol During Desert Storm.

Author's Assessment

There is no disagreement that the Coast Guard can perform some sort of function(s) in MRCs, LRCs, and LICs. The issue is what to use as a base for these functions. Should they be based upon the Coast Guard's non-combat missions (such as port safety and security, maritime law enforcement, and aids to navigation)? Or should they be based upon the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and force structure for a broader range of coastal operations, including coastal warfare? The former viewpoint espouses a Coast Guard role that is primarily an extension of its peacetime missions. The latter is based upon an opinion that existing Coast Guard forces represent an inherent capability for a full range of coastal or 'green-water' operations beyond the harbor.

Those advocating the latter viewpoint will no doubt seize the words of the four star Navy Admiral in Section I, page 57 in this chapter. This senior Navy leader stresses the need for "maximum economy and efficiency" and to "challenge all sacred cows and break counterproductive rice bowls. . . . The Coast Guard offers capabilities that the DoD services do not and must be entered into the equation. Complementary capabilities should be fine tuned;

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

costly redundancies eliminated." Is this very senior Navy admiral ready to support the Coast Guard as a major force provider for coastal operations?

He knows the Navy does not have any "redundant" capabilities in duplicating the Coast Guard's port safety and security, maritime law enforcement, and aids to navigation functions. As discussed in Section I, page 65, there may be duplicative capability in some areas. Naval Reserve Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare (MIUW) units could provide forces for port security units in lieu of the Coast Guard Reserves. The Coast Guard's large ASW equipped cutters could be considered redundant, especially to a Navy retiring all its *KNOX* Class ASW frigates. Conceivably the Coast Guard's inventory of HC-130H aircraft used for wide area surveillance and the location of distressed mariners, could also be considered a redundant capability as the Navy retires large numbers of its P-3 aircraft.

One Coast Guard capability that is not redundant is its patrol boat fleet, notwithstanding the arrival of the Navy's new class of 170 foot coastal patrol boats. The Navy's boats are primarily designed to support the requirements of special operation forces (SOF), and as such are essentially fast attack craft (FAC). Whereas the Coast Guard's boats are designed for coastal interdiction and surveillance and search and rescue duties. Coastal operations in a regional conflict will probably require the services of both types of patrol boats. Clearly the Navy boats can also conduct coastal interdiction and surveillance, but at the expense of not supporting SOF operations.

If the Coast Guard patrol boats are determined to be redundant for regional conflict purposes, this would have a major outcome for the Coast Guard. Declaring Coast Guard patrol boats redundant along with changes in threat and emphasis on MDZ and CONUS coastal warfare requirements, erodes any rationale for arming these boats beyond law enforcement purposes. There is no longer a sound basis for the Coast Guard to retain its naval warfare capability, which, in turn, calls to question the Coast Guard's status as a military service.

On the other hand, if the Coast Guard patrol boats are not redundant, then the capability residing in these boats should be acknowledged and recognized by DoD before DoT, OMB, and Congress (See Chapter 4, Section I, page 102 for a related discussion on this issue of recognizing the Coast Guard's contribution to national security.) The issue of the role of Coast Guard patrol boats is extremely sensitive to many Coast Guard leaders and its resolution will have profound effects on the service. (See Chapter 3, Section 3, page 89 for a discussion on patrol boats.)

Those who advocate the other view that the Coast Guard should perform functions in regional conflicts based strictly upon its traditional peacetime missions have a strong case. As discussed the Navy has very little, if any redundant capability in these mission areas. Since these missions have had an uneven record of demand in previous conflicts, it is difficult to gauge a future requirement for such services. The Coast Guard's capability to draw upon its maritime law enforcement mission as a source of 'visit and search teams' for naval blockade and interdiction




Figure 65: Coast Guard ISLAND Class Patrol Boat Underway at Speed.

remains attractive to planners. It is difficult to be sure about the others; Coast Guard safety teams (explosives and fuel) for the Persian Gulf did not deploy, and commercial contractors provide aids to navigation services in the Persian Gulf.

In Section I, page 57 of this Chapter a Navy four star admiral says that in regard to future missions "All armed services, including the Coast Guard, will answer to the Unified CINCs' requirements." This statement certainly expresses the intent of the reforms required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act for joint, integrated defense efforts. But will it happen? Will the Navy really allow the CINCs to decide if the Coast Guard has capabilities to use? Or will it be filtered? In Chapter 7 on page 205 of this report, a full Navy Admiral says the Coast Guard should not be allowed into the joint arena without Navy sponsorship.

More importantly, if some CINCs decide that the Coast Guard does have capabilities that are useful and needed, it really does appear from these responses that some will object to their use. They will argue that the Coast Guard is not in DoD or that Coast Guard forces exist for Coast Guard missions, and they will forget that the Coast Guard also has a statutory requirement to




Figure 66: Coast Guard Cutters Use the Navy's MK75 76MM Dual Purpose Surface Gun.

serve in the Navy. The whole matter of Coast Guard involvement in this issue becomes a circular argument.

Again, the evaluation of the Coast Guard's role in "exportable MDZ" (deployable littoral defense) will be a clear signal of how DoD, especially the Navy, views the Coast Guard's contribution to national security.

Section IV
Future Coast Guard Role as DoD's Force Manager
for Coastal Patrol Boats

Summary

The disagreement over the extent the Coast Guard should be involved in a naval warfare capability is evident in these responses to the proposal to designate the Coast Guard as the DoD's force manager for coastal patrol boats. The majority of Coast Guard admirals and approximately one half of the decision maker and naval analyst group believe the Coast Guard's experience, expertise, and force mix as well as reasons of efficiencies and economies justify this designation. The CINCs, the Navy admirals, and the other half of the decision maker and naval analyst group say no, principally because the Coast Guard is not part of DoD and that warfare is not a primary Coast Guard function.

The responses are based upon the survey question three, "With its assets, expertise, and experience in coastal and patrol boat operations, should the Coast Guard be designated as DoD's force manager and primary provider for patrol boats for regional contingencies?" The figure below shows the distribution of replies.

RESPONSES GROUP		SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE SPRING 1991				
		MEMBERS	YES	YES BUT	NO	NO BUT NO RESPONSE
1 U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10		4	3	3	
2 U.S. COAST GUARD RETIRED ADMIRALS	8		5	1	1	1
3 U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3		1		2	
4 U.S. NAVY RETIRED ADMIRALS	7		1	1	5	
5 U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS	4				4	
6 DECISION MAKERS & NAVAL ANALYSTS	18		5	2	11	
7 TOTALS	50		16	7	26	1

Figure 67: Distribution of Replies for Future Role as a Force Provider or Manager of Coastal Patrol Boats.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 68: Comparative Advantage: Coast Guard: Coastal Patrol Boats. Navy: Large Surface Combatants. Coast Guard POINT Class Patrol Boat and Navy KNOX Class Fast Frigate.

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Four Coast Guard active duty admirals say "absolutely yes" citing the direct applicability of Coast Guard forces and missions, experience (Vietnam), and expertise as well as efficiency and economy. Three other admirals agree, but did not think it realistically or politically feasible. If tasked to provide a full time LIC capability in its patrol boats, they argue that the Navy would want to control (operate and manage) them. They also feel that it is a "no win option over funding and rice bowls." One sums it up by stating that though "we have the experience and expertise - look what we did with the E-2C (aircraft). Notwithstanding purple suit talk, it is too glaring an incursion into their (DoD) sand box and not politically acceptable."

Another three active duty admirals say no because the Navy has global experience and is better suited to managing all aspects of naval warfare, and that the Coast Guard is not billeted nor budgeted for such additional duties. One predicts a conflict if the Coast Guard tries to serve both DoT and DoD. Furthermore, he is not sure Congress would authorize patrol boats in theater to the detriment of (the Coast Guard's) peacetime missions. The third feels it unlikely that the Coast Guard would seek, or Navy would support, or that even DoD would agree to "elevate" Coast Guard's national defense role beyond its current definition.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

One Coast Guard flag officer writes that, "I do not support such a designation naval warfare rests with the Navy." However, he adds a caveat that, "The Navy's patrol boats should be the first responders to a military situation (whereas) Coast Guard patrol boats should be armed and trained to augment the Navy's boats." He believes such an approach will allow the Navy to maintain a smaller patrol boat fleet, if the Coast Guard patrol boats retain a military capability.

The retired Coast Guard admirals who state unequivocally that the Coast Guard should have this designation use the same rationale as their active duty counterparts. They also cite cost effectiveness reasons for avoiding duplication. One retiree argues that "It's a force-in-being in times of budget shortages." Another presents an additional reason that, "The Navy seems to have little interest in craft the size of patrol boats. In my personal interaction with senior Navy officers, with very few exceptions, they could hardly be bothered. "




Figure 69: Requisite Coastal Expertise: Alongside Small Boat Operations.

However, these admirals do not believe it is feasible due to:

- o legitimate budgetary, administrative, and political reasons.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o location of Coast Guard in DoT, not DoD, and DoD's responsibility naval warfare.

Furthermore they note that not all (Coast Guard) commandants and secretaries of transportation are interested in wartime missions. They suggest cooperative efforts and compromise, arguing that it is "better for DoD to retain the function of patrol boat manager with an appropriate agreement for Coast Guard participation to provide some level of patrol boats" than to debate the issue.

U.S. Navy Views

The one active duty Navy admiral who thinks the Coast Guard should be the force manager notes that, "As the only operator of patrol boats on a routine basis, Coast Guard is the expert . . . avoids duplication . . . provides extra funding for the Coast Guard for additional boats held in reserve to avoid mission loss."

The two Navy admirals who state no indicate that:

- o "extensive civil responsibilities make it impractical for Coast Guard to be primary provider Coast Guard hard pressed to assume a major new role as DoD's force manager for patrol boats without more resources placing force manager outside DoD takes away a good measure of DoD's control of its destiny also places Coast Guard in a different light, from primarily a maritime law enforcement service to a mini-Navy this is not in the best interests of U.S. . . . (There would be) executive and legislative resistance to using Coast Guard patrol boats for contingency operations because of their need for domestic operations."
- o "Patrol boats are potentially valuable LIC assets, but that should not be their primary reason (for being) President and Congress not willing to send overseas as long as narcotics smuggling continues to be a severe domestic problem. Militarily, these vessels are ill equipped to defend themselves in a hostile environment, and too noisy and slow for use in SOF."

A four star active duty admiral pens that, "This is a non-starter. It's pure turf battle on both sides. The Coast Guard is not adequately staffed and doctrinally prepared to take on this responsibility, even were it not for the disparity between multi- and single-mission craft."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

One retired Navy flag officer agrees with the Coast Guard becoming the force manager, but says that the objections are really turf issues:

"It's a mission consistent with other Coast Guard missions; it would preclude the need for a duplicate Navy force structure and ensure top people crewing them . . . (since) small boats have not been an historic launch pad for high rank in the Navy."




Figure 70: Requisite Coastal Expertise: Open Sea Small Boat Transfers of Personnel. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

Five retired Navy admirals say no principally because the Coast Guard is not part of DoD and warfare is not a primary Coast Guard function. They also offer the following:

- o causes a "hodgepodge of material and personnel programs."
- o Coast Guard forces would be "unresponsive to the commanders."
- o "widely separate accountability."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o "Coast Guard does not train against the sophisticated weapons to be expected in LIC."
- o "Coast Guard can't meet its own needs and would not be successful funding more duties."
- o "Coast Guard expertise in this warfare area does not exceed Navy's."
- o "DoT has not funded Coast Guard out-of-area operations insisting that DoD do so."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

All four CINCs say no to this question because the different missions for the Coast Guard patrol boats set these boats apart with their differing requirements. The CINCs state that multi-mission Coast Guard boats are not good at any one mission and that a DoD patrol boat is optimized as a single mission platform. Another disadvantage they mention is the extra administrative requirement in the procurement process that the inclusion of the Coast Guard would bring to an already complicated process. Though they recognize that the Coast Guard has the patrol boat experience and expertise, the Coast Guard does not have the staffing for this new responsibility. One CINC adds that "The SBS (special boat squadrons) assigned to Naval Special War (forces) have the assets, expertise, and experience in coastal and patrol boat operations to conduct this mission."

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

Five respondents from the decision makers and naval analyst group support the designation. The former very senior civilian decision maker in DoN states that this designation should include primary provider for riverine as well as coastal warfare. One naval analyst comments that "This concept would be consistent with jointness and making maximum use of all services in contingencies". However, he adds that "possible problems include service friction and distraction from Coast Guard primary missions, which offers Congressional actors opportunity to play both ends against the middle . . . (But) on whole if USN/USCG could get together on this concept, it should work." Another naval analyst exempts from this designation "those craft dedicated to special operations."

One retired captain writes that "OP-03 . . . is understandably preoccupied with the high end of the force structure mix. The Coast Guard could give much needed "visibility" to this often-overlooked, yet increasingly important, segment of the maritime force structure." Another retired captain suggests that "it would be a logical approach. However, arrangements for funding such a mission could be a serious problem." The Coast Guard civilian believes that

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

"Political realities will not permit it. Neither Congress nor the Navy want the Coast Guard to have a real USN role in the DoD sense."

Eleven respondents from the decision maker and naval analyst group, including the senior person from DoD, do not support such a designation. One naval analyst writes the, "Coast Guard should not aspire to a role primarily military." A second naval analyst states that:

The missions for Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats are fundamentally different. Navy patrol boats are operated by Special Boat Squadrons in support of Navy special operations forces. Most of their operations are of short duration and require heavy fire power and covertness. Attempts to 'homogenize' the two separate patrol boat forces into one 'all purpose' force would cause a general degradation in capabilities of each as compromises were made to accommodate less than optimal mission training and patrol boat outfitting.

A third analyst is concerned where the Coast Guard would find assets for this mission, either those normally employed in CONUS or special assets held in reserve. He notes that:

If, from the former, then protection of U.S. coastal waters or sea-going commercial assets near major ports would suffer from a reduction in Coast Guard patrols at precisely the time when threats to those assets from man-made sources are most likely to increase. If patrol boat assets are, in fact, drawn from reserves, then there is little reason to place such reserves under Coast Guard control when their principal purpose is to operate in foreign waters during times of crisis or armed conflict -- a Navy, not Coast Guard, responsibility.

A fourth naval analyst notes that the "Coast Guard has a pretty full plate already, without undertaking a new principal context." The DoT person, though he believes the Coast Guard should insure its operating procedures and equipment are compatible to DoD modes of operation, does not think the Coast Guard should be so designated.

Author's Assessment

This is a contentious issue that predictably falls along service lines. The Coast Guard prides itself on its patrol boat expertise and vast experience. Many Coast Guard senior leaders believe if there is any warfare resource that the Coast Guard could and should justifiably and logically provide, it is patrol boat capability for coastal warfare. This issue causes a great amount of frustration for them, because they see a better rationale for the Coast Guard to provide this capability than to provide ASW equipped cutters for ocean convoy. Perhaps there is even some irritation that it is another example of a "mission that the Navy doesn't want, but won't let others acquire." Yet, they are not blind to the powerful arguments against this force manager designation vice force provider.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 71: Requisite Coastal Forces: Coast Guard ISLAND Class Patrol Boat on Coastal Surveillance.

A senior Coast Guard operational commander sums up this attitude of exasperation and displeasure over the current relationship:

The Coast Guard is more experienced in coastal operations in peacetime than is the Navy, and should be able to make the transition to wartime coastal operations readily, as was demonstrated in Operation Market Time during the Vietnam War and in Operation Desert Shield/Storm. In time I'm sure that the Navy could spool up a credible naval coastal force, but why not include the Coast Guard, as was done in the MDZ commands? The Coast Guard can help the Navy fill its void in naval coastal warfare capabilities.

His observation has been made by others. SRI International prepared a report for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Engineering, and Systems) in September 1987. This report forecasted the future strategic environment for the year 2000 and beyond, and the role of the Navy in the national strategy for this forecast period. Buried in an appendix is the following:

The Coast Guard's drug enforcement and fisheries enforcement missions provide an excellent grounding in the type of operations that would be necessary to

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

support a "quarantine". The U.S. Coast Guard has a large force of patrol boats, which is now undergoing a modernization program.⁵ *In general, the Coast Guard provides a force of superb boat handlers with extensive inshore/coastal operational experience.* (Author's italics.)

This issue has major implications for the Coast Guard in its present patrol boat replacement acquisition program. The venerable 82 Foot *POINT* Class patrol boat, veteran of Vietnam service, requires replacement. If there are no coastal warfare requirements from the CINCs (or the Navy), there may be no need for the replacement craft to have a military capability. Arming and equipping Coast Guard patrol boats for coastal defense duties in U.S. home waters is highly unlikely in today's defense budget environment.

Perhaps, as suggested by a couple of respondents, there is a middle ground on the patrol boat issue. A former CNO suggests that the Coast Guard could be designated a "major provider" of patrol boats vice a "force manager". This is a reasonable compromise, which leaves the Navy in control and yet gives the Coast Guard a credible military role. But undoubtedly there will be those who will say that mission requirements between the two naval services are so diverse that it is impossible to use this approach. Perhaps. Surely there must be common ground, from which reasonable men can solve this issue.

Though the missions of the Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats are fundamentally different, it is not simply a question of multi-mission Coast Guard versus single-mission Navy boats. Coast guards and navies require patrol boats for four principal purposes:

- o Fast attack
- o Coastal patrol and interdiction
- o Search and rescue
- o Special warfare

As discussed the Navy's new class of 170 foot coastal patrol boats are primarily designed to support the requirements of special operation forces (SOF) or special warfare, and are essentially armed and equipped as fast attack craft (FAC). The Coast Guard's boats are designed for coastal patrol and interdiction and search and rescue duties. Coastal operations in a regional conflict will probably require the services of both types of patrol boats. Clearly the Navy boats can also conduct coastal interdiction and surveillance, but at the expense of not supporting SOF operations. And as one CINC notes in Section III, page 83, depending on the size of regional conflict, these few Navy boats may require augmentation.

Are each service's patrol boat requirements that rigid, and firm, that there can be no adjustments between the Navy and the Coast Guard? (See Chapter 4, Section V, page 111 on a related discussion on the Coast Guard's use of DoD platforms.) Can not the approach represented in

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century



Figure 72: Requisite Coastal Forces: Coast Guard Personnel Crew Light Surface Weapon.

the quote, "Best is the enemy of good enough" be applied, or are planners still operating under a philosophy of "thinking richer, not smarter"?

Danish industry and the Danish Navy have a ship concept that could serve as a model approach for both the Navy and Coast Guard with additional economic benefits for the nation. They have a 54 meter ship that is both a Coast Guard cutter and a Navy combatant depending on the configuration of its installed modules; surveillance, minelaying, attack, mine countermeasures, and oil pollution control. Their concept is called the Standard Flex 300. Such an approach has been applied by the Swedish Pelmatic Company to their 33 meter MCV33, multi purpose coast guard patrol boat. Their boat comes equipped with various modules for coastal patrol and interdiction, fast surface combatant, special warfare, search and rescue, diving support, mine warfare, fire fighting, and even initial environmental response. U.S. industry could produce its version of a modular boat. Worldwide there is a considerable market for such a patrol boat with such versatile capability. Furthermore, the modular patrol boat concept becomes even more attractive to the world's navies, if they see the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard operating a modular type patrol boat. Foreign military sales by U.S. companies of such a patrol boat will definitely help an ailing U.S. economy, and the production of such a craft will also help the U.S. maintain its maritime industrial base.




Figure 73: Requisite Coastal Experience: Coast Guard Conducts Thousands of Boardings Each Year. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

The Coast Guard respondents may be concerned not so much over the role of patrol boats, but the more fundamental question of what that role represents to the Coast Guard's continued contribution as a military service. Patrol boats without combat systems, greatly reduced requirement for CONUS MDZ commands, no threat requirement to arm Coast Guard cutters for operations in U.S. waters, and possibly no deployment role for Coast Guard cutters to regional conflicts, generate a new calculus for the level of effort the Coast Guard devotes to its status as an Armed Force. The Coast Guard to justify a military capability for its cutters will use requirements based strictly on law enforcement needs, deterrence and ship disabling, and possibly low-order confrontations with regional states.

The international legal definition of a warship does not require the vessel to be armed to be considered a warship. "For the purposes of this Convention, 'warship' means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline." (*U.N. Law of the Sea Convention 1982*, Article 29). Warships or Coast Guard cutters are extensions of U.S. sovereign territory and enjoy all the rights and privileges of a U.S. ambassador in his overseas embassy. However, a state vessel



Figure 74: Requisite Coastal Experience: Coast Guard Resources Have a Long History of Coastal-Littoral Operations.

need not be a Navy combatant or a Coast Guard cutter to enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity. Naval auxiliaries and other state owned and operated vessels can have this status conferred upon them by the state. In summary a government vessel does not need armament and its crew need not necessarily be military members for the ship to have sovereign immunity under international law. The loss of the Coast Guard's military capability from its cutters does not prevent these cutters from enforcing U.S. laws and international treaties. The presence of combat systems provides the means to demonstrate credible U.S. resolve in a confrontation or crisis (coercive diplomacy), but the systems are not required to justify the cutters' role as a federal vessel.

Chapter Four

The U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with the Department of Defense




Figure 75: Navy-Coast Guard Interoperability - Navy LAMPS I Helicopter Lands on BEAR Class Cutter.

Section I Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by DoD

Summary

The proposal to include the Coast Guard as part of DoD's Base Force and the total naval force package presented to Congress is almost evenly split. All the Coast Guard admirals and one half of the decision maker and naval analyst group say yes because not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets, understates U.S. defense capability. Since Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' war planning documents, these admirals argue that the assets should be recognized before Congress. One CINC, the Navy admirals, and one half of the decision maker and naval analyst group say that there should be no recognition.

The responses are based upon the survey question five: "Should DoD formally recognize and include Coast Guard assets as part of an integrated total naval force package when testifying before DoD Congressional oversight committees?" Figure 76 shows the distribution of replies.

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE						
SPRING 1991						
RESPONSES GROUP	MEMBERS	YES	YES BUT	NO	NO BUT	NO RESPONSE
1 U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10	4	1	2		3
2 U.S. COAST GUARD RETIRED ADMIRALS	8	5	1	1		1
3 U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3	1		2		
4 U.S. NAVY RETIRED ADMIRALS	7	5	1	1		
5 U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS	4			3		1
6 DECISION MAKERS & NAVAL ANALYSTS	18	4	3	4		7
7 TOTALS	50	19	6	13		12

Figure 76: Distribution of Replies for Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities in DoD's Force Presentations.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 77: Coast Guard Involvement in the 1989 St. Croix "NEO".

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Most Coast Guard active duty and retired admirals state that the Navy should include (recognize) Coast Guard forces for specific mission and capabilities before Congress. They argue that not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets, understates U.S. defense capability. They also note that, since Coast Guard assets are included in DoD war planning documents, they should be referenced in the Navy's force planning submissions to Congress. However, if Coast Guard forces are shown, a retired admiral recommends that the forces must be properly characterized for what they are and the ground rules for and the implications of their availability clearly stated. He says that "the Coast Guard must be careful not to mislead anyone on the utility of its assets." His recommended fix is to include the Coast Guard assets in a separate category. (Note that there is total agreement to keep Coast Guard and Navy budgets separate.)

The two dissenting Coast Guard active duty admirals do not want to include the Coast Guard in a Navy force package because it would mean Coast Guard assets may be available for contingency service which is a false premise. One retired Coast Guard admiral also disagrees

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

and says that Coast Guard forces should not be included as it might increase scrutiny of Coast Guard programs and that the Navy would oppose the idea, as it might serve to reduce gray hulls. One active duty Coast Guard flag officer believes that there is no benefit to Navy by including the Coast Guard, since Congress would tell the Navy to make do with less.

In the same vein another Coast Guard retired flag officer believes that it is a "good idea but it won't happen; no mechanism in Congress and or in the administration . . . plus DoD and DoT have no incentive for such cooperation." He also says that "just prior to (his) retirement one former CNO even suggested that the CNO should testify before a Coast Guard appropriations hearing. It never happened, because DoD (Navy) feels that the Coast Guard is a competitor for funds and not a partner in a total force package."




Figure 78: Navy-Coast Guard Joint Operations - HAMILTON/HERO Class Cutter with a Navy Cruiser.

In lieu of including the Coast Guard, an admiral suggests that the Congressional Armed Services Committees "should change their charter to include oversight of the Coast Guard expenditures for national security items. The oversight should be in the nature of awareness of what the Coast Guard's plans are for a total comprehensive integrated effect."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

A district commander believes that recent "Congressional budgetary machinations may provide some insight (into) 'rice bowls'. For the first time in its history, two-thirds of the Coast Guard Reserve's budget is being taken out of function 50. The significance is that this is the percentage Congress felt was 'defense' vs 'domestic' related. Since the budget agreement with the White House stipulates that domestic and defense appropriations are cut equally, Congress has scrambled to push traditional domestic spending under the defense column. Two can play at this game. How much 'grey hull' time is provided doing domestic drug enforcement? How much wartime capability can be swept up in the domestic missions of the Coast Guard. We may be seeing the start of an interesting budgetary shell game obfuscated by the question, where does national defense end and national security begin? It is conceivable that the rules of the game may change enough that it will be to DoD's advantage to champion the Coast Guard's domestic budget to preserve some military capability lost to the defense budget."

A senior flag officer states that, "The Coast Guard should be included in the total naval force package presented before Congress, especially in this era of shrinking budgets. It is important




Figure 79: Coast Guard Involvement in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

that Congress understands how Coast Guard military capabilities augment those of the Navy, so that the needs of the Navy are neither understated (because Coast Guard military capabilities are

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

overrated by the Congress) or overstated (because Coast Guard military capabilities are ignored)."

U.S. Navy Views

Only one active duty admiral states that the Coast Guard should be included in total Navy force packages before Congress. The Navy admiral in the policy making position writes that "Including Coast Guard assets as part of an integrated total Navy force package before Congressional oversight committees would limit the operational flexibility the Navy gets from Coast Guard forces. If Congress began to equate USCG cutters with USN ships, the Navy would lose ships which the Coast Guard would be expected to replace."

A four star admiral notes that, "This is the key to the whole issue. Congress must be made to see and support a viable contingency military role for the Coast Guard short of global declared war. Funding, oversight, and inter-departmental issues must be solved."

One retired Navy admiral makes an argument for including the Coast Guard before Congress based on the need to formalize the relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard. He suggests that "DoD should include Coast Guard assets in its annual posture statement and make it clear in that statement when and how and under what circumstances Coast Guard forces are available for augmenting naval units. It is recommended that this approach be initiated in order to clarify and codify our thinking in DoD, the Navy, DoT, and the Coast Guard on this matter." A second retired Navy admiral says "absolutely yes" to include before Congress, but another counters not to include because there is a mismatch in missions (between Navy and Coast Guard).

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

Three CINCs gives a definite no to this proposal. One CINC indicates that the Commandant of the Coast Guard could go before the Congressional defense committees on his own to provide this information.

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

The decision maker and naval analysts group is divided over this proposal. One naval analyst writes that it is a "good idea only if there is agreement and working relationships between USCG and Navy." However, a second analyst believes that "It has not been a significant issue." Another analyst gives practical reasons for not including the Coast Guard that "No organization should be subjected to additional Congressional oversight." Another analyst sees political risk, but feels the benefits are worth the effort. He notes that it could be "dangerous. People, especially in a budget-conscious period, will ask 'why have two navies when all we need is

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

one?" Still the opportunity to be included in the planning - not forgotten - is important enough to justify the risk."

Another naval analyst addresses political concerns over this proposal that "Both services stand to lose some autonomy and, more significantly, will be subjected to pressures to reduce force structure because of the perceived opportunity to integrate assets and the inevitable integration of missions. Each services' missions and requirement are unique . . . to combine them would force compromise which would beget an overall reduction in capabilities."

The DoT respondent says the Coast Guard should pursue an information campaign with House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee to ensure staff and members understand Coast Guard's role and capabilities. One retired captain states that if DoD recognized the Coast Guard as part of the naval force, DoD should also have oversight responsibility.




Figure 80: Coast Guard HC-130H Aircraft Equipped with APS-137 Radar Is a Formidable Surveillance Resource.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

Author's Assessment

This issue also causes a great amount of frustration for the Coast Guard leadership. The Coast Guard is a member of the defense team and since there is such great emphasis on "jointness", it seems unreasonable and inconsistent not to recognize the Coast Guard. Why the fear? Why explanations that sound more like excuses: "The Coast Guard is not in DoD."? The Coast Guard regardless is still a U.S. Armed Force.

Is the inclusion of the relatively minor, but singular, Coast Guard capabilities and forces so threatening, that DoD and the Navy could not survive? That's very doubtful. Is the inclusion so potentially confusing to Congress that they would lump the Navy and Coast Guard together? That's very doubtful too. A Navy four star admiral says, "Coast Guard units will never supplant, only augment a true Navy combatant." Surely the Congress can understand and accept that statement without reading in to it the "potential" for Coast Guard cutters to form rival carrier battle groups.

Congress and DoD do a nice job separating and not confusing the two land armies that the U.S. maintains, i.e., the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. Congress is smart, and so is DoD. Three hundred years ago the world navies solved a similar problem by designating ships of the line as first rate, second rate, third rate, and so on. Their scheme worked and people understood the differences. It is not unrealistic to believe that we can not solve this problem today? Reasonable men and woman can find ways to present this information without threatening or confusing anyone. What did that active duty full Navy admiral say (Chapter 3, Section I, page 57) about it being time to break rice bowls? It is difficult not to conclude that this is another example that the Navy wants it both ways; they want Coast Guard assets but do not want to recognize their contribution because they fear increased budgetary responsibility for the Coast Guard's national security role at the Navy's expense.

There are latent hard feelings over this issue because it is difficult to reconcile why Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' contingency plans, but are not recognized as contributing to the national security before Congress. As reported above, a Navy four star admiral notes that, "Congress must be made to see and support a viable contingency military role for the Coast Guard short of global declared war." Well, who's going to do that? The Coast Guard on its own? Not likely. Only DoD with DoT input and JCS and CNO concurrence will make this happen.

Including the Coast Guard as suggested by the Navy retired flag officer would, at a minimum, force the Navy to "clarify and codify our thinking in DoD, the Navy, DoT, and the Coast Guard on this matter."



Figure 81: Coast Guard EC-130V Aircraft with Rotodome Air Search Radar.




Figure 82: BEAR Class Medium Endurance Cutter.

Section II

Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by the Unified Commanders

Summary

If the Unified Commanders (CINCs) plan to use the Coast Guard in a national security role, the majority of participants believe the CINCs should include the Coast Guard in the CINCs' submissions for force planning requirements. They that argue not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets understates U.S. defense capability. They also note that since Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' contingency plans, they should be referenced in the CINCs' force planning submissions. The CINCs do not support such inclusion.

The responses are based upon the survey question seven: "If the CINCs intend to use the Coast Guard, should the Unified Commands include the Coast Guard in their submissions for force planning requirements to JCS/OSD?" Figure 83 shows the distribution of replies.

		SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE				
		SPRING 1991				
RESPONSES GROUP	MEMBERS	YES	YES BUT	NO	NO BUT	NO RESPONSE
1. U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10	4	3			3
2. U.S. COAST GUARD RETIRED ADMIRALS	8	6				2
3. U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3			1		2
4. U.S. NAVY RETIRED ADMIRALS	7	2		2		3
5. U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS	4			3		1
6. DECS ON MANEERS ANALYSTS	18	7	2	4		5
* TOTALS	50	19	5	10		16

Figure 83: Distribution of Replies for Formal Recognition of Coast Guard Capabilities by the Unified Commanders.




Figure 84: Coast Guard ISLAND Class Patrol Boat on Search and Rescue Response.

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Four Coast Guard active duty admirals believe the supported CINCs should include (recognize) Coast Guard forces. One admiral comments that from the secretary of defense's perspective there is no desire to deal with Coast Guard required force levels; Department of the Navy (DoN) and DoD value Coast Guard as an off-budget resource of limited value that may be available and have no current interest in clarifying that viewpoint or altering it. Another says the Coast Guard needs to prod the CINCs more proactively. He suggests Coast Guard area commanders talk directly to their supported CINCs about anticipated needs for Coast Guard forces and clearly define what the Coast Guard is capable of producing and performing.

A Coast Guard flag officer states that, "the Coast Guard should be included as part of the total force package, and thus should be included in the warfighting CINCs' force planning submissions."

All retired Coast Guard admirals agree with this proposal, offering an additional reason why:

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

- o "Not to show Coast Guard forces as part of the potentially available assets understates U.S. defense capability." Since Coast Guard assets are included in the CINCs' contingency plans, they should be referred to in the CINCs' force planning submissions to the JCS.

An active duty admiral suggests that, "Each warfighting CINC should have a Coast Guard notional force, which would be triggered through a centralized pool of resources. (And assigned to the CINC) . . . a permanent (Coast Guard) staff."

U.S. Navy Views

One active duty Navy admiral does not recommend inclusion of the Coast Guard since the Coast Guard is not part of DoD and is considered as (some sort of free) contingency asset. (There were no other active duty Navy replies.)

A retired Navy flag officer comments that "you can't count on timely commitment of Coast Guard forces . . . imprudent to consider them". Moreover, he adds that the "addition of Coast Guard forces would not have a significant effect on either the strategy or naval force application" since he considers the Coast Guard to be a fortuitously available force. Another retired admiral pursues this force-of-opportunity argument. He writes that the CINCs state their "requirements in terms of naval forces needed, and the Navy sees that the proper (naval) forces are procured, equipped, and trained. If at the time contingency plans are exercised or implemented, naval forces are inadequate and there are Coast Guard forces available for augmentation, that is the time the decision should be made to include Coast Guard forces."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

Two CINCs state no for the following reasons:

- o "I do consider and request Coast Guard assets for contingency planning whenever the nature of a contingency warrants their use." However, . . . (in) my AOR, maritime contingencies don't occur very often, therefore predicting what my requirements for Coast Guard forces are would be difficult. Hence, I am not in favor of including Coast Guard assets in my force requirements and budget requests, since inclusion would not reflect my day to day requirements."
- o "If included, dual tasking and potential service conflict could result."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The third CINC comments that he considers Coast Guard forces as resources-of-opportunity. He states that a warfighting CINC will take advantage of any forces made available to him and implies that he had done this with Coast Guard assets that are located and available in his area of operations.

A fourth CINC notes that, "If MDZs are to be included in DoD's future requirements, then Coast Guard capabilities must be considered in meeting requirements across the entire operational continuum. Maintaining and modernizing the Coast Guard's capabilities must be considered in the context of a thoroughly joint viewpoint, rather than simply by a Navy-Coast Guard Board."

He also states that, "Procurement and developmental issues involving Coast Guard assets, or those which impact on future Coast Guard capabilities, should be resolved in a joint context as well. DoD should, perhaps, identify capability requirements, and an interdepartmental entity should make procurement or budgetary recommendations for presentation to Congress."




Figure 85: Crisis Response: Coast Guard Involvement in the 1980 Cuban Boatlift.

A fifth CINC writes, "DoD does recognize the Coast Guard in its planning doctrine and should in theory count fully dedicated defense assets in force planning submissions. However, these

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

assets are small in number with only reserve port security unit assets being fully dedicated to national security. Warfighting hardware on Coast Guard ships has and should continue to be funded by the Navy. However, since these ships have multi-mission responsibilities, they should not be counted as DoD assets in force planning submissions due to potentially conflicting priorities which are often governed by law. Additionally, even fully armed USCG ships do not have the capabilities needed by the Navy in heavy conflicts."

A Joint Staff flag officer comments that the issue of including "Coast Guard assets in planning submissions, is one which we have addressed on the Joint Staff. We have long recognized the value of the Coast Guard in roles not traditionally assigned. The *1993-1995 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) directs CINCs desiring to use Coast Guard forces or resources for planning, to submit the requirements to their naval component commander for validation and subsequent coordination with the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The specific apportionment of Coast Guard forces is also addressed in the JSCP, but the details are classified. These procedures should assist in correcting this perceived shortcoming."

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

Seven persons from the decision maker naval analyst state 'yes'. One naval analyst argues that:

"To plan to use Coast Guard forces and not inform OSD risks redundant tasking and possible unavailability of forces during a contingency . . . (and also) incurs the risk of inadequate funding should use of Coast Guard forces be necessary."

Three retired captains offer the following insight:

- o "Ideally, yes, the Unified CINCs should include the Coast Guard in their annual prioritized list of requirements But this should only be done if the Navy and Coast Guard are somehow more closely integrated, both organizationally and operationally. An independent competition for resources by the Coast Guard in this arena would probably be counterproductive."
- o "Usually, the FLTCINCs (Fleet CINCs) are aware of our capabilities and their MDZ relationship will call on us, but CINCs (except CINC CENTRAL) don't want, know, or care about us except when we offer to do something, without cost to them. In truth, Coast Guard officers write in (the) Coast Guard in (the) JCS, Navy, CINC, FLTCINC plans If not, no input."

The DoT participant says that in his experience CINCs have shown uneven treatment of Coast Guard capabilities.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

One naval analyst notes sharply that "If in a future contingency the Coast Guard's expertise at inshore operations and their equipment for doing them is of critical importance, then they will be called upon. It is absurd to turn them into a poor edition of a third-world Navy for use in overseas adventures when they have more than enough to do at home." A retired captain warns that if the CINCs include the Coast Guard "watch out for the end of your existence as a separate service."




Figure 86: Coast Guard CASA Logistics Aircraft Was Used to Fly U.S. Ambassador out of Haiti in December 1991.

Author's Assessment

This issue relates closely to the previous section and, like it, frustrates the Coast Guard leadership for many of the same reasons. It can only be stressed that this frustration and confusion about the Coast Guard's role increases when CINCs cite the Coast Guard's role in crisis de-escalation response and security assistance (see Chapter 3, Section I, page 59). To read such an assessment and then read that the Coast Guard capabilities cannot be recognized by the CINCs because the Coast Guard is not in DoD or is fully employed elsewhere is disconcerting to say the least. It seems like Alice in Wonderland logic.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

This issue also relates to the statement by the active duty Navy four star admiral (Chapter 3, Section I, page 57) who says, "All armed services, including the Coast Guard, will answer to the Unified CINCs' requirements." The flag officer on the Joint Staff notes that the CINCs' requirement for Coast Guard forces will be worked through the each CINC's Navy component commander with the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The issue here is not so much appearing on the CINCs' Integrated Priority List (IPL), but to receive CINC recognition when the CINC addresses the contributions of all Armed Forces that support his theater objectives.

How DoD leadership tends to obfuscate this issue is clearly demonstrated by the CINC's statement in the above. He states that since Coast Guard cutters "have multi-mission responsibilities, they should not be counted as DoD assets in force planning submissions due to potentially conflicting priorities which are often governed by law. Additionally, even fully armed Coast Guard ships do not have the capabilities needed by the Navy in heavy conflicts." Then why does the Coast Guard have ASW equipped high endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters with an anti-ship warfare mission area, or aircraft written into the contingency plans as long-range maritime patrol platforms? It seems almost as if he might as well add: 'For reasons I can't discuss Coast Guard forces have a military capability.' It seems to be forgotten that the Coast Guard has a statutory requirement to serve as an Armed Force, and therefore DoD has an obligation, if not a requirement, to plan and recognize the use of the Coast Guard. The issue of the Coast Guard being too busy or having too many other duties does not lessen or remove this statutory requirement.

A former CNO comments explains why Coast Guard assets can not be counted. He reasons that, "the force level argument is inherently insupportable given the consistent bias which systems analysts and budget analysts take on striving for the lowest common denominator. This will be especially true in the years immediately ahead as a massive effort will be directed towards force level re-education on the part of budget analysts everywhere. If the U.S. Coast Guard cutters were to be countered equivalent to a FFG-7 or an *ARLEIGH BURKE* (destroyer), one would not be surprised to find U.S. Navy officers taking rather strong exception, especially given the fact that for as long as any of us can recall, we have a substantial shortfall in the numbers of surface combatants 'required' to meet national security objectives. This is not to suggest that the U.S. Coast Guard is not a highly useful member of the maritime team. Clearly it is. And clearly, also, it deserves the strong support of the U.S. Navy in meeting its prescribed mission. Perhaps the real issue is, is now the time to change the statutory mission for the U.S. Coast Guard? I doubt it."

The former CNO has an argument that reflects his assessment of the 'devious mentality of budgeteers'. But it does not answer why the Coast Guard is arming and equipping its cutters and aircraft and writing itself into contingency plans. What is really being said here is that if the Navy needs more assets, the Navy will fill the requirement, and not Coast Guard resources. If like capability between the Navy and the Coast Guard is being compared then this is a strong argument. But it's not. As erroneously discussed by the CINC respondent above, like

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

capability is obviously not being compared when he mentions "fully armed Coast Guard Ships". What is being discussed, not compared, is a Coast Guard capability to augment and complement the Navy. As a Navy four star admiral says in Section I of this chapter, page 108, "Coast Guard units will never supplant, only augment a true Navy combatant. But in a LICs an augmentation resource functioning within its stated capabilities can be a force multiplier of significance." (Note on a historical basis, such as the use of Coast Guard forces in WW-II or Vietnam, this opinion does not hold water.)

Despite the CNO's fears of "lowest common denominator", it is difficult to imagine that Coast Guard assets could not be presented in such a manner to prevent such an unfair comparison. This attitude is mindful of the famous quote by Secretary Stimson that Navy admirals were wrapped up in a "peculiar psychology" in which "Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church." Congressman Newt Gingrich has also commented that the Navy leadership gives him signs that "only the Navy, and not lesser mortals, truly understand seapower" and its attendant requirements. If Coast Guard forces can not be included, what is the Coast Guard doing by devoting so much of its resources to military operations? Again there is an Alice in Wonderland quality to these discussions.




Figure 87: Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Lands on BEAR Class Medium Endurance Cutter.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

A Joint Staff flag officer comments that the issue of including "Coast Guard assets in planning submissions, is one which we have addressed on the Joint Staff. We have long recognized the value of the Coast Guard in roles not traditionally assigned. The *1993-1995 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP) directs CINCs desiring to use Coast Guard forces or resources for planning, to submit the requirements to their naval component commander for validation and subsequent coordination with the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The specific apportionment of Coast Guard forces is also addressed in the JSCP, but the details are classified. These procedures should assist in correcting this perceived shortcoming."

Besides the new direction in the JSCP, the CINCs may have some additional authority to cite when considering the Coast Guard. The JCS *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF) publication states that the CINCs have the authority to:

- (9) Submit recommendations through the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense concerning guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.
- (10) Participate actively in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPB) as follows:
 - (b) Provide guidance to Service Component Commanders on warfighting requirements and priorities for addressal in their program and budget requirements to their respective Military Departments.
 - (d) Review reports from Service Component Commanders on the degree to which their program/budget requests meet warfighting requirements of the Command.
 - (e) Review and provide comments and recommend to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff on the degree to which Service programs satisfy warfighting requirements.¹

The Coast Guard is not in DoD and the Coast Guard does not belong to a Military Department. What is not too clear is whether the Navy is the Coast Guard's Service Component Commander for all instances involving the use of Coast Guard forces to support the CINCs. Regardless, let the lawyers decide the definitions. What's important is the spirit of these authorities. Another section of the UNAAF talks about the critical importance for unity of effort amongst all the

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

military services, and the Coast Guard is a military service. This governing publication says in its very first paragraph on page 1-1, that "Effective use of the military power of the Nation requires that efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated." The intent in these directives is to include the Coast Guard. As long as the CINCs, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and DoD include the Coast Guard for purposes of supporting national security goals, no one should quibble.

The new JSCP fundamentally alters the guidance to the CINCs for conducting deliberate planning. Whereas the previous JSCP focused on planning to deter and contain the global Soviet threat, the new JSCP views regional contingencies as the most likely threat to U.S. national interests. This new planning focus directs the CINCs to plan a full range of options, both military and non-military for the national command authorities (NCA). The CINCs are to apply a new, adaptive planning approach to generate a full range of flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that include diplomatic, economic, and political responses, as well as, the traditional military responses for contingencies. These varied, graduated options are intended to minimize the use of force and prevent escalation while still achieving national objectives. The use of FDOs is a significant shift by the JCS. The Coast Guard is obviously an instrument of national security, and under this new directive to consider all U.S. capabilities, the CINCs have the authority to plan for the Coast Guard's use. (See Figure 88.)




Figure 88: Flexible Deterrent Options and the Coast Guard.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

Examples of possible diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options involving the requested use of Coast Guard forces are:

- o Alert and introduce special teams such as mobile training teams (MTT).
- o Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures (NEO).
- o Provide non-threatening presence based on Coast Guard's humanitarian image, which still demonstrates U.S. resolve.

Examples of possible military Flexible Deterrent Options involving the requested use of Coast Guard forces are:

- o Employ readily in-place assets.
- o Upgrade alert status.
- o Initiate or increase presence actions.
- o Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area.
- o Increase port calls or air visits to the area.
- o Increase mobile training teams.
- o Impose restrictions on military personnel retirements, separations, leaves and establish curfews.
- o Use cutters/personnel capability to enforce sanctions.
- o Activate procedures to begin Reserve callup.
- o Prestage sealift reception assets to sea ports of embarkation (Activate MDZ).

Examples of possible economic Flexible Deterrent Options involving the requested use of Coast Guard forces are:

- o Enact trade sanctions.
- o Reduce security assistance programs.

Section III

Policy Making Mechanism for Determining the Coast Guard's National Security Role

Summary

Though there is widespread agreement that the Navy-Coast Guard (NAVIGARD) Board is satisfactory for policy coordination on the Coast Guard's national security role, there is not complete harmony. Some admirals believe that fundamental policy issues between the Navy and the Coast Guard have never really been addressed.

The responses are based upon the survey question six: "Is the present arrangement of Navy-Coast Guard Board deliberations and frequent meetings between the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Navy sufficient?" The figure below shows the distribution of replies.

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE						
SPRING 1991						
RESPONSES GROUP	MEMBERS	YES	YES BUT	NO	NO BUT	NO RESPONSE
1. U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVITY ADMIRALS	10	4	3	1		2
2. U.S. COAST GUARD RETIRED ADMIRALS	8	5	1	1		1
3. U.S. NAVY ACTIVITY ADMIRALS	3	3				
4. U.S. NAVY RETIRED ADMIRALS	7	3	2	2		
5. U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEF	4	2				2
6. DECISIONMAKERS ANALYSTS	18	5	2	6		5
7. TOTALS	50	22	6	10		10

Figure 89: Distribution of Replies for Policy Making Mechanism for Determining the Coast Guard's National Security Role.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD



Figure 90: NAVGARD Board in Miniature - Joint Operational Planning by Coast Guard and Navy Personnel.

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Four Coast Guard active duty admirals believe the present arrangements are satisfactory and working. Five retired Coast Guard admirals also believe that the Navy - Coast Guard Board "was an effective way to do business and that frequency of meetings was about right." Another says that "It works very well. Good way of addressing joint needs."

Not all respondents regard the present mechanism so favorably. Three active duty Coast Guard admirals qualify their favorable replies. Their unhappiness with the NAVGARD Board covers a wide range of items:

- o "Initially a vehicle to coordinate Coast Guard activities with Navy. Recently failed to serve as a vehicle of change and coordination - no clear direction of Navy's expectations for Coast Guard's military capability."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o "Competing service imperatives; need a honest broker (like what Goldwater Nichols did with CINCs). Need a better USCG/CINC interface."
- o "Without MDZ umbrella Navy/Coast Guard interaction would not occur, and policy direction from NAVGARD would have little or no relevance."
- o "Board seems productive; but where rubber meets the road in day to day meetings between Navy and Coast Guard counterparts, there is significant room to expand dialogue."
- o "Personality driven and rice bowl protection."




Figure 91: Coast Guard 44 Foot Motor Life Boats Train on the Columbian River Bar.

Two Coast Guard retired admirals also concur with this unfavorable assessment. One admiral comments that the Board, though a vital communications link between top levels of OPNAV and CGHQ "requires strengthening in the agenda area Board dealt effectively on many issues, mostly Coast Guard originated and mostly status quo matters. Fundamental policy issues dealing

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

with the Coast Guard's role were never discussed." Another retired admiral adds that some Secretaries of Transportation have not been interested in their responsibilities to the Coast Guard as an armed service and in the Coast Guard's national security role. He feels this is a severe handicap.

A Coast Guard flag officer writes that, "There is no perceived backlog of issues that have not been addressed because the current format is inadequate. It is more likely that the issues that could be addressed by the NAVGARD Board never reach it because of a lack of knowledge at lower echelons on when and how to submit input. Educating people about the NAVGARD Board may improve its responsiveness but without indications of significant shortcomings, there doesn't seem to be a requirement to alter the current system."

One retired admiral says that, "close personal relationships facilitate this matter and strengthen NAVGARD Board agendas. Regrettably, I have seen situations where the relationships between the Commandant and CNO have been less than close. On the other hand, I have known two Commandants who have been close with the CNO. The system isn't broke, so don't fix it." He continues that, "The Navy has been the basic source of funding for all Coast Guard armament and related electronic equipment and support. The Coast Guard must proceed gently without giving an appearance of expanding into the turf of others. During the present drawdown, that would not be beneficial."

A retired commandant notes that the responses underplay the role of the Commandant and the CNO to decide policy; it's not the NAVGARD Board, but the two service chiefs, according to this Coast Guard flag officer, who can make the difference.

U.S. Navy Views

All three active duty Navy admirals say that the present arrangement is satisfactory and working. According to one of these admirals "The NAVGARD Board has studied and decided some critical issues affecting Navy/Coast Guard since its inception."

A four star admiral suggests that, "A second generation NAVGARD Board should be empowered to resolve doctrinal, procurement, funding, etc. problems." Two retired Navy admirals say the present arrangement works well.

Some retired Navy admirals also feel very differently about the Board. They comment with the following:

- o "good forum for discussions of cooperative efforts and a good basis for improved mutual understandings and respect . . . it is not an adequate forum for much more than this."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o "Lack of effective follow-up to Board meetings which are cursory in nature and do not really provide for implementation of policies agreed."
- o "Present setup is adequate for those situations in which large transfers of funds are not at issue. In those cases such as USN funding for LAMPS helos and towed arrays, the Board simply can't reach decisions."
- o "Board is insufficient. No DoT members on Board, no OSD members. As now constituted Board renews USCG/USN friendship but does not deal in really substantive procurement and operational matters. They are dealt with on an ad hoc, direct basis."




Figure 92: Coast Guard Buoy Tender Works a Monster Open Ocean Buoy.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

The decision maker and naval analyst group are not unanimous in their evaluation. One retired captain states that "The Coast Guard always took the meetings very seriously; the Navy less so. Implementation of the decisions depended on the VCNO and the importance he personally attached to the sessions. On balance, it was a useful forum, if only to educate the Navy leadership to the Coast Guard's very real problems as they related to Navy funding issues."

Five respondents from this group agree that the current system is adequate or satisfactory. One writes that "The NAVGARD Board has been able to resolve all issues without resort to higher level involvement."

The former secretary of the Navy notes that "the current arrangements are entirely inadequate . . . the Coast Guard is an orphan in DoT". The DoT person suggests that a better way should be found for Coast Guard and Navy interface. Another retired captain is very concerned. He writes that the "NAVGARD Board does not discuss problems. All items are staffed to provide no surprises . . . no substance, no controversy . . . Commandant and CNO are not actively working toward any common goals. Study groups are poorly staffed, no funding or clout; output is consensus which must then be approved by O-7s, then O-8s . . . Even 1989 audit (on the MDZ) was a joke."

A naval analyst writes that judging from the results the present arrangements do not look like they are working. A third naval analyst recommends that since it appears the CINCs are end users, the CINCs should have an input into the present lash-up.

Author's Assessment

There seems to be more uneasiness with the value of the NAVGARD Board than is being admitted. It does not really appear that fundamental policy issues between the Navy and the Coast Guard are being addressed. For example, a four star Navy active duty admiral writes that once the (Navy-Coast Guard) relationship is defined, "a second generation NAVGARD Board be empowered to resolve doctrinal, procurement, funding, etc. (issues)." Such a statement from such a knowledgeable player indicates that the broader, over-arching policy matters are not being addressed in the NAVGARD forum.

This assessment is reinforced by the recent NAVGARD Board decision in February 1992 not to continue installation of Harpoon missiles on the Coast Guard's 378 Foot *HAMILTON/HERO* Class high endurance cutters. Despite the significant policy implications of this decision, there is an underlying issue beyond the weapon requirements for these cutters. The real issue not addressed is the Coast Guard-Navy relationship, i.e., what military roles should the Coast Guard perform? Until that fundamental decision is made decisions about combat systems will only be in response to transitory personality dependent relationships and current budgetary needs.




Figure 93: Coast Guard HAMILTON/HERO Class High Endurance Cutter Fires a Harpoon Missile.

A interesting footnote to the decision to remove Harpoon is what role did the warfighters, the CINCs, play in this decision. CNO, as a service chief and not an operational commander, is responsible for providing trained, equipped, and ready forces to the CINCs via the naval component commanders. Did the NAVGARD Board receive input from the CINCs before making substantive changes to the military capabilities of Coast Guard forces?

Section IV The Utility of the Coast Guard's Military Capability

Summary

The majority of the respondents are unconcerned that Coast Guard cutters have not been used in contingency operations since 1982. They say there is no adverse effect because the Coast Guard ships were not best suited, were not available, or were too busy elsewhere. However, there is not complete agreement by seven participants who argue either "use it or lose it". Some of the Coast Guard admirals believe non-use is based on interservice competition rather than utility.

The responses are based upon the survey question four: "Does the non-use of active duty Coast Guard ships in recent contingency operations undermine the rationale for providing the Coast Guard a military capability for a national security role?" The figure below shows the distribution of replies.

RESPONSES GROUP		SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE SPRING 1991				
		MEMBERS	YES	YES BUT	NO	NO BUT NO RESPONSE
1. U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10	3			6	1
2. U.S. COAST GUARD RET. ADMIRALS	8	1	1		4	1
3. U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3				3	
4. U.S. NAVY RET. ADMIRALS	7				3	3
5. U.S. COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS	4				4	
6. DECISION MAKERS ANALYSTS	18	5			11	1
7. TOTALS	50	9	1		31	6

Figure 94: Distribution of Replies for the Utility of the Coast Guard's Military Capability.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 95: Harpoon Cannisters on a Coast Guard HAMILTON/HERO Class Cutter - Soon To Be Removed.

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Six active duty and four retired Coast Guard admirals say there is no adverse effect for the following principal reasons:

- o "If there had been a stronger need, the boats would have been deployed."
- o Coast Guard was involved in some shape or form somehow.
- o Coast Guard is not structured to provide fast reaction combat support forces.
- o Not every Coast Guard asset has a wartime mission.
- o Heavily involved elsewhere.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

One retired admiral states "absolutely not. The Coast Guard's contribution to national security lies primarily in non-combat arenas."

Three Coast Guard active duty admirals believe the non-use does undermine the rationale for providing Coast Guard cutters a military capability, "either use it or lose it." Two of these admirals believe it is a turf issue; one writes that "Navy remains willing to talk but not to commit - pulled the plug on the patrol boats for the (1987 Persian Gulf) reflagging due to Navy politics." This admiral believes that no one has the experience in coastal operations that the Coast Guard has. The third admiral in this group said the outcome of such non-use may very well be a paradigm. He predicts that Desert Shield/Storm could be the model for Coast Guard participation in future conflicts, implying substantial reduction in the present combat capability of Coast Guard cutters. Only one Coast Guard retired admiral feels strongly about non-use. He writes that "Of course, the non-use undermines the rationale for using Coast Guard cutters in future contingency operations."

Another retired Coast Guard admiral thinks non-use could possibly be harmful but not necessarily if the decisions were based on operational requirements, and not turf protection. However, one Coast Guard retired flag officer clearly believes that turf protection is an issue in two cases. He writes that "The non-use in Grenada and the Persian Gulf reflects the reluctance of the Navy to call on the Coast Guard because it gives the appearance that the Navy can't do its job. It's that simple. Congress would say - 'why with the large Navy budget, do you now need assets provided for domestic programs, i.e., drug war, SAR, etc.?'"

An active duty flag officers says that, "non-use of cutters in recent contingency operations (does not) undermine the rationale for requiring the Coast Guard to maintain (its) military (capability). . . . in this era of dwindling budgets we must utilize the Coast Guard's naval force-in-being. If cutters were better armed and their crews combat-trained, they would more likely participate in a future conflict."

An retired admiral offers, "I was involved (with the Navy for planning Coast Guard military capability) for many years. Quite frequently, I stated that the Navy should tell us where they wanted the Coast Guard to fit into the overall naval picture. It never happened except when they desired the Coast Guard to accept a mission. It was frustrating. But, we got what we thought we needed through good salesmanship with the Navy and outstanding high level support in the Navy. It worked reasonably well and supported our multi-mission concept."

Another retired admiral says, "the problem of 'turf issues' . . . is serious and prevents the Navy and Coast Guard from working together - and it needs to be addressed pronto. The Coast Guard should first stop trying to be a Navy. Sublimate the national defense role. Convince the DoT that the Coast Guard has a national security role. Define the Coast Guard peacetime missions for the next century now. Then get DoT funding. Enlist the Navy to consult in ship and aircraft design, and to provide specialized training to Coast Guard personnel as needed.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Without the threat of having to fund another 'navy' the Navy leadership should be much more willing to acknowledge the Coast Guard as a maritime force in being and able to complement rather than compete."

U.S. Navy Views

The three active duty Navy admirals also say there is no undermining to the Coast Guard continued need for a military capability. According to them it was not an unwillingness to use the Coast Guard but that Coast Guard cutters were not the best platforms available and that there were other overriding considerations. However, one observes that "Deployment . . . would have reaffirmed the Coast Guard's national security role to Congress and the public." A four star flag officer states that, "I do not support any Coast Guard play in the joint arena. Coast Guard forces should always be subordinate to the Naval Component Commander."

An admiral in a senior policy making position writes that, "We believe the Coast Guard has a very important role to play in future national security issues in conjunction with the Navy. The cooperation between our Services is already excellent, and we look forward to continuing that."




Figure 96: Coast Guard PELICAN Class Cutter Operates with the HH-65A Helicopter.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

The four retired Navy admirals say no undermining of the Coast Guard's argument for a military capability for different reasons:

- o "USCG not seen by DoD as a substantive augmenting force in time of war."
- o "Coast Guard could be viewed as abandoning its drug responsibilities to participate in a far off crisis in which it had no statutory responsibilities (no war declared)."
- o "Other alternatives; not cost effective nor an appropriate employment operationally and politically (peacetime)."
- o These are "military operations" and Coast Guard not a component of DoD.
- o Adequate forces were "available in the properly constituted Navy."

One retired Navy admiral also offers further interpretation about these events. He says that "Non-use is strictly a turf issue. The reason that the Navy resists Coast Guard involvement is basically that the USN will have to pay for it . . . out of hide . . . (The 1987 reflagging issue about the Coast Guard) got pretty bitter with many end runs of the system on both sides."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

All four CINCs agree that there is no undermining since DoD had sufficient forces and Coast Guard were not needed to augment them. However, one CINC adds that future conflicts may require augmentation by the Coast Guard. Another CINC also notes that "If a conflict becomes protracted, Coast Guard assets will likely be needed and used. That contingency itself justifies continuance of USCG military capabilities." Another CINC writes that "If a large numbers of small patrol craft had been essential to the success of the operations there is no reason to believe Coast Guard cutters would not have been made available."

A CINC with much experience working Coast Guard-Navy issues writes that, "My only caution is that one should not automatically jump to the conclusion that 'the system is broken' and that the Navy-Coast Guard relationship is totally saturated with agency parochialism. The fact is that recent events have amply demonstrated that Navy-Coast Guard cooperation has never been higher."

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

The majority of the decision maker and naval analyst group reply that there is no undermining for the following reasons:

- o "Not the best suited or most available ships."
- o "Navy had adequate resources."
- o Coast Guard is "envisioned as being exercised in time of extreme need, not routinely . . . as implied so strongly in its very name, (Its role) is to protect the coastline of the United States itself."
- o Coast Guard "fulfilling other important missions."

Five respondents from the decision maker and naval analyst group disagree with the majority. One is the former high level DoN civilian who writes that "the current non-use of the Coast Guard for contingency operations is further evidence that changes should be made." A naval analyst comments that:

If you don't take part every time you are forgotten. Few people with experience in one war will be around to remember usefully when the next war breaks out. Don't get left out. You will lose out.

Of interest is the Coast Guard's participation in the Grenada Rescue Operation. All the respondents cite this contingency as an example that Coast Guard forces were not needed for the initial operation. However, according to two participants Coast Guard forces were needed, requested, and deployed, but were turned around before commencing the operation. The reasons for rescinding the order are not specified, but are described as related to service chief politics at the Washington level. A third knowledgeable participant with direct involvement in this decision-making states that the information provided by the other two persons is a distortion.

Author's Assessment

Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and huge reductions in the defense budgets, non-use of Coast Guard forces in these historical case studies undermines the continued rationale for providing Coast Guard cutters a military capability. If Coast Guard forces were not used during the Cold War when DoD stressed to contain the 'Evil Empire' and other assorted threats, it is hard to justify a Coast Guard military capability for future contingencies. The reasons given that Coast Guard resources were not best suited, were not available, or were too busy elsewhere for these cases are reasonable and acceptable to responsible persons who have some knowledge of

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD



Figure 97: Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) at Work with a Foreign Navy. Coast Guard MTT Have Access to Countries to Sensitive to DoD's Presence Such as India.

naval matters. But, this is not the case inside the Beltway of Washington. Unfortunately, those who reside there, especially those who oversee the Coast Guard, will tend to make quick and superficial judgements of the Coast Guard's 'non-role' in these past cases. They will probably not understand the need, nor support, a continued Coast Guard military capability for future crises. It is like the arguments against the Marine Corps' amphibious sealift capability for forced entry. The Marines have not used this capability since the Inchon landings during the Korean War in 1950. However, the comparison ends there, because the Coast Guard can not possibly hope to match the Marine Corps with its almost mystical support in a city working under the gaze of the Iwo Jima monument. (Note, to be more accurate, this almost "mystical support" results from a consistent and determined corporate willingness to seek political support and influence. 'Simple sailors' may be encountered in the Coast Guard and Navy, but one rarely encounters a truly 'simple Marine'.)

According to Dr. Robert E. Johnson, the fear of "use it or lose it" has been a real concern to Coast Guard leadership in the past. Admiral Edwin J. Roland, Commandant from 1962 to 1966, faced such an issue over the Coast Guard's involvement in Vietnam, and may have suggested to the Navy the use of the Coast Guard patrol boats. "Admiral Roland had been trying to devise




Figure 98: Coast Guard ISLAND Class Patrol Boat Screens a Former Soviet Warship.

a way to get the Coast Guard involved in Vietnam, fearing that if his service were limited entirely to a support role as it had been during the Korean War, its prized status as one of the nation's armed forces might be jeopardized."²

Section V DoD's Role in Coast Guard Platform Acquisition

Summary

There is widespread agreement to include DoD in the selection of Coast Guard platforms for reasons of military utility. The respondents cite interoperability, supportability, efficiencies, and economies for doing so. Final choice would, of course, remain with the Coast Guard and Coast Guard mission requirements would remain paramount, but the "jointness" issues and complementary military roles would need to be addressed by DoD.

The responses are based upon the survey question five: "Should DoD directly participate in Coast Guard programmatic decisions concerning selection of replacement aircraft and cutters to ensure a mission/force match and logistics interoperability?" The figure below shows the distribution of replies.

RESPONSES GROUP		SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE SPRING 1991				
		MEMBERS	YES	YES, BUT	NO	NO, BUT NO RESPONSE
1. U.S. COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	10	7		3		
2. U.S. COAST GUARD RET. RET. ADMIRALS	8	7	1			
3. U.S. NAVY ACTIVE DUTY ADMIRALS	3	1		2		
4. U.S. NAVY RET. RET. ADMIRALS	7	5				2
5. U.S. COMMANDERS INCHIEFS	4	4				
6. DECISIONMAKERS & NAVAL ANALYSTS	18	13	1	1		3
* TOTALS	50	37	2	6		5

Figure 99: Distribution of Replies for DoD's Role in Coast Guard Platform Acquisition.




Figure 100: Non-DoD Supportable Aircraft - Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter in Flight. (Photo by Joe Towers)

U.S. Coast Guard Views

Seven Coast Guard active duty admirals believe DoD participation is desirable and necessary for interoperability, supportability, and economies of scale benefits. One states that it is, "vitally important". Another says that the Navy viewpoint is not only welcome but (already) acquired formally. He notes that future resource acquisitions should be DoD supportable.

The issue of DoD supportability is a key factor with these respondents. One sums it up best that the Coast Guard learned as a result of the HH-65 helicopter and HU-25 fixed wing aircraft buys (Both are French/American built, non-DoD supportable aircraft) that future procurement should be accomplished with a view toward DoD support, like the recent HH-60J purchase. These admirals seem to imply that the need for DoD involvement goes beyond purely supporting the military missions of these cutters and aircraft, but also because of the logistic requirements of supporting these assets for their peacetime Coast Guard missions.

Three Coast Guard admirals feel there should be no involvement because Coast Guard needs come first and then DoD and that the Coast Guard must retain its identification. They are concerned that the Coast Guard would not remain focused on peacetime missions and that DoD

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

involvement may mean optimization for Navy vice Coast Guard missions. One writes that the "Coast Guard is multi-mission; DoD has no expertise with these missions. DoD should be consulted on vessel/aircraft acquisition, but only for informational purposes."

A district commander submits that, "There is a continuing debate within the Coast Guard over what defense capabilities we should incorporate in our ship and aircraft designs. Some would argue for nothing more than a deck gun saying that because the Navy doesn't use us, additional capability 'costs too much.' My counter to this is; being military - to be a member of the club - requires the possession of certain capabilities and the attendant training. The Coast Guard will never be called upon if it has nothing to bring with it. It is the baggage of mutual respect."

Another field commander says, "Through the NAVGARD Board, the Navy should participate in development and procurement of Coast Guard platforms, as a way of effectively incorporating the Coast Guard into the Navy force structure. This is logical because the Navy should pay for the combat capabilities built into those platforms. The NAVGARD Board can determine the extent of Navy participation, based upon the proposed platforms' potential naval warfare roles."

A third district commander says, "It makes absolute sense to have DoD input to the Coast Guard's platform procurement process. In so doing, however, we need to focus on those things which can enhance our interoperability without compromising our ability to meet our peacetime tasking. The question should not be how we can better do some of the Navy's missions, but how we can better do OUR missions in their midst."

The retired Coast Guard admirals are in complete agreement that the Navy should participate in cutter/aircraft replacement under following conditions:

- o "many Coast Guard assets do have DoD uses and to the extent they do, DoD should be in the review/decision making process . . . cost avoidance opportunities under such an arrangement."
- o To ensure forces are logistically supportable, but "final choice is made by Coast Guard."
- o "Ample and full consultation"; direct but "not full time" involvement; the aim should be interoperability, supportability and capabilities that complement.

One retired admiral offers another reason for including DoD in Coast Guard procurement. He comments that DoD "input ought to be formalized, and made a part of the acquisition milestones, so that" DoD would understand that Coast Guard requirements are legitimate. He states that the Coast Guard's problem with acquisition is that the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) "has little or no education or interest in national security matters".

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

U.S. Navy Views

A active duty four star flag officer observes that, "The Coast Guard has gravitated back to DOD-sponsored aircraft procurement. DoD has had an input on ship systems acquisition all along. Much more can be and should be done to integrate Coast Guard platforms into force structure."

U.S. Commanders-in-Chief Views

Two CINCs support DoD participation: (1) to prevent "joint mission/force match" occurrences and (2) to achieve "cost savings and efficiency." The other two CINCs say this cooperation is being done now, and one thinks it works well because Coast Guard assets are adaptable to defense needs. Also agreeing with DoD participation are the three active duty Navy flag officers who state that there should be (DoD) involvement to some degree in (Coast Guard) platform replacement programs. One notes that "coordination with the Navy for combat systems (is needed, but) . . . (the) Coast Guard must determine (its) specific vessel (requirements) . . . (since) only the Coast Guard knows its needs . . . (and is the) expert for law enforcement and SAR." Another comments that since DoD is paying the bill for the combat hardware that DoD should directly participate in program decisions. Two retired Navy admirals believe what DoD does now is adequate and sufficient.




Figure 101: DoD Supportable Aircraft - Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter in Flight.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD

Decision Makers and Naval Analysts Views

The respondents from the decision maker and naval analyst group support this proposal with basically the same caveats as the admirals. However, the former high level civilian DoD decision maker recommends bold corrective measures. He says that "The Coast Guard should be moved entirely into the Department of the Navy . . . (it's) an orphan in the Department of Transportation."

The senior OSD civilian decision maker agrees with Navy participation. He notes that "It would be appropriate for DoD to continue to review the military elements of major Coast Guard investments as part of Navy-Coast Guard board discussions and in meetings between the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of the Navy."

One naval analyst says that the two services should not get too close; the Coast Guard should keep the Navy informed of forces selected. Whereas the DoT civilian official comments that "DoD's expertise in procurement and development of war plans/force requirements should be utilized to insure interoperability and aircraft-cutter replacement but Commandant Coast Guard and, or SECDOT (Secretary of Transportation) should retain final authority." A second naval analyst suggests that "Certain efficiencies might be gained by putting in place a more formal mechanism to monitor interoperability and compatibility . . . economies of scale could be recognized through common procurement of major platforms and systems."

A third naval analyst agrees with this position "to consider the need for interoperability and adaptability of major Coast Guard platforms and systems with those of the armed services most likely to cooperate with them in crisis and war." He argues that "DoD requirements should not drive (Coast Guard) purchasing decisions" and that the "Coast Guard's primary responsibilities must take precedence".

Three retired captains all agree that DoD should participate more directly in planning, programming, and budgeting decisions relating to Coast Guard force structure, especially in a period of shrinking budgets. Two of the captains state that this is already being done.

Author's Assessment

This is always a sensitive issue for Coast Guard leadership. When defining mission requirements for platforms, the Service's uniqueness as an organization with its own peculiar needs and sense of identity can become subject to examination, if DoD platforms are automatically embraced. Coast Guard service peculiar requirements are constantly stressed in replacement platform programs, yet the Coast Guard has done very well by many DoD platforms. Notable examples are aircraft such as the HU-16E *Albatross*, HC-130H *Hercules*, and now the HH-60J *Jayhawk*, and cutters such as 311 Foot WHEC (ex-USN AVP), 255 Foot

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

LAKE Class WHEC (a Navy designed WW-II gunboat), 327 Foot *SECRETARY* Class WHEC (based on the Navy's *ERIE* Class gunboat).

The three Coast Guard admirals who feel there should be no involvement do not hold a minority view within the service. Many share their perspective because they want to ensure the Coast Guard retains its unique service essence which they view is threatened by the widespread use of DoD platforms. The development of the 210 Foot *RELIANCE* Class and the 270 Foot *BEAR* Class WMEC, and the 378 Foot *HAMILTON/HERO* Class WHEC represent this concern. Perhaps, the acquisition of these cutter classes reflects an absence of suitable U.S. Navy vessels rather than an overwhelming need to satisfy Coast Guard mission requirements.

For the most part, the Coast Guard has demonstrated that a DoD combatant platform makes an effective Coast Guard platform, but a Coast Guard platform does not necessarily make an effective combatant platform. (Chapter 3, Section I, page 89 for a related discussion on requirements for patrol boats and service implications.) However, as logistics issues such as life-cycle costs become increasingly more important, commonality with DoD also becomes a more important consideration. The Coast Guard's recent experience with the procurement of two non-DoD aircraft types testifies to the advantages of using DoD logistics infrastructure. The use of DoD platforms has a significant institutional advantage; it strengthens the Coast Guard's continued role in naval warfare, and perhaps as a military service.

Figure 102 depicts the enduring and versatile capability of the *SECRETARY* Class. They began service life in the 1930s carrying an amphibian aircraft conducting hydrographic research and law enforcement as well as search and rescue (SAR) missions. In WW-II they escorted Atlantic convoys, sunk U-boats, and acted as amphibious command ships. After the war they returned to their peacetime duties, now expanded to include ocean station patrols for weather and SAR standby. In the Vietnam War they conducted naval gunfire support (NGFS) and coastal interdiction of enemy shipping. In the last decade of their service life, they focused on law enforcement, interdicting aliens and drugs and protecting marine resources. For over 50 years these cutters served the Nation both at war and at peace in a variety of different roles - all successfully met. This class of cutters epitomizes the relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard, and should serve as the model for providing future military capability to Coast Guard forces.

U.S. Coast Guard's Relationship with DoD




Figure 102: "The Enduring Cutter" - Coast Guard 327 Foot SECRETARY Class High Endurance Cutter.

Chapter Five

The Central Finding by the Author



Figure 103: A Coast Guard Buoy Tender Deploys an Oil Spill Containment Boom

Section I

A Classification Scheme for Navies and Coastguards

In the process of developing the composite responses to the survey questionnaire, the author observed a recurring theme; what is the Coast Guard, and what is its relationship with the U.S. Navy? This recurring theme is as important as the assessment of the Coast Guard's national security role in the next century and is central to this research project. A Navy four star admiral calls this finding the "most important result of the study", and recommends that, "The relationship must be redefined in light of the new threat scenario and fiscal realities." A Coast Guard admiral says this theme "is the heart of the issue . . . what do we need and why?" However, a retired Commandant takes an opposite view and says, "There is no real problem here unless one decides the Coast Guard would be better served by having itself designated to 'help' the Navy."

To answer these questions a frame of reference is needed to analyze the modern U.S. Coast Guard. Ken Booth in his book, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, offers such a model by classifying navies according to their function.¹ Booth considers all naval services, including coastguards, that use the seas as navies. He does not differentiate navies by type of uniforms, commissioning status of its officers, civilian or military personnel, weapon systems employed, missions assigned, size or number of vessels.

Booth believes nation states basically use the sea for three general purposes: "(1) for the passage of goods and services; (2) for the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes, or for use against targets on land or at sea; and (3) for exploitation of resources in or under the sea." According to Booth navies exist "as the means to further such ends."²

He sees navies performing three fundamental roles for a nation: diplomatic, military, and policing. (Figure 104 depicts Booth's functional analysis.) Booth writes:

It is appropriate that the military role forms the base of the trinity, for the essence of navies is their military character. Actual or latent violence is their currency. It is a navy's ability to threaten and use force which gives meaning to its other modes of action. It derives its diplomatic impact from perceptions of its military character. Obviously it derives its utility in conflicts from its ability to exert brute force successfully. The diplomatic role of navies is concerned with the management of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force. Diplomatic applications support state policy in particular bargaining situations or in general international intercourse. The policing role (and waterspace management role, author's words) is internally as much as externally oriented. These functions are rarely concerned with the armed forces of other states: they

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

are mainly concerned with extending sovereignty over the state's own maritime frontiers.³

Policing takes place mainly in territorial waters, and is concerned with the maintenance of public order in a broad sense. It is the maritime version of the work of police, border guards, and the idea of 'military aid to the civil authority'. While this role is rarely seen as a part of foreign policy as such, the character and effectiveness with which it is carried out (or not) may have external implications.




Figure 104: Ken Booth's Functions of Navies and Coastguards.

Coastguard responsibilities. These tasks are by far the most important within the policing role. They are responsibilities familiar to all coastal states, and may be performed by a separately organized maritime service, a navy, or jointly. These forces attempt to further the basic interests of all coastal states, namely the extension of sovereignty, resource enjoyment in contiguous areas, and the maintenance of good order.

Nation-building. This role involves contributing to internal stability, especially during natural or political turmoil, and contributing to internal development in

The Central Finding

more settled times. . . . The coastal policing role is not likely to appeal as an important mission to those navies which jargon describes as 'blue-water'. However, for one-third of the world's navies, coastguard and nation-building responsibilities represent the extent of their functions (and ambitions).⁴

Booth also uses the concept of "geographical reach" to further divide his naval classification scheme into four categories of navies:

- (1) Coastal navy: "The basic orientation of such a "navy" is to have sufficient strength to carryout Coast Guard functions, but with minimal capability to handle even modest naval intrusion."
- (2) Contiguous-sea navy: "seaward extension of the home territorial defense zone; little to no requirement to operate outside contiguous waters . . . depends on size of state . . . and regional interests."
- (3) Ocean-going navy: "can not operate simultaneously in several parts of the world"; smaller and fewer deployments.
- (4) Global navy: "world-wide deployment capability without denuding forces required for maritime defense in contiguous seas."⁵

When categorizing a navy, Booth looks strictly at its functions, its "geographical reach", and also the "strategic orientation" of its military role, i.e., does the navy conduct sea denial or sea control? It is obvious, the U.S. Navy according to Booth would be classified as a global navy principally conducting sea control. What is not so obvious is the U.S. Coast Guard's classification.

Section II

What is the U.S. Coast Guard?

Using Booth's model, the U.S. Coast Guard, at first appearances, definitely fulfills the water space management and policing role. The U.S. Coast Guard is a type of navy which oversees the "passage of goods and people" on the sea and the "exploitation of the sea resources." U.S. Coast Guard responsibilities include duties clearly involving sovereignty, resource enjoyment, the maintenance of good order, and internal development. However, one aspect about the Coast Guard's responsibilities and one aspect about the nature of the Coast Guard itself do not allow the Coast Guard to be confined strictly to Booth's policing role.

First, many of the Coast Guard's responsibilities have a "geographical reach" well beyond the U.S. coastline and contiguous sea. The Coast Guard has extensive international involvement for such duties as environmental, commercial vessel safety, and navigation, etc. The Coast Guard's sovereignty responsibilities and broad maritime law enforcement powers take the Coast Guard far from the shores of the U.S. continent. (See Figure 105.) The Coast Guard has ships with an ocean-going and polar capability. Second, by federal law the U.S. Coast Guard is a military service and Armed Force at all times; it is not strictly a 'maritime police and regulatory agency'. The Coast Guard maintains a military capability to serve with the Navy and has done so in all the major wars of the United States. Under Booth's model for the military role, the Navy quite obviously does has responsibility for "balance of power functions" and "projection of force functions". The Coast Guard contributes forces and unique skills to conduct these naval functions. For these reasons, the U.S. Coast Guard can also be considered a sea-going navy according to Booth's model. The U.S. Coast Guard does not fit neatly into Booth's classification scheme, or for that matter, probably any other. The Coast Guard does not lend itself to a 'clean, clear, and elegant' analysis of its roles and functions. The Coast Guard can be considered as a combination of different types of organizations:

- o Maritime safety and regulatory agency.
- o Maritime navigation agency.
- o Maritime environmental protection agency.
- o Maritime lifesaving service.
- o Maritime constabulary.
- o Navy.

This combination of different organizational functions gives the Coast Guard its unique nature with its strongly opposing contrasts. The Coast Guard is both: (1) a humanitarian and law enforcement service, (2) a regulatory and operational agency, (3) an Armed Force and a federal agency, and (4) a domestic and an international agency. Besides making any analysis or classification of the Coast Guard into a complex, difficult problem, some of these opposite dimensions generate powerful internal/external tensions that tug and pull the Service in a variety of directions. (An oral interview with a naval analyst for this research gave an arresting, but

The Central Finding

	COASTAL	CONTIGUOUS SEA AND U.S. EEZ	OCEAN GOING	GLOBAL	FUNCTIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT
NATIONAL MARITIME SAFETY FUNCTIONS					
ADD TO NAVIGATION					
SEARCH & RESCUE					
POLAR ICE OPERATIONS					
DOMESTIC ICE OPERATIONS					
WATERWAYS MANAGEMENT					
COMMERCIAL VESSEL SAFETY					
ARMS ADMINISTRATION					
RECREATIONAL BOATING SAFETY					
PORT SAFETY & SECURITY					
NATIONAL MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS					
ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES					
RESOURCES ALERTS DRUGS					
NATIONAL MARITIME ENVIRONMENTAL FUNCTIONS					
MARITIME ENVIRONMENT RESPONSE					
PORT SAFETY & SECURITY					
POLITICAL/MILITARY FUNCTIONS					
MILITARY					
NAVAL WARFARE					
FOR SAFETY & SECURITY FOR IS & REGIONAL					
NON-MILITARY					

Figure 105: Ken Booth's Geographic Reach Matrix and the Functions of the U.S. Coast Guard.

obvious, observation. This person states that his organization has four or five different analysts, all in separate departments, looking at the Coast Guard's responsibilities each from a different functional perspective. None of these analysts view the Coast Guard's functions as an integrated, synergistic, collective whole that enables the Coast Guard to be so versatile, flexible, and responsive with its multi-mission [multi-function] forces. His comment implies that how most people view the Coast Guard tends to reflect their interests and that few consider the entirety of Coast Guard functions in a comprehensive, undivided manner.)

As discussed about Booth's model, the U.S. Coast Guard has elements of being both a coastguard and a navy (along with a few other different types of organizations). And therein may lie the difficulty in defining its relationship with the U.S. Navy. The Coast Guard is organized, trained, and equipped as a naval service, as well as being an Armed Force prescribed by U.S. federal statute. It is a navy in all but its name, but it has many functions that have no bearing on being a military service or no need for an association with the Navy. The U.S. Coast Guard differentiates itself from the Navy to:

- o prevent roles and mission confusion by public and Congress.
- o distinguish the Coast Guard as a separate non-duplicative service.

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o eliminate budgetary resource competition with the Navy.
- o promote service pride within the Coast Guard.

Yet, by doing so, the Coast Guard tends to downplay some of its national security functions that it shares with the Navy, i.e., providing U.S. maritime presence and ensuring U.S. maritime sovereignty. The Coast Guard conducts these functions principally in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), portions of the high seas, polar regions, and the Caribbean basin. The major difference is that the Coast Guard underwrites U.S. presence and sovereignty from a law enforcement basis, whereas the Navy does so from a naval warfare basis.

The sharing of some similar functions plus the Coast Guard's unique status as a U.S. Armed Force with broad law enforcement authorities makes the Coast Guard a powerful national security instrument for U.S. policy objectives. This capability challenges the Navy's role as the principal upholder of U.S. maritime sovereignty interests. Because of its size and global responsibilities the Navy treats and tends to consider (and with good reason) the Coast Guard as a very junior partner. The Coast Guard is and should remain the junior partner in naval matters; that is not an issue. What is at issue is to ensure the Coast Guard's unique skills and forces to achieve national objectives remain available to national command authorities, that they complement the Navy, and that they receive formal recognition from the 'national security establishment'. Coast Guard capabilities should not become threatening to the Navy either from a budget or mission perspective. But neither should increased formal recognition of the Coast Guard's contributions to national security be denied so as not to give the appearance of competing with the Navy.

Recognition and understanding that the Coast Guard and the Navy achieve U.S. sovereignty from different capabilities, should enable a better comprehension of how these two naval services can complement each other to achieve national objectives. Historically the Navy has concentrated upon achieving and enforcing U.S. sovereignty through deterrence (presence) or warfighting. The Coast Guard achieves and maintains sovereignty through deterrence (a combination of presence and its legal powers), but not warfighting. Use of the Coast Guard and the Navy should be tailored to best reflect the needs of the situations.

Coast Guard forces have been used in disputes - primarily marine resources - with the former Soviet Union, Canada, Korea, and Mexico. Coast Guard forces have taken the lead in interdicting economic aliens in the Caribbean attempting to enter the U.S. illegally by boat. A Coast Guard cutter was used in the search and rescue phase of the 1983 Korean Airline shootdown (KAL-007) to deescalate the crisis and to ensure the humanitarian nature of the U.S. Navy task force operating so close to Soviet waters. Many nations, especially in Latin America, are more tolerant of the Coast Guard's presence even when conducting national security missions than they are of the U.S. Navy's. Capitalizing on the Coast Guard's unique humanitarian and law enforcement image, yet an image that still shows U.S. resolve, is an option that gives national command authorities flexibility in their responses to use "graduated responses".

The Central Finding

In summary, as Booth points out in his book, the majority of the world's navies exist to conduct functions in the coastal or contiguous sea areas. These navies resemble the U.S. Coast Guard in everything but their name. According to Booth the U.S. Coast Guard could be classified as a coastguard for its functions conducted domestically, and a navy for its functions that have a national security implication or are conducted internationally. But these are too limiting in scope; the Coast Guard, despite its small size, is a sophisticated, multi-dimensional organization that does not readily lend itself to straightforward examination and codification.

In 1915 Captain Commandant Ellsworth P. Bertholf, USCG, recognized this problem and described the newly established Coast Guard:

The Coast Guard occupies a peculiar position among other branches of the Government, and necessarily so from the dual character of its work, which is both civil and military. Its organization, therefore, must be such as will best adapt it to the performance of both classes of duties, and as a civil organization would not suffice for the performance of military functions, the organization of the service must be and is by law military. More than 120 years of practical experience has demonstrated that it is by means of military drills, training, and discipline that the service is enabled to maintain that state of preparedness for the prompt performance of its most important civil duties, which . . . are largely of an emergent nature.⁶




Figure 106: An Average Coast Guard Day for Mission Accomplishments.

Section III

The U.S. Coast Guard's Ambiguous Relationship with the U.S. Navy

The Coast Guard has a long history of an awkward, ill-defined, and ambiguous relationship with the U.S. Navy. And yet the Coast Guard also has a long history of outstanding service with and for the Navy during periods of national emergency. This issue has been debated for over a century. During the Civil War the Revenue Cutter *HARRIET LANE* worked for the Navy covering amphibious landings and protecting troop convoys. For a lengthy period the cutter's crew remained unpaid, while the Treasury and Navy Departments conducted an extensive debate over which Department should pay for the cutter's services. Eventually the Navy decided to buy the cutter and crew it with Navy personnel. In 1884 Ensign W.I. Chambers, USN, wrote the prize winning essay for the Naval Institute; he suggested that Revenue Marine Cutters have preplanned wartime roles. See Figure 107.




Figure 107: Reprinted Portion of the Naval Institute Prize Essay of 1884.

In 1919 the Coast Guard's first Commandant, Commodore Bertholf wrote:

The Central Finding

. . . the fundamental reasons for the services are diametrically opposed. The Navy exists for the sole purpose of keeping itself prepared for . . . war. Its usefulness to the Government is therefore to a large degree potential. If it performs in peacetime any useful function not ultimately connected with the preparation for war, that is a by-product. On the other hand, the Coast Guard does not exist solely for the purpose of preparing for war. If it did there would then be, of course, two navies - a large and a small one, and that condition, I am sure you will agree, could not long exist. The Coast Guard exists for the particular and main purpose of performing duties which have no connection with a state of war, but which, on the contrary, are constantly necessary as peace functions. It is, of course, essentially an emergency service and it is organized along military lines because that sort of an organization best enables the Coast Guard to keep prepared as an emergency service, and by organization along military lines it is invaluable in times of war as an adjunct and auxiliary to the Navy . . . while peacetime usefulness is a by-product of the Navy, it is wartime usefulness that is a by-product of the Coast Guard.

This is a day when humanitarianism is in the minds of most people, and the war (WW-I) being over, (national defense) . . . is on the wane. The Coast Guard rests on the idea of humanitarianism; the Navy rests on the idea of . . . (national defense). To my mind, the best band-wagon is the former . . . (for the Coast Guard).⁷

In 1947 Congressman Everett M. Dirksen asked about the Coast Guard's role:

What we have got to determine is this: Is it going to be one of those expansive agencies to work all over the world, or is it going to be a coast guard? . . . It is considered to be a civilian agency, but its program makes it appear as an auxiliary navy. I want to know whether it is a coast guard or a miniature navy. If it is going to be a navy, then let the Navy take care of them. If it is a coast guard, it has no business running loran stations out in Guam and away up in Alaska and all over the blue water of the seven seas.⁸

In 1982 Senator Bob Packwood released a study on the Coast Guard prepared by the Congressional Research Service that asked in part:

There are several issues over the Coast Guard's wartime role, the chief one being the extent to which prospective wartime duties should . . . detract from performance of Coast Guard's peacetime functions. And should the operating characteristics of those (Coast Guard) ships and aircraft reflect the potential wartime use of the platform if that use would be substantially different from

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

intended peacetime employment? If the answer to these questions is yes, should the Navy or the Coast Guard pay for these . . . specialized characteristics?⁹

A retired Coast Guard commandant does not believe this relationship can be or should be defined. He offers, "I see no way to spell out a doctrine that can sufficiently deal with the idiosyncracies of the Coast Guard and its myriad duties, nor its relationship with the Navy and all other Armed Forces; there is relationship to be shaped with each. To try - as some responders suggest - is to unduly limit or enhance some aspects at the expense of others." A senior Coast Guard field commander says that DoD views, "Coast Guard forces and the capability they represent as off-budget resources of limited value that may be available, and have no current interest in clarifying that viewpoint or altering it."

Booth's model is helpful to help define this relationship. An apparent ambiguity arises over the U.S. Coast Guard's legal designation as a U.S. Armed Force, and its consequent military role, the usual domain of the U.S. Navy. How should the Coast Guard, as a naval service, relate to the U.S. Navy? Does the Coast Guard contribute, complement, duplicate, or support the U.S. Navy?




Figure 108: Coast Guard HH-60J Helicopter Lands on the Flight Deck of a BEAR Class Cutter.

The Central Finding

The responses to the survey questionnaire indicate two contrasting viewpoints on this question. I have termed these positions as resource-of-opportunity and naval force-in-being. As a resource-of-opportunity, chance and circumstances determine how the Coast Guard is used in a military role. Those advocating this position see the Coast Guard as an instrument of national security only if its missions and force mix have an application in a crisis, contingency, or an application requiring military forces. The other view sees the Coast Guard as a naval force-in-being with prescribed national security functions that include well defined military missions that complement the Navy. These respondents want the Coast Guard to have predetermined national defense roles with an associated, dedicated military capability for these purposes. A retired Coast Guard commandant describes this comparison as the difference between what you get on D-Day versus what you get from a pot-luck approach. In other words, one is the pre-planned use of Coast Guard capabilities compared to situational use.

Is the Coast Guard a Resource-of-Opportunity?

Treating the Coast Guard as a resource-of-opportunity is best described by an assistant secretary of defense, who writes:

(The Coast Guard) should not be tasked for specific missions . . . (but) could contribute to an overseas operation on an "ad hoc" basis . . . (with its) assets of opportunity . . . (if) the need for these assets . . . would exceed the need for them in their regular mission.

Other respondents express the same opinion. One naval analyst comments that the Coast Guard is envisioned as being exercised in time of extreme need, not routinely. As implied so strongly by its very name, the Coast Guard should protect the coastline of the United States itself. Another analyst states that "Coast Guard detachments on board Navy ships, as was done during the maritime interception force operation against Iraq, make much more sense than equipping and training the Coast Guard for carrying out Navy missions."

A retired Navy admiral holds an extreme interpretation of this resource-of-opportunity opinion. He writes that the decision to use Coast Guard forces for augmentation should only be made at the time contingency plans are implemented and if Navy forces are inadequate. Another Navy retired flag officer essentially considers Coast Guard forces as fortuitous, available resources, as did a Coast Guard retired admiral. Other respondents hold this view. In general they agree that the Coast Guard should have a national defense role and military capability. But the closer the questions attempt to define or recognize that role, the more definite became the replies that the Coast Guard should have a very limited role or no role.

A good example of this is a reply by a Navy active duty admiral in a policy making position. He writes that "The military capability provided by cutters buys the Navy (and the nation) a cost effective force multiplier. Having a ready, capable pool of small combatants and patrol craft

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

available allows the Navy to stretch its thinning fleet more effectively. Commonality of communications and weapons suites improves interoperability should the need arise for their use."

However, in response to a follow-on question specifically about a national defense role, he narrows his initial answer. He comments that "there is little, if any, need for U.S. Coast Guard forces in regional conflicts beyond maritime interdiction, port security, and harbor defense." It appears that the need to use this "ready, capable pool of small combatants and patrol craft" remains undetermined.

Commenting on the Draft Report, a highly respected naval historian submits from his studies that, "Until the adoption of the MDZ quite recently, Coast Guard units and personnel were used rather haphazardly by the Navy - as 'resources of opportunity'."




Figure 109: Coast Guard HH-26A Aircraft in Flight. (Photo by Joe Towers)

The Central Finding

Is the Coast Guard a Naval Force-in-Being?

Contrasting this resource-of-opportunity view, is the opinion held by many Coast Guard admirals, some analysts, and others. They believe that the Coast Guard's expertise, experience, and force mix have valuable uses in dedicated national defense purposes. At a minimum they believe the Coast Guard's complementary role to the Navy and contribution to national security should be more formally recognized both in Congress and in DOD. This view is expressed by one Coast Guard retired admiral who notes that the Coast Guard is a naval "force-in-being financed by the taxpayer. This force should be a factor when planning defense budgets." Another description of this status is a 'naval reserve augmentation force'.

It appears that these participants want to train and equip the Coast Guard for predetermined national defense uses, as opposed to relying on circumstances at the time of a contingency to determine if the Coast Guard can or should participate. In other words, if these assets already exist, they want to plan in advance to use them in specific functions before a crisis occurs. To a large extent the CINCs support this view of planned Coast Guard response. (See their comments Chapter 1, Section III, page 78.)

A retired Navy admiral considers that he sees "the Coast Guard as a force analogous to the Naval Reserve. It is, after all, pretty much inferred a reserve in the law which makes the Coast Guard a part of the Navy in wartime the Naval Reserve has units in warfare and support areas which augment active duty forces when needed. Likewise, the Coast Guard can provide either special capabilities (such as Law Enforcement Detachments) or ships and aircraft when needed. Given that, the Coast Guard must man, train and equip for its peacetime roles but then be ready to augment the Navy when the President so directs . . . but only with those people and equipment already in the inventory in order to satisfy peacetime requirements."

A Coast Guard field commander believes the Coast Guard should be a naval force-in-being with prescribed national security/defense missions. He makes his recommendation because "certain naval warfare missions parallel Coast Guard peacetime missions, e.g., maritime SAR and maritime combat SAR (maritime CSAR) in a no to low threat environment; peacetime and wartime port safety and security; and maritime coastal surveillance-and-interdiction."

A four star Navy admiral warns that, "A resource-of-opportunity is always a big unknown. It's risky playing "pick up ball". The alternative is to accept Coast Guard as a "naval force-in-being" and train, equip, and operate accordingly."

A naval historian suggests that, "Ideally, I think, the Coast Guard should be assigned a specific military mission. That of inshore and riverine - 'brown water' - warfare would seem to be obvious given its small craft expertise Neglect of these 'small ship' functions by the Navy has been quite common, presumably on the assumption that these can be extemporized in time




Figure 110: Coast Guard Global Engagement Activities in 1991.

of need; or is it that naval officers do not consider such assignments career-enhancing? Nor is it clear that their importance and potential scope are generally understood.

Or is the Coast Guard Both?

More than one respondent notes that naval force-in-being and resource-of-opportunity are not mutually exclusive terms, including a retired Coast Guard commandant. A Coast Guard field commander says that, "We can and should be both. On the one hand the Coast Guard is, by nature and tradition, a seagoing Naval service. On the other hand, we are NOT 'a little Navy'; we are a unique service with a unique family of missions which will continue to be important in wartime, and our primary national security tasking should be based on doing those things which we do well and often, in the context of overall national priorities. It's important that we recognize that 'national security roles' and 'wartime tasking' are not synonymous. That said, we can't deny the Coast Guard's potential as a 'resource of opportunity.' There will inevitably be future contingencies which don't fit our preconceptions, or which stretch DoD capabilities in some way that may be relieved by an unforeseen application of the Coast Guard's maritime capabilities. The key point is that we need to better define our national security tasking.

The Central Finding

Another district commander agrees. He comments that, "We are proudly a naval service, . . . (but) . . . we are not the U.S. Navy. The naval component commander of any CINC is going to view the Coast Guard as having different skills from those of either the Navy or Marine Corps units under his command." A four star also believes the Coast Guard is both a resource-of-opportunity and a naval force-in-being just like the other armed services. He states that, "The Coast Guard should continue to be included in our standing plans, should exercise and operate with DoD counterparts, and must be considered as we face each security challenge of the twenty-first century."

The retired Commandant writes that this comparison is his major problem with the paper. "The author wants a codified strictly laid out roles and mission kind of thing . . . and that is not simply appropriate for the reality of what the Coast Guard is and how it fits in with DoD, and not just the Navy."

A combatant CINC says that, "the study seems to discard the resource of opportunity concept in favor of viewing the Coast Guard as a naval force-in-being, or a 'second' U.S. Navy." He also says that using Coast Guard specialized capabilities and expertise in situations and circumstances are not decisions not made on an "ad hoc" basis. "I am convinced that the decision to use Coast Guard personnel and equipment in Southwest Asia and the recent Haitian NEO contingency was neither *laissez faire* nor *ad hoc*. It was a conscious decision to apply the proper resource to the given situation." This is true but the reference to *ad hoc* indicates that there is no national-level tasking for the Coast Guard to act upon in advance; it is all current operations and situational events. For example, Coast Guard Commander Atlantic Area does not have tasking to be prepared to conduct NEOs. Nor does he have national-level tasking to conduct security assistance; despite reimbursement for operating costs, this is an *ad hoc* capability provided by assets funded and procured for other purposes.

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century




Figure 111: The Value of Coast Guard's Presence Operations in the Antarctica.




Figure 112: Coast Guard HAMILTON/HERO Class Cutter on Patrol - Alaskan and Pacific Ocean Fisheries, Counternarcotics, and Alien Interdiction Are Its Primary Missions. (Photo by Joe Towers)

Section IV

A Relationship Shaped by Politics and the Budget

A Navy retired admiral describes the current relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard as "a marriage of convenience which by tacit agreement by both the Navy and Coast Guard has never really been consummated." According to this flag officer, the Navy and Coast Guard are "two organizations that have been notionally klugged together in the simplest fashion possible at policy levels with no real consideration by the regional CINCs." How the Coast Guard and Navy relate to each other has not been defined for several reasons, the principal one being fiscal.

Budgetary Threats

A senior policy making Coast Guard admiral notes that, "Our role has been ambiguous for many years and, I think, with reason. Both the Coast Guard and the Navy have benefitted from this loose relationship. It creates headaches for the planners, but it has been workable. Trying to constrain the relationship with a fixed 'role' will mean someone is likely to lose when brought before Congress. This, I think, has been recognized by present and past Service Chiefs and is the reason a more definitive relationship was not established years ago. He also states that, "The budget ultimately dictates the size, shape, sophistication, and modernization of the naval forces. Coast Guard forces will be viewed as a threat by the Navy as long as they are presented to Congress as potential, comparable, and capable warfare platforms. This attitude is prevalent even with Coast Guard forces left out of the total force package submitted to Congress. Including Coast Guard resources in the force structure package presented to Congress will only ensure further divisiveness by putting the two services in direct competition for resources. Congress does not always appreciate the differences in capabilities between classes of ships despite disclaimers by both services."

A Coast Guard active duty admiral writes that, "The Coast Guard cannot carve out a role and claim a particular naval warfare area without the Navy's agreement, endorsement, and support. The Navy must reasonably expect that many in Congress and the administration will seek to place funding for the Coast Guard military capability in the DoD budget, and unless it is clear that the increased military capability of the Coast Guard is a force multiplier for the cost, and contributes importantly to a national need, the Coast Guard cannot get out of the starting block." Or, as an active duty Navy admiral explains, "If Congress began to equate USCG cutters with USN ships, the Navy would lose ships which the Coast Guard would be expected to replace."

A Coast Guard district commander states that, "An underlying issue is who will pay for our national security capabilities. Conversely, it may turn out that whoever is willing to pay will be in the position of dictating the tasking . . . and we should no longer blindly assume that's the Navy." A retired Coast Guard admiral notes that, "In the present budgetary climate, it is unreasonable to expect the Navy or other organizations to support new missions for the Coast

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

Guard. They would neither be willing to fund such mission/s nor desire to shed any desirable mission when their own budgets are threatened. So, putting aside of "agency parochialism" has the same chances as "a snowball in Hell". A Coast Guard Commandant writes that just prior to his retirement one former CNO even suggested that the CNO should testify before a Coast Guard appropriations hearing. It never happened, because "DoD (Navy) feels that the Coast Guard is a competitor for funds and not a partner in a total force package."




Figure 113: Coast Guard Port Utility Boat Fights a Pier Fire.

A Coast Guard field commander comments that, "If Coast Guard assets have a capability rivaling potential adversaries or equal to Navy combatants then it is likely that Congressional members would seek to count Coast Guard assets as part of the Naval equation. The Navy is opposed to such an outcome. The Navy wants to own outright all its assets In time of war the DoD, of course, is delighted to have as a ready reserve, Coast Guard forces for which it has contributed only minimally"

A four star Navy admiral writes that, "it is - and through the near term will continue to be - difficult to find consensus on even the general nature of that role. Visualizing the Coast Guard's contribution to national security is problematic at a time when each of the DoD services is examining the basic assumptions of his own capabilities and roles, and when the Unified CINC's

The Central Finding

are just starting to craft a new set of JSCP war plans." One retired Navy flag officer states that, "the substitution for Coast Guard units (even conceptually) for Navy capability is in effect a form of program and budget competition not likely to be embraced by" OPNAV, the CINCs, and the JCS.

A former CNO notes that, "I worked very closely with Admiral . . . when he and I served simultaneously at Chiefs of our own service. That experience led me to believe that the Coast Guard will always be scrambling for financial support. It will always have difficulty receiving the level of financial support it would like, given the competitive nature of requirements that a non-DOD agency or department confronts. It is almost unarguable that, with respect to esoteric national security weapons requirements of Coast Guard cutters, the DoD should be expected to underwrite a good measure of such costs in that the vast majority of time in which such weapons systems would be employed would be in support of DoD missions, not DoT. The only way in which such financial support is likely to be forthcoming from the Department of the Navy is for the Chief of Naval Operations (or Vice Chief) to be actively engaged with the Commandant of the Coast Guard (or Vice) in a periodic review of the Policy Board's recommendations. To lower the decision/review level below the Service Chief in expectation that the Navy is going to support spreading its always scarce dollars to Coast Guard requirements is fatuous thinking, at best. One should not be surprised at the difficulty which OP-03, 07, or 090 have in looking at the requirement in the same measure as is held by the Coast Guard. Witness what happens routinely to mine warfare, for example, within the DoN itself. Only the Service Chief can compel the investment priority be met!"

A combatant CINC with much experience working with Coast Guard issues writes, "I am afraid my experience convinces me that issue does boil down to command and control as well as budgetary authority issues. It just is not realistic to expect the Navy who competes for defense dollars (now drastically declining) to divert these dollars for Coast Guard warfighting capabilities which are only available in times of war. In the current environment, if you want one capability you have to give something else up to get it. The reality is the Coast Guard will continue to play consistency politics to get as much increased capability as it can from DoT and DoD while the Navy will be less than enthusiastic as it views this as a drain on dwindling assets without measurable returns on the dollars invested. I also believe that as long as the Navy and Coast Guard have different constituencies in Congress and the Executive Branch, some of the differences pointed out in the study will remain, not because of hypocrisy, but simply the realities of budgetary politics."

He continues that if the Coast Guard is treated "as a naval force-in-being with defined national security and national defense mission, budgetary fears of who will pay for the "second navy" become real. During this period of shrinking defense budgets, additional demands on the Navy's total obligation authority will be difficult, at best, to fund. From the Navy perspective, the addition of new programs will mean that other programs will have to be deleted or scaled back. The turf battles and rice bowl mentality . . . would surely result."

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

A retired Commandant believes that the budgetary concerns are overstated in the paper and that he has seen no evidence of the Coast Guard being a budget threat to the Navy.

A former Secretary of Transportation says that "I can see where the differences of opinion over funding might cause a problem in defining the relationship between the Coast Guard and the Navy, but I think it is the nature of the beast for this to be a speculative issue until or unless circumstances warrant some definitive positions."



Figure 114: Coast Guard National Oil Pollution Strike Team Member Oversees a Port Oil Spill. Their Expertise Has Been Used from Mozambique to Russia.

The Roles of Congress and the Department of Transportation

A Coast Guard district commander says that "the resistance that lies within the Department of Transportation" is underplayed in its effect to prevent a well defined national security role for the Coast Guard. "DOT doesn't see itself as a defense player. The policy debates in the Secretary's office and just as importantly in the staff - which has a remarkable continuity - focuses on the ground and air transportation problems. National Security issues are either obstructions or distractions. There is a strong bias toward punching all defense related resource requirements into the Defense budget. This has struck a responsive chord on the Hill."

The Central Finding

Another senior Coast Guard field commander submits that the Coast Guard's unique combination of peacetime and wartime capabilities and responsibilities requires joint oversight at the Congressional level. He believes a review by "Joint Transportation-Defense Congressional committees would be appropriate."




Figure 115: The Consequences of Bad Port Safety Practices.

Section V

The National Need to Define this Relationship

As discussed in Section IV both a retired CNO and a Coast Guard admiral in a senior policy making position believe that the ambiguous relationship is needed. According to them, if the relationship is defined, it will lead to budget competition. However, there are good reasons for making this determination and there is precedent. DoD and Congress have been able to differentiate successfully between the two U.S. land armies: the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army. Surely they can do it between the Coast Guard and the Navy? The active duty Navy admiral in the policy making position states:

The rapidly changing world security environment, combined with domestic fiscal restrictions, changes the way we look at force size and composition. The future Navy . . . will have more difficulty sustaining high tempo operations in time of crisis. Meeting all commitments with a smaller Navy makes cooperation and interoperability with the Coast Guard even more vital than in the past.




Figure 116: Coast Guard Forward Presence Operations in the Caribbean - Counter-narcotics.

The Central Finding

One geographic CINC follows up on the above observation by noting that "the loss of Coast Guard military capability would limit the options available for CINCs to consider when planning contingency operations." How does the Coast Guard achieve "cooperation and interoperability" with the Navy and how do these two services ensure that the CINC retains his option to use the Coast Guard over the long-term without defining this relationship?

Furthermore, if the CINCs plan to use Coast Guard forces, then recognition of the Coast Guard's role in national security should be included in JCS/DoD's submissions to Congress. To deny formal mention of the Coast Guard on the basis that it is not in DoD and yet realize (and write about) what a unique contribution the Coast Guard makes to national security is inconsistent. The DoD and CINCs seem to want it both ways, i.e., they want to use the Coast Guard, but are reluctant to formally recognize this use before Congress. This reluctance or denial also seems especially inappropriate when "jointness" and interservice cooperation are so strongly stressed by the armed forces' senior leadership.

There are additional reasons for defining this relationship. The *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF) publication states, "Effective use of the military power of the Nation requires that the efforts of the separate Military Services be closely integrated."¹⁰ In addition to unity of effort, which is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency, this publication stresses the need for common doctrine and interoperability as major principles to follow when organizing the nation's military capability. Not defining this relationship and not including the Coast Guard would seem in clear violation of this common sense and practical policy directive. Other reasons are:

- o To inform the Coast Guard's political leadership with their domestic/transportation outlook of the valid and useful contribution that the Coast Guard makes to national security.
- o To provide the Coast Guard an official forum for recognition of its national security role.
- o To tell how uniquely different the Coast Guard is from the Navy, and why it is important to maintain Coast Guard-DoD interoperability.
- o To articulate and recognize the Coast Guard's security assistance's role and contributions to the CINCs as flexible deterrent options (FDOs) based on the Coast Guard's unique missions, forces, and humanitarian image.
- o To plan effectively the future use of Coast Guard forces. This is especially important for the impending replacement of the medium/high endurance cutter.

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

- o To have agreement both within the Coast Guard and with the Navy on the Coast Guard's national security role for internal unity of effort and common purpose.
- o To ensure the use of Coast Guard forces is thoroughly examined before employment in some ad hoc fashion and to provide consistency of usage. For example, port security units support CINC Central, but apparently do not support the other geographic CINCs.
- o To provide a rationale for the current levels of planning, training, and equipping Coast Guard forces.
- o To explain in detail the Coast Guard's wartime (contingency) functions listed in the UNAAF ("To provide specialized Coast Guard units, including designated ships and aircraft, for overseas deployment required by the naval component commander.").¹¹

(Note, the UNAAF states "During war, the Coast Guard will function as a Military Service." The Coast Guard always functions as a Military Service. 14 U.S.C. 1 states that the Coast Guard "shall be a military service and a branch of the armed forces of the United States at all times." One DoD publication did get the word correctly; the *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint PUB 1-02) designates the Coast Guard as a Military Service on page 231.)

In summary John Collin's law best encapsulates all these reasons. This respected defense analyst from the Congressional Research Service says, "If you don't know what you want to do, you can't plan how to do it."¹²

Section VI One Approach to Solving this Dilemma

Both Navy and Coast Guard admirals believe budgetary competition prevents the definition of the relationship between their services. Defining the Coast Guard-Navy relationship in this fiscally sensitive environment is difficult, and made more so in the absence of clearly articulated requirements for a Coast Guard military role, beyond its MDZ command responsibilities. Using a top-down approach to establish this relationship is challenging since national defense tasking for the Coast Guard does not adequately exist in federal statutes, executive orders, or DoT/DoD policy statements. 14 U.S.C. 2 requires the Coast Guard to serve as a "specialized service" in the Navy and to fulfill its MDZ command responsibilities, but there is no definition of what a specialized service is.

Without more specific national defense tasking, the relationship may be resolved strictly on the basis of chance, politics, and budget battles. Despite that possibility, there are some (obvious and hopefully, accepted) parameters that will help begin the process:

- o The U.S. Navy exists essentially to conduct naval warfare in support of U.S. national objectives.
- o The U.S. Coast Guard exists to perform missions principally in the domestic arena. Many of these missions have a national security implication (interdiction of drugs & aliens, safe waterways, polar presence, a regulated mercantile fleet, etc.).
- o Though almost all its missions support national security, the Coast Guard's *raison d'être* is not naval warfighting.
- o Notwithstanding the general requirements of 14 U.S.C. 2, the Coast Guard's military role has primarily been the result of opportunity and convenience, i.e., its existence as a naval service. Consequently, the Coast Guard's historical military role could best be described as a 'naval reserve' augmentation force.
- o The U.S. Coast Guard is the only U.S. Armed Force not located in DoD and the only Armed Force with both domestic and national security roles.
- o No Coast Guard aircraft or ship has ever been built in response to national defense requirements. Instead these platforms are justified strictly on the basis of Coast Guard peacetime missions; any

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

military capabilities are additive or are incorporated on an *ad hoc* (historical/traditional) basis.

- o The U.S. does not need two "navies", or more correctly, does not need two identical navies.
- o Finding valid, justifiable requirements for the Coast Guard to have a naval warfighting role by definition must be a non-starter. If there are valid, justifiable requirements to fulfill, then the U.S. Navy with its responsibility for national defense, and not the U.S. Coast Guard should fulfill them.
- o The Navy is faced with reduced budgets, many commitments, and high-cost capital plant replacement programs for submarines, aircraft carriers, surface ships, and aircraft.
- o Though the Navy is shifting emphasis to littoral warfare, the Navy appears to be moving toward a triad of strike combatants: submarine (*TRIDENT & SEAWOLF*), carrier (*NIMITZ* with stealth aircraft), and Aegis equipped surface ships.
 - * A Navy fleet composed of very large, few-in-number, high-cost combatants.
 - * A Navy fleet primarily built for blue-water power projection and sea control, which in some regional or littoral scenarios may experience restricted utility.

Fiscal realities and the readily availability of Coast Guard unique resources no longer make this matter a simple and clear-cut debate about roles and missions between the Navy and the Coast Guard. In this age of billion dollar deficits, is it militarily imprudent and economically unwise to ignore the potential national security/defense capability residing in existing Coast Guard forces? With these parameters in mind, defining the Coast Guard-Navy relationship begins by asking the operative questions:

- o What inherent capabilities (statutory and resources) does the Coast Guard bring to the national security arena that are useful, not redundant, and complementary ?
- o Since the Coast Guard operates ships and aircraft with trained military personnel, are there cost effective and military advantages

The Central Finding

to equipping these existing and available platforms with a naval warfare capability, not in response to specific national defense requirements, but for value added reasons and to exploit or to ensure these inherent and unique capabilities are available in a crisis or contingency?

In response to first question that the Coast Guard has unique capabilities provide: (1) broad maritime law enforcement power; (2) extensive coastal and port expertise, experience, and assets; (3) maritime environmental expertise. In regard to the second question, the Coast Guard is approximately the tenth largest navy in the world today; it has a full range of coastal assets available for operations in the littoral regions. Specifically, the Coast Guard can:



Figure 117: Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter Conducts Hoist Drills with a 41 Foot UTB.

U.S. Coast Guard National Security Role in the 21st Century

- (1) Support some coastal and riverine regional requirements for a naval warfare capability (coastal forces for maritime interdiction and surveillance). For example, the Coast Guard can deploy on short notice 8 *ISLAND* Class Patrol Boats along with a *HAMILTON/HERO* Class WHEC to act as the force/support commander.
- (2) Provide a U.S. "naval" presence in the Caribbean and Latin America to support forward deployments by a smaller sized U.S. Navy.
- (3) Increase its security assistance training to international navies for alliance strengthening. The Coast Guard has more in common - force mix and missions - with the majority of the world's navies than the U.S. Navy.
- (4) Support reconstitution and regeneration of naval forces (e.g., ASW cutters, long range surveillance aircraft, over-water combat search and rescue, and mine counter-measure vessels.) The key is to provide space and weight reservations for modular combat systems. Examples:
 - o Retrofit a mine counter-measure capability (MCM) (space and weight to operate remote control MCM submersibles) to its new fleet of 38 coastal and ocean-going buoy tenders to offset the cancellation of the Navy's Craft of Opportunity (COOP) MCM program.
 - o Retrofit a naval coastal warfare capability (space and weight) to its new class of patrol boats to replace the 82 Foot *POINT* Class.
- (5) Expand the range of Flexible Deterrent Options available to the CINCs by using the Coast Guard's unique mission capabilities and force mix and by exploiting the advantages of its non-threatening, humanitarian image.

This does not imply that Coast Guard assets are currently under utilized, but is based upon premise that the above capabilities, though necessary, are cost prohibitive given other Navy priorities. However, this proposal does imply that some of the statutory missions performed by some Coast Guard forces in domestic arena may not be performed when these forces are assigned to national security duties out of CONUS. It depends on national priorities. It is a trade-off; we are entering a new world and not every requirement is affordable. The Coast Guard can be

The Central Finding

considered a national security 'bargain', and the budget dollar is maximized by training and equipping an already existing maritime force to be gainfully employed in peacetime and ready for contingency service.




Figure 118: Helm Watch on USCGC EAGLE.

Chapter Six

Other Significant Findings by the Author



Figure 119: A Typical Multi-Mission Coast Guard Station. These Stations Conduct Search and Rescue, Law Enforcement, Environmental, and Maritime Defense Zone Duties.

Section I

The Coast Guard's *Ad Hoc* Role in Naval Diplomacy and Security Assistance

One CINC observes that small navies more "readily relate to USCG than to USN . . . the bigger ships overwhelm them." This CINC is addressing the Coast Guard's roles in naval diplomacy and nation building. These roles are frequently discussed by the participants. For example the navy active duty admiral in the policy making position writes that "Other potential roles, depending on circumstances, include security assistance training, U.N. peacekeeping operations . . . in LIC scenarios, the Coast Guard can be of greatest value in the nation building or presence phase." He adds that Coast Guard missions and force mix are similar to many world navies and that the Coast Guard has the added advantage of appearing less intimidating, which enhances its nation building effectiveness. This CINC also discusses another important capability about the Coast Guard that he considers extremely valuable:

When regional tensions heighten, the presence of a multi-mission Coast Guard cutter or contingent is often less threatening to Host Nation sovereignty concerns than a DoD asset would be simply because it is not perceived as a U.S. "military" presence. Yet, that presence still demonstrates U.S. commitment to our allies and can be an effective deterrent to aggression.

A former Coast Guard area commander writes that, "This is perhaps the most enlightened, perceptive comment I've ever seen or heard attributed to a CINC. If there is one thing to be kept uppermost in mind, by everyone, it is that there is nothing even remotely near important to any country than its sovereignty. If, or when, a friendly nation suddenly appears to be less cooperative, less understanding, less interested in combined operations, etc., it will invariably be traceable back to some instance (or the perception of one) in which some action by the U.S. government seemed to assign a subordinate role to the country. Intimidation, albeit absolutely unintended, is the greatest insult to a sovereign nation." What this CINC observes about the Coast Guard is captured by Sir James Cable in his book, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979*. Sir Cable notes that, overt . . . small-scale (naval) operations for the protection of . . . nationals or property . . . (without) organized opposition . . . calls for resolution, judgment and good intelligence rather than powerful or numerous warships."

Some of the active duty Coast Guard admirals comment that before a crisis evolves into a conflict, nation building (security assistance) and alliance strengthening as (national security) missions are appropriate for Coast Guard participation. They too cite the great similarity between the Coast Guard and many of the world navies as the basis for their opinion. Many of the admirals suggest that the Coast Guard has a meaningful role to play in naval diplomacy. The availability of Coast Guard "white hulls" provides national command authorities the means to

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

obtain U.S. national objectives without ratcheting up the escalation scale during a confrontation or crisis. Additionally many countries view the Coast Guard as a non-threatening naval force and thus are more amenable to the Coast Guard's presence.

A Coast Guard district commander adds that, "I am impressed every day at the vitally important role the Coast Guard plays in preserving our nation's interests with the nations . . . (in my AOR.) I have had the opportunity to speak with many of our ambassadors to the developing nations of this region. As a group they are high-level advocates for the Coast Guard's continued role in nation building and keeping our country actively engaged in the third world." Another Coast Guard field commander agrees that the Coast Guard's role is ill-defined, and that often, "the Coast Guard can play a more effective role than the Navy in naval diplomacy and nation building."

**"ADMIRAL, I DON'T WANT YOU TO
WALK OUT OF THIS ROOM WITHOUT
UNDERSTANDING WHAT HIGH
REGARD THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
HAVE FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD."**

**PRESIDENT SALINAS OF MEXICO
TO ADM KIME, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD
MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
OCTOBER 1990**

Figure 120: Quote by the President of Mexico About the Coast Guard's Role in Security Assistance.

A naval analyst observes that the Coast Guard's "mix of forces, operating techniques, and missions are similar to those of the navies which will most likely be encountered in areas where limited conflict might exist . . . (The Coast Guard) can provide training and support for a host nation's naval forces." He goes on to state that "establishing working relationships around the world prior to the outbreak of low intensity conflicts can be vital to proper response and

Other Significant Findings

successful resolution. The 'non-threatening' aspect of the service could be used to a much greater extent in establishing a 'U.S. Presence' in many areas without raising political concerns."

As discussed above there is widespread and significant recognition of this Coast Guard capability. However, there is no indication in the responses that there is a concerted, dedicated, high-level effort to exploit this capability. No on-going programs are cited, no policy doctrines are mentioned, and no level of commitment is stated. It appears that this capability is considered important to discuss, but is in reality an *ad hoc* result of the Coast Guard's existence. There appears to be no real foundation to these roles, resource commitment, or official recognition by those in the national security establishment that the Coast Guard should be so tasked.

A Navy four star flag officer comments that this is a "very good point. Coast Guard vessels could perform FON (freedom of navigation), naval presence, diplomatic, military assistance (training) missions" with the nations in my AOR. A second full Navy admiral writes that, "Clearly the Coast Guard can, and does bring significant capabilities to bear. Similar efforts can be expected in the other AOs. Again DoD and DoT must coordinate and fine tune our efforts to provide the best possible product to the CINCs."

A combatant CINC disagrees that the Coast Guard's role in nation building is *ad hoc* and there is no dedicated, high level effort to use Coast Guard capabilities. In his AOR he conducts annual exercises and separate operational training deployments to foreign countries that depend very heavily on Coast Guard participation for their success. This CINC strongly agrees that "the Coast Guard's naval diplomacy, nation building, and national security roles should be defined so that these missions can become assigned missions."

Another geographical CINC says that, "The Coast Guard may also have a larger peacetime role to play. Given a volatile and distant AOR, (our) strategy for maintaining peace and stability in the region rests rarely upon maintaining a viable forward presence and providing security assistance to our friends in the area. To this end, the Coast Guard has been instrumental in the continuing . . . operations, in managing our theater . . . program, and in the conduct of . . . training for . . . nations. From our experience, it can be seen that the Coast Guard can play an important role in nation building and naval diplomacy. A cooperative effort to define that role - vis a vis that of the Navy - is warranted."

The issue here is somewhat akin to the competing viewpoint as to whether the Coast Guard is a resource-of-opportunity or a naval force-in-being. It appears that increased and more formal recognition of the Coast Guard's role in naval diplomacy and security assistance may be considered as budget threatening to the Navy in particular and not a "traditional" Coast Guard function by others. Compounding this problem is the current structure whereby the various maritime and transportation related Congressional committees that oversee the Coast Guard do not normally exercise oversight of national security issues.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

The Coast Guard's security assistance role needs to be defined. But, more importantly, this role must be formally recognized by Congress and the Departments of Transportation and Defense, and become an assigned mission with separate budget authority for program management personnel and training personnel billets and for operational training activities.

This is not an issue about whether the Coast Guard should be in Budget Function 50 (Defense) and not Budget Function 400 (Transportation). There is unequivocal recognition and acceptance that the Coast Guard should remain in Function 400. The issue is: how can this national security mission for the Coast Guard receive adequate and correct attention when its present Department, its reviewing section in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and its Congressional committees all have essentially a domestic or transportation perspective?

A retired area commander believes this to be an extremely important point. He writes that, "I think there are two major aspects to the problem's resolution: (1) DoT/OMB/Congress are not used to thinking of this as a Coast Guard mission, and to now 'add' it would necessarily require an increase in resources - politically unacceptable. (2) Even though the Coast Guard has been significantly involved for many years in naval diplomacy and security assistance, such efforts have been small in scope, relative to any other organization. However, if DoD - particularly the Navy - sees such activity as 'budget enhancing', you can bet that during these lean times there will be considerable interest in taking the lead role. (Not unlike the small boat/riverine issue . . . turf concerns over a mission they don't have, but didn't want anyone else to acquire.)"



Figure 121: Forward Presence Activities by a Coast Guard Mission to the People's Republic of China.

Other Significant Findings

Section II The Lack of Doctrine on the Coast Guard's Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

A second finding is the lack of doctrine on the Coast Guard's national security role. This lack of common doctrine on who and what is the Coast Guard is very evident from the responses. As discussed, there is little agreement as to whether the Coast Guard is a resource-of-opportunity or a naval force-in-being with prescribed national security/defense missions. One active duty Coast Guard flag officer states that the "Coast Guard's primary defense role is to support strategic mobility in the ports and waterways of U.S.", but there is no consensus on such a position. His statement reflects the problem of no authoritative policies and definitions.

The Coast Guard has previously recognized the need for doctrine. In March 1964 the Coast Guard published a directive titled "United States Coast Guard Objectives" (CG-378). (See Appendix B.) The then Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Roland, wrote in its letter of promulgation: "Its merit lies not in originality, but in general assertion of philosophical objectives for planning." This publication had three important purposes:

- o To set forth the basic Coast Guard philosophy.
- o To define Coast Guard objectives in relation to national objectives and assigned missions.
- o To provide long range policy guidance for use in planning operations.

The need for doctrine is not unique to the military. Thomas Watson, famed leader of IBM, wrote that "any organization, in order to survive and achieve success, must have a sound set of beliefs on which it premises all its policies and actions."¹ Philip Selznick, the management theorist, similarly observed that a long-standing organization is marked by "choices which fix the assumptions of policy makers as to the nature of the enterprise, its distinctive aims, methods, and roles."²

Traditionally the military has stressed the importance of a sound set of beliefs. General George H. Decker of the U.S. Army has said it the best: "Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and unity of effort."³ He means that doctrine is not dogma to be followed blindly without thinking. Doctrine is authoritative guidance, but its use still requires sound judgment. Is there common agreement within the service on the Coast Guard's enduring values, multi-mission capability, comparative advantages, or its role in national security? A codified body of common philosophy or doctrine provides a way of thinking⁴ and a commonly understood starting point from which to develop

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

solutions to specific future challenges.⁵ Doctrine provides a credible, overarching concept that lends coherence to the myriad activities of an organization.⁶




Figure 122: Coast Guard RELIANCE Class Cutter Fights a Major Ship Fire.

A critically important, but undefined term is "national security." To many respondents this term connotes a warfighting or a military capability, whereas to others it means something much more which includes such factors as diplomatic, economic, and environmental considerations, not to mention polar and law enforcement capabilities. Because there is no common definition, the responses obviously reflect how the participant defines "national security". The term national security and national defense (naval warfare or military capability) are not synonymous. The Coast Guard's national security role in maritime law enforcement or even in projecting U.S. polar presence may require and justify naval combat systems on its cutters, separate from any possible national defense requirements.

How many of the participants defined "specialized service" is also representative of this lack of doctrine. Some of the Coast Guard active admirals defined "specialized service" as either expertise, missions, or capabilities. For example:

Other Significant Findings

- o "Refers to Coast Guard expertise derived from Coast Guard peacetime roles which are applied to Navy Wartime missions."
- o "Our day to day Coast Guard missions continuing in time of war . . . in both the U.S. and in littoral waters, and in the foreign theater."
- o "Our capabilities in executing statutory regulations carry over as a specialized service to support the Navy."

Two Coast Guard retired flag officers offer additional variations about the definitions of specialized service. One writes that its meaning is "intended and should remain a reference to organizational relationship, rather than a specific list of duties or capabilities." The other retiree notes that the Coast Guard as a specialized service is "not meant to be a (another) 'navy'. The services it provides are special and ongoing. (Even as part of the Navy) . . . the Coast Guard retains its identity". The service according to his definition complements the Navy with its unique capabilities.

Two CINCs give very interesting opinions as to why there is no definition about specialized service. One writes that "Statutes regarding the Coast Guard's mission are intentionally ambiguous, to provide flexibility in response to national requirements." The other states that "I suspect those specialized services were left undefined intentionally, so as not to limit or constrain this diverse arm of our armed forces." A retired Coast Guard area commander "totally agrees" with that explanation.

The Navy active duty admiral in the policy making position writes that "Specialized service is recognition of the diverse nature of duties the Coast Guard is tasked to perform in military contingencies." A retired Navy admiral comments that he believes specialized service "means to employ Coast Guard assets to supplement naval assets which are not available as a result of their wartime missions."

Somewhere in these many definitions is the truth, but without doctrine no authoritative definition exists to guide policy and decision makers when dealing with the Coast Guard's national security/defense role. It's not just in addressing this role that guidance is needed. Force planning, training requirements, and a whole host of personnel issues are shaped by well defined policies and doctrine on roles and missions.

The absence of doctrine on the Coast Guard is evident elsewhere. One Coast Guard admiral notes that since wars had not been declared, the Coast Guard could not have been used in Grenada, Panama, and the 1987 Persian Gulf Tanker Reflagging operation. He does not explain how the Coast Guard was used in Vietnam or recently in the Persian Gulf. A retired admiral states that "the Coast Guard's contribution to national security lies primarily in non-combat

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

arenas." This view is countered by a Navy active duty admiral who says that "The Coast Guard's primary role is focused on coastal defense of CONUS ports." These views are contrasted by the views of the CINCs given above. No common, accepted definitions appear to exist on the Coast Guard.

Doctrine and communicating that doctrine go hand in hand. Many Coast Guard participants mention the lack of understanding about the Coast Guard's roles and capabilities. For example the following are typical comments: (1) "we need to do a better job educating CINCs on Coast Guard capabilities."; (2) "area commanders should talk directly to their supported CINCs about anticipated needs for Coast Guard forces."; (3) "clearly define what Coast Guard is capable of producing and performing."; (4) "because of our size CINCs may not immediately think of us in a continuing (crisis action) response."; and (5) "I doubt if CINCs are fully aware of the total Coast Guard capability." Reinforcing this observation is a Navy retired flag officer who states that decision makers are not generally aware of Coast Guard capabilities.

One senior Coast Guard field commander fully supports the need for Coast Guard doctrine, along with a Coast Guard district commander. However, the district commander suggests not



Figure 123: Coast Guard Coastal Patrol Boat Monitors Large Oil Spill.

Other Significant Findings

to get "snarled in a debate about what is national security and what is national defense. The answer will always be "it depends," because the terms define points along a continuum. He recommends, "clearly delineating doctrine and capabilities so that the customers, be they a CINC or a domestic agency, know what they are getting. Whether they want to define it as security or defense is their problem." A second Coast Guard district commander states that, "The word 'doctrine' has a strong emotional connotation (and DoD slant). Point is, there needs to be consensus on the Coast Guard's role." A retired Commandant strongly disagrees with the need for doctrine and believes that Title 14 U.S.C. is sufficient.

A combatant CINC underscores the need for telling "customers" to know what they are getting and can get from the Coast Guard: "We agree that the Coast Guard should develop doctrine which addresses each of its roles, and that a concerted effort be made to communicate that doctrine to decision and policy makers. The full range of Coast Guard capabilities is not always appreciated or considered by those outside the Coast Guard. The development of solid doctrine - in concert with the Joint Staff - could do much to correct this deficiency."

A full Navy admiral submits that, "MDZ is only one of the many diverse mission areas in which the Coast Guard can assist the Navy. Unfortunately, MDZ has become synonymous with a mental picture of the Coast Guard's only military utility."

A flag officer on the Joint Staff says the, "Coast Guard, like any organization, needs good doctrine." He suggests the Coast Guard needs "doctrine and liaison officers - right ones in the right places . . ." A retired Coast Guard admiral picks up this theme of liaison officers with his comment that, "I favor strengthened liaison officer relationships. Strengthened relationships coupled with a widely distributed and briefed Coast Guard doctrine should enhance the Coast Guard's contribution to national security."

The Coast Guard needs a doctrine that addresses its national security role, "specialized service" role, and multi-mission capability. Good doctrine provides a common basis of knowledge and understanding that can guide an organization's activities for unity of effort. In essence doctrine provides a knowledge base for making decisions to achieve consistency and balance over the long term. The absence of a codified doctrine on the Coast Guard hinders the service. Furthermore, this doctrine must be extensively communicated to decision and policy makers, both in and out of the Coast Guard.

Section III

The Coast Guard's Organizational Structure for National Security

Figure 36 in Chapter Two depicts the four primary Coast Guard mission areas and the functions associated with each mission area. Figure 124 shows the same information but reflects the five different Coast Guard offices in Headquarters with national security responsibilities. Three offices, each headed by a rear admiral, supervise Coast Guard functions or operating programs: (1) Office of Defense Operations and Law Enforcement, (2) Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, and (3) Office of Navigation Safety and Waterways Services. Two offices involved in national security do not have oversight over operating programs: (1) Office of Readiness and Reserve, headed by a rear admiral, and (2) the Commandant's International Affairs Staff, headed by a senior executive service member.




Figure 124: Coast Guard Offices in Headquarters Responsible for National Security.

The Coast Guard lacks a central focal point for developing and coordinating an overall Coast Guard national security program. The present matrix organization accommodates budgetary considerations, but not the integration of related functional duties into common staff groupings. The diverse nature of the Coast Guard's duties and the multi-mission characteristic of its forces,

Other Significant Findings

perhaps, prevents such a functional arrangement. Despite this practical limitation, the Coast Guard could benefit from an office with a clear charter to advance and integrate Coast Guard national security efforts. Such a 'Plans and Policy' office could be established by renaming the Office of Readiness and Reserve, and relocating the Reserve portion of this Office to the Office of Personnel, thereby grouping all personnel matters in one place (a Total Force proposal). Additionally, the International Affairs Staff would relocate as an appendage of the Commandant's personal staff to this new Office of Plans and Policies. This new Office would not exercise oversight of a Coast Guard operating program, it would be better positioned to provide 'oversight' of the Coast Guard's total national security mission. It would be principally tasked to produce a coordinated national security strategy for the Coast Guard.




Figure 125: Coast Guard Buoy Tender at Work.

Section IV
The Lack of Historical Case Studies
on Coast Guard Involvement in National Security

The lack of Coast Guard historical case studies, reports, and interviews on significant events in the Coast Guard is nothing short of appalling. The number of times the Navy's aircraft carriers have been used in crisis response is well documented. Unfortunately the number of times Coast Guard forces have been used by the NCA or the CINCs is not so well documented. The Coast Guard does not have an accurate list of those instances when Coast Guard forces supported U.S. national security objectives. Though at the time it may be well known that Coast Guard forces were present, like a ship's wake, memories fade and officers retire and with them goes the knowledge of that use.



Figure 126: Coast Guard Law Enforcement Boarding Team Inspects a Sailboat's Life Raft. (Photo by Chuck Mussi)

Without a record, the use of Coast Guard forces in national security activities can not be made known to future generations of Coast Guard leaders, much less studied and assessed. For example, at a recent conference of senior Coast Guard officers attended by the author, the majority of participants had no knowledge that Coast Guard forces were requested for use in Grenada, except for one or two who stated that the forces had been recalled for reasons they did

Other Significant Findings

not know. If it had not been for those few informed officers, most of the participants were ready to believe that the Navy did not need the Coast Guard in the Grenada contingency operation of 1983. The same lack of knowledge is shown in the responses to the survey question about the Grenada incident. Though some respondents were aware of the request for Coast Guard forces, disagreement exists as to why Coast Guard forces were not employed. Without historical case studies of the Coast Guard's involvement in national security, few lessons can be learned about the national and service level decision-making associated with using the Coast Guard in a crisis.

This shortcoming not only prevents a better understanding of the Coast Guard both in and out of the Service, but it also hinders development of future Coast Guard leaders. Case studies of how two recent commandants, Admiral John Hayes and Admiral Paul Yost, prevented the civilianization of the Coast Guard and the loss of missions to the Customs Service respectively do not exist. The significance of these major events and the organizational, political lessons learned cannot be handed down by word of mouth to future generations of leaders. Historical accounts are very important for ensuring a corporate record of how events occurred and why decisions were made. Without such history to provide a context for future decision-making, Coast Guard leaders lack the practical benefit of lessons learned, do not strengthen their institutional identity and knowledge, and do not fully develop an appreciation of the 'longer view'.

It is not only in contingencies that critically important organizational information is not collected and retained. A retired Coast Guard area commander writes about the active role of DoD in the procurement of the Coast Guard's HU-25 Falcon medium patrol aircraft and HH-65 medium range helicopter. He notes:

In both (aircraft procurements) instances, operating requirements had to be very carefully scrubbed, because DoT approval has to be achieved prior to the Coast Guard having the authority (dollars in the approved budget) to begin the acquisition process. Only traditional, day-to-day multi-mission needs were supported There was no war-fighting role envisioned. Once given the go-ahead, the Coast Guard took a very careful look at all aircraft in DoD inventory. In fact, the Coast Guard MIPR'd (Military Interdepartmental Procurement Request) to the Navy for their SABRE-7s, but political pressure forced us to withdraw the MIPR and conduct an open competition. The modified Falcon-20 was the winner.

In the case of the HH-65 . . . there were 17 required characteristics identified and approved. Included were: operating radius 150 nm unescorted; single pilot IFR, day or night, over the water; HF, VHF, UHF, FM communications; radar; max gross weight not to exceed 10,000 pounds.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Only those helicopters known, in the free world, could appear to meet those requirements . . . none were, nor are there today, in the DoD inventory. The Coast Guard has, for many years (e.g. C-130s since 1950) been very much aware of the absolute desirability of owning and operating DoD-supported aircraft. In fact, the justification for aircraft replacement programs - all of them - during the last thirty-or-more years has been solely because of the high cost of supporting existing aircraft type which either never were - or no longer were - being operated/supported by DoD.

A Coast Guard admiral in discussing the potential deployment of Coast Guard forces to the Persian Gulf in 1987, states that Congress, and in particular Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida, played the major role, not CINC Central, in saying no. Other respondents mention the reason for not using the Coast Guard was money; the Navy would have to pay for the Coast Guard deployment out of hide since Congress did not provide the navy supplemental funding. Others indicate it was Congress concerned about the loss of assets from the drug war to go to the Persian Gulf. Again, a case study of the national level decision-making involved in this contingency, and an assessment of why the Coast Guard was requested, but not used would be extremely useful and beneficial to the Service.

During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Center for Naval Analysts (CNA) had at any one time, approximately 28 analysts observing and collecting data on Navy-Marine Corps operations in that conflict. The Coast Guard does not need that level of effort. However, the Coast Guard could easily achieve its own capability by standing up a ten person Coast Guard Reserve Operational Assessment/Historical unit, much like the ones in the Army Reserves. This unit would deploy not only to regional contingencies, but also to crises such as the massive Valdez oil spill, the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo, or the Haitian alien interdiction operation. For too long the Coast Guard has hurt itself by not collecting this data.

Other Significant Findings



Figure 127: Coast Guard 47 Foot Motor Life Boat Will Replace the Vintage 44 Foot MLB.




Figure 128: Coast Guard BAY Class Icebreaking Tug Is a Multi Mission Cutter that also Served in Grenada to Provide Naval Presence.

Chapter Seven

Recommendations by Individual Respondents




Figure 129: Coast Guard HH-65A Helicopter in Flight. (Photo by Joe Towers)

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

A suggestion that the author not provide in the Report "any finding or recommendation not explicitly supported by at least a substantial majority of the survey replies" has merit. The study, per se, does not make any recommendations; only the recommendations made by individuals are presented in this Chapter. As in other chapters, the author comments on some of the recommendations presenting his analysis.




Figure 130: Top Down Derivation of the Coast Guard's Functions.

Recommendation 1

Who from DoD Provides Policy on the Coast Guard's National Security Role - the CNO, the CINCs, or the C'JCS ?

A Coast Guard district commander says that the issue really goes beyond any command relationships of whether the Coast Guard should be a specified command for the Unified CINCs. He asks: (1) "What is the Coast Guard's logical national security role?"; and (2) "What should be the command relationships within which we define and execute that role? Up until now, the starting point for any analysis of the Coast Guard's national security role has been the statutory provision to transfer the Coast Guard to the Navy Department in time of war. It's now time to reconsider that organizational relationship."

In light of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, this Coast Guard district commander is questioning the role of the CNO and the DoN to determine the Coast Guard's national security role. He believes that instead of the CNO acting as a "broker" between the CINCs and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Chairman, JCS should be the go-between. The respondent is suggesting that the Coast Guard become a "specialized service" in DoD, in lieu of in the Navy.

He continues that, "The wartime transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy is a concept which was first made law in 1914, more than three decades before the current unified command structure was conceived. The underlying premise is now 45 years out of date: it's no longer the services which define operational tasking and carry out operations; that's the role of the CINCs. Yet, we continue to labor under the assumption that the Coast Guard's wartime tasking needs to be defined or "blessed" by the Navy. It's time for a paradigm shift; we need to re-examine who should determine the Coast Guard's national security role. Only when we have properly identified the "customer" can we properly identify the "product" we should deliver. The broader issue is whether the Coast Guard and DoD should seek a statutory change to give the CINCs first priority in defining the Coast Guard's wartime tasking. Unnecessarily limiting; the exact nature of command relationships can be worked out after we escape the confines of the 1914 law."

Another Coast Guard district commander supports this recommendation with, "The 1914 law that requires the Coast Guard to transfer to the Navy was rendered an anachronism after the DoD reorganization acts. With the CINCs working directly for the national command authority, the Coast Guard no more receives operational direction through the Navy than does the CNO control naval operations. Repeal the law and we will continue to commit forces directly to the CINCs' naval component commander just as we are already doing."

A retired Navy admiral who is now a naval analyst on strategic and naval force matters agrees. The issue is no longer what "specialized service" the Coast Guard can perform for the Navy, but whether this concept of specialized service is still valid. The relationship is based on

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

warfighting capability, but national security has broadened to include more emphasis on economic, environmental, diplomatic considerations than the traditional definition of military concerns of national survival.

This retired admiral writes, "I think it's time to 'deep six' the old thinking of the Coast Guard as part of the Navy in wartime as if it were just another form of reserves with specialized capabilities for use in augmentation. Instead, we should think of the Coast Guard in the broader context of a comprehensive definition of national security for which it has unique missions in both peacetime and wartime. Those missions do not compete with but complement the missions of the U.S. Navy. . . . It is time to accept that the Coast Guard has unique national security missions that require unique training and equipment. Those missions are important for U.S. national security in peacetime and when the nation is at war. To think of the Coast Guard as a part of the Navy in wartime in the twenty-first century is to divert its focus from its real national security mission and to reduce its effectiveness. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard are not competitive organizations in national security. They each have unique capabilities and missions."

**"THE COAST GUARD PROVIDES
NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES
A UNIQUE INSTRUMENT IN THE NATION'S
NATIONAL SECURITY TOOL BAG."**

**GEN. COLIN POWELL
CHAIRMAN, JCS
SPEECH, US. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
MAY 1991**

Figure 131: Quote About the Coast Guard by General Colin Powell.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Author's Comment

This suggestion reflects the Coast Guard's broader national security capabilities to provide more than combatant-type surface vessels to the naval component commanders. It also reflects the reality that only three times in this century has the U.S. formally declared war. It is only when the "the President directs or in time of war" that the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy. To these admirals the likelihood of global war appears to have diminished. They believe that tomorrow's peacetime engagements, regional contingencies, and crisis responses will undoubtedly require the unique, broader national security capabilities of the Coast Guard, and not so much it's "warfighting" (national defense) capabilities.

Allowing the CINCs to define the use of the Coast Guard to meet their requirements, will formalize and streamline the employment of the Coast Guard as an instrument of national security. It will provide the CINCs assured and quick access to that flexibility of crisis response that they cite as a particularly attractive feature of the Coast Guard. Such a designation should provide the decision criteria for using the Coast Guard. The precedent for Coast Guard commands to work for DoD was set with the designation of the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commanders as respective MDZ Commanders for U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet. Further precedent was established by inviting the Commandant of the Coast Guard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for when matters directly affecting the Coast Guard are discussed.

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

Recommendation 2

Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role

There were many recommendations to initiate studies to determine the Coast Guard's future roles and missions. A Coast Guard district commander asks for a "fresh, unbiased study to determine our national security role." A Navy retired admiral notes that "The assignment of DoD roles and missions to the Coast Guard is an issue that goes far beyond the military capabilities of Coast Guard vessels -- it goes to the heart of the basic relationship between DoD and DOT." Another retired Navy admiral summarizes it best when he calls for "a top-down review of such trends (national security and geo-political events) and a hierarchical set of policies should replace trying to revise policy-oriented accommodations such as the MDZ as means to define the USCG future." In amplification this Navy flag officer recommends:

To determine if future USCG roles and capabilities ought to be improved in ways that make them more combat capable in terms of traditional naval strategy, a credible analysis of national security policy, regional strategies, threat evolution and technology is needed.




Figure 132: DoD Lines of Communications to Request Coast Guard Forces.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Internal Coast Guard Study

A retired Coast Guard admiral writes that, "I don't mean to be an alarmist but it is possible that the Coast Guard as we know it could disappear. Privatization and user charges make powerful surface arguments for doing away with government agencies like the Coast Guard. If that were to come to pass, I believe the people of the United States (and the world) would lose a very valuable asset. But given the diminished military threat and the extreme budgetary constraints, one cannot simply dismiss the possibility. The Coast Guard must look out for its own destiny. It needs to revalidate its *raison d'être* as it moves into its third century of service. A new Roles and Mission Study with input from the DoD, the CINC's, and the Navy is imperative in my opinion."

Joint Navy-Coast Guard Study

A flag officer on the Joint Staff writes that, "The Coast Guard and Navy should jointly examine their respective capabilities, identify areas of duplication, and eliminate or consolidate them. This will allow Navy to focus on military operations, and Coast Guard to concentrate on complementary roles . . . port security and safety, search and rescue, law enforcement, environmental expertise, and aids to navigation, as well as a significant role in counterdrug operations. Accordingly, employment of Coast Guard by or with DoD forces should be identified throughout the planning process, to include Unified and Specified Commands' submissions to the Joint Staff. This is in fact the case for several current plans and orders." He continues that, "Coast Guard has unique capabilities to offer joint military commanders. These capabilities, like those for DoD Services, can be thought of as "tools in a box" that are employed as situations dictate. Coast Guard should identify those capabilities, maximize them, and in coordination with DOD, be prepared to employ them both here and abroad."

A combatant CINC supports this recommendation for a study by noting that, "The Navy and Coast Guard work together to more clearly define the Coast Guard's national security role . . . Coast Guard forces contributed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm by providing port security and assisting in Maritime Interception Operations. This demonstrated that the Coast Guard can have a role in regional conflicts. Since the requirement for Coast Guard participation in such conflicts can be expected to continue into the future" . . . this review is appropriate."

A retired Coast Guard flag officer supports this approach. He writes that, "The CNO and the Commandant of the Coast Guard convene a series of NAVGARD Board Meetings dedicated to the review of the Coast Guard's national security role. I recommend that the JCS provide an observer, if not a participant, when Board progress so dictates it advisable."

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

Cabinet Level DoD/DoT Study

A current assistant secretary of defense also supports a joint review, but at the cabinet level. He writes that, "The Departments of Defense and Transportation jointly determine if significant changes in the Coast Guard's national security role are both needed and possible." He believes this report is "an excellent starting point for such an effort, and a joint DoD/DoT analysis of current Coast Guard roles and missions would be key to making such a determination."

A combatant CINC supports this recommendation. He writes that, "In today's climate of fiscal austerity there is a need for the Departments of Defense and Transportation to jointly determine appropriate command relationships to ensure the proper integration of the Coast Guard's capabilities in future peacetime engagements, regional contingencies, and crisis responses."

A retired Commandant of the Coast Guard supports the cabinet-level approach and not the Service Chief approach. He writes that, "Unless the political masters require it, the Service Chiefs will never do it. This must be a political decision."

Author's Comment

This recommendation goes to the heart of this research project - what is the Coast Guard's relationship with the U.S. Navy? In the author's opinion, until this fundamental issue is defined, the Coast Guard's national security role will remain a speculative commodity, subject to continuous reinterpretation and reevaluation. If the CINCs plan to use Coast Guard forces, then recognition of the Coast Guard's role in national security should be included in the Base Force and in JCS/DoD's submissions to Congress. To deny formal mention of the Coast Guard on the basis that it is not in DoD and yet realize (and write about) what a unique contribution the Coast Guard makes to national security is inconsistent. One approach to defining this relationship is presented in Chapter 5. The call for a study to determine the Coast Guard's national security role is the most important suggestion to emerge from this research. This study should be at the cabinet level with National Security Council input to ensure the full range of Coast Guard capabilities are addressed. The study is urgently needed.




Figure 13: Coast Guard Polar Star icebreaker in the ice

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

Recommendation 3

Additional Issues for the Study on the Coast Guard's National Security Role

Some of the respondents, in addition to recommending a study on the Coast Guard's national security role, suggested other topics that required studying. Because these additional issues relate to the Coast Guard's national security role, the recommended study could also address these topics as well.

Funding the Coast Guard's National Defense Role

Who should fund the Coast Guard's national defense capability? A Coast Guard active duty admiral recommends that DoD should continue to fund the Coast Guard's national defense functions. He recommends that funding for the national security functions that are not military should ultimately be in DoT's Function 400 (Transportation). The subject of funding is frequently mentioned by the respondents and should be carefully examined.

Congressional Oversight

A four star active duty Navy admiral notes that congressional oversight is, "the key to the whole issue. Congress must be made to see and support a viable contingency military role for the Coast Guard short of global declared war. Funding, oversight, and inter-departmental issues must be solved."

A Coast Guard field commander writes, "The Coast Guard's unique combination of peacetime and wartime capabilities and responsibilities requires joint oversight at the Department and Congressional levels. The NAVGARD Board provides the joint oversight at the Department level. Joint Transportation-Defense Congressional committees would be appropriate."

The Coast Guard's Role in Security Assistance

A combatant CINC comments that, "the Coast Guard's naval diplomacy, nation building, and national security roles should be defined so that these missions can become assigned missions. The ability of the Coast Guard to perform these additional missions will demonstrate not only continuing improvement in the service provided to the American people, but will also serve to reinforce the requirement for continued funding support within the Department of Transportation."



Figure 1.34: Coast Guard Marine Safety Inspector at Work on Port Facilities.

Another combatant CINC writes that, "The Coast Guard may also have a larger peacetime role to play (in security assistance). Given a volatile and distant AOR, the . . . Command strategy for maintaining peace and stability in the region rests rarely upon maintaining a viable forward presence and providing security assistance to our friends in the area. To this end, the Coast Guard has been instrumental in (our) continuing . . . operations, in managing our theater . . . Advisory Program, and in the conduct of law enforcement detachment training for . . . nations. From our experience, it can be seen that the Coast Guard can play an important role in nation building and naval diplomacy. A cooperative effort to define that role - vis a vis that of the Navy - is warranted."

Recommendations by Individual Respondents




Figure 135: Two Coast Guard Sentinels for the Mariner: HAMILTON/HERO Class Cutter and a Lighthouse.



Figure 136: Coast Guard Buoy Tenders Conducting Drills.



Figure 137: Coast Guard Mobile Training Team at Work with a Foreign Navy.



Figure 138: Coast Guard BEAR Class Cutter Prepares to Exercise the Coast Guard's Broad Law Enforcement Powers.

Recommendation 4

The Coast Guard's Command Relationship with DoD

Two active duty Coast Guard admirals suggest changing the Coast Guard's command relationship to the CINCs by making the Coast Guard a either a sub-unified or specified command. They base their suggestion on the need:

- (1) To reflect the Coast Guard's broader national security capabilities to provide more than combatant-type surface vessels to the naval component commanders. They believe that tomorrow's peacetime engagements, regional contingencies, and crisis responses will undoubtedly require the unique, broader national security capabilities of the Coast Guard, and not so much its "warfighting" (national defense) capabilities.
- (2) To streamline the availability of Coast Guard assets for use by the CINC in contingencies short of global war. These admirals believe that the likelihood of global war has diminished. It also reflects the reality that only three times in this century has the U.S. formally declared war. It is only when the "the President directs or in time of war" that the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy.

This recommendation does not have widespread support. A Coast Guard field commander writes that, "Turning the entire Coast Guard into a specified command, subordinate to the unified CINCs would be inappropriate, because (1) a specified CINC does not report to a unified CINC, and (2) optimum employment of Coast Guard forces by a unified CINC would be utilization of specific Coast Guard assets for specific missions." Furthermore, he observes, "We should not create another commander who reports directly to the unified CINCs. In the interest of command efficiency, direct access to CINCs should be kept to a minimum. In any form, Coast Guard forces should not report directly to unified CINCs. Because the Coast Guard is a sea service, it is appropriately part of the CINCs' naval components."

He also states that, "The Coast Guard's capabilities, warfighting and non-warfighting, are presently available to the unified CINCs' naval component commanders through the MARDEZ organizations . . . (via) the two FLTCINCs, who provide all naval forces to naval component commanders. The Coast Guard is not a stand-alone force. We live in a joint/unified U.S. military community now, and the Coast Guard's appropriate place is with the Navy."

A Coast Guard admiral in Headquarters writes that, "I would foresee a great deal of resistance to this idea, since it potentially detracts from peacetime missions, subjugates the Coast Guard

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

to DoD during peacetime, and possibly injects inter-service competition between the Navy and Coast Guard."

A retired Coast Guard admiral with long experience in this area notes that, "I concur with the basic recommendation that something must be done in this area. But, I believe that it would be a mistake for the Coast Guard to become a part of the CINCs organization. I fear that it might jeopardize the unique relationship of the Coast Guard - its white cutters can do things that a gray ship can not do. The Coast Guard is different and should remain so."




Figure 139: CINC Versus CNO Interaction When Requesting Coast Guard Forces.

A four star Navy admiral writes that, "Under no circumstances should the Coast Guard venture into the Joint Arena without Navy sponsorship/support." A combatant CINC agrees. He writes that, "Having DoD and DoT jointly determine the USCG role appears to have merit. However, making the USCG a sub-unified command would have no apparent value/added impact on operations."

A flag officer on the Joint Staff believes that the legislative and executive branches can best address the Coast Guard's command relationship. He adds: "As we progress into the decade of the 90s and beyond, the concept of Total Force Policy will be central to the operations of our

Recommendations by Individual Respondents

Armed Forces. Our response to developing regional crises will consist of a variety of measured responses, some of which may include Coast Guard forces and resources. As demonstrated during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a declaration of war need not precede the employment of Coast Guard forces in roles other than those traditionally assigned. The President may employ the Coast Guard in response to a crisis whenever he feels it is in the best interest of national security. Recognizing this fact, the Coast Guard is involved in virtually every major military exercise conducted by the Joint Staff. We are applying the lessons learned from these exercises and are constantly improving and defining the relationships between the Coast Guard and the Services. Falling under the Department of Transportation jurisdiction allows the Coast Guard to perform many missions which would require extensive legislation or Presidential action if it were under the Department of Defense. The current command relationships allow the National Command Authority significant flexibility in dealing with developing crises."

A second flag officer on the Joint Staff notes that, "The Coast Guard's current command relationship, when properly exercised, appears adequate. However, in most multi-organizational operations where Coast Guard is or has been involved, no lead agency has been designated. This results in parallel chain-of-command with no one in charge. Thus, it is incumbent upon policy makers to ensure clear command relationships are established during inter-agency operations."

A retired Coast Guard area commander provides further information by discussing the differences in organizational relationships between the Coast Guard and the other Armed Forces. He believes that, "Perhaps, the greatest obstacle to a better understanding of 'where's the problem' is the basic difference in organizational authority." Unlike the other service chiefs, the Coast Guard Commandant by law has both operational responsibility as well as responsibilities for administrative, planning, budgeting, procurement, and personnel matters. "So you have a situation, where the Commandant meets with the Joint Chiefs, than meets/interacts with individual CINCs as the operational commander." But it is the area commanders who have been delegated by the Commandant the responsibility for operations. "Coast Guard area commanders have three stars, so are not accepted as 'equivalents' (let alone equals) when the CINCs gather. One-on-one, there is no problem, but that is to a great extent dependent on personal relationship."

Chapter Eight

Author's Conclusion




Figure 140: In the Post Cold War Era, What is the Coast Guard's Relationship with the Navy? Watercolor Courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute.

A Defining Time for the Coast Guard

The Coast Guard's maritime law enforcement, maritime environmental, safety, and political-military functions will continue to support significantly the national security of the United States in the Twenty-First Century. Requirements for a U.S. Coast Guard will continue; there will be many opportunities for the Coast Guard to demonstrate its important contributions to national security. There will also be dangers to the Coast Guard's continued existence in its present form.

One example for opportunity will be the continuing need for U.S. maritime law enforcement capability, especially for marine resource protection and economic alien interdiction. "At the end of World War II, the United States and Latin America had roughly similarity sized populations; in 2010, the Latin American population will be *twice* the size of our own."¹ This huge demographic imbalance between two regions marked with other imbalances in wealth, jobs, and economies will generate large migrations by undocumented, illegal aliens into the U.S. seeking a better life. Some of these will attempt to come in by sea; the Coast Guard will require a blue-water capability to interdict these aliens before they reach the U.S. Other likely developments that will substantiate a requirement to conduct the enforcement of laws and treaties mission in the 21st Century are: tension among users of limited marine resources, environmental activities (ocean dumping, hazardous waste disposal, and transportation of chemicals), conflicts between nations arising from boundary disputes, and jurisdictional claims over resources on the high seas.²

However, there also will be dangers for the Coast Guard, principally to its existence as an Armed Force. The possible loss of military status could also lead to other dangers to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard's military capabilities traditionally has been the glue that has kept the Coast Guard together. Its loss could result in the loss of certain Coast Guard functions, in particular its environmental responsibilities.

Presently, redundant, duplicative capabilities exist between the Navy and Coast Guard. In the future the Coast Guard's military functions to operate combatant-type vessels for the Navy as a form of "Naval Reserve" augmentation force will greatly diminish. There will be no justification for the Coast Guard's large cutters, medium and high endurance, to retain combat systems, sensors and weapons. Coastal defenses requirements for the CONUS-based MDZ commands will not generate the need for combat systems for these cutters. Furthermore, the Navy will not expect these forces to deploy to a regional conflict on short notice. The Coast Guard's patrol boats have utility in regional conflicts as coastal patrol and interdiction assets. If the Navy decides that it has no requirement to deploy them to such a conflict, these cutters too will have no need for combat systems.

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

A decision by the Navy not to call upon the Coast Guard's patrol boats means that there is no requirement to include warfare capability in the Coast Guard's replacement patrol boat for the 82 Foot *POINT* Class cutter. The only requirement for a weapon system will be law enforcement duties (deterrence and disabling fire) and low-order confrontations with other nation-states. Basically Coast Guard cutters will become a family of offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and possibly lose their naval auxiliary status. (These cutters could still retain a reconstitution capability - if the Navy desires - for a major conflict, but no resources need be expended on them to maintain a military capability in the interim.) Though the combat systems will go, the command, control, and communications (C3) systems must remain fully current and retain full DoD interoperability for joint operations in non-military crisis response like the Haitian crisis of December 1991 or the Cuban Boatlift of 1981. The recent events in Haiti clearly demonstrate the need to use DoD communications and tactical information systems.

There is no longer a threat of global war with the Soviets and the concomitant need for national mobilization. The Navy will only consider complementary, non-redundant military capabilities for the Coast Guard, and not augmentation roles. It is this profound change in the strategic landscape and its implications to the Coast Guard's military functions that makes the removal of Harpoon slightly deceptive in its real importance.

With the end of the Cold War, the calculus for justifying the Coast Guard's current military capability has dramatically changed. The need for MDZ will continue to diminish and will not support a viable military role for the Coast Guard. The only possible future threat for MDZ to consider is a terrorist threat occurring between the pier face and the sea buoy of a few strategic seaport ports. MDZ will focus exclusively inside the ports; coastal planning considerations will be nil. Consequently, for operations beyond the sea buoy into the U.S. EEZ and other adjacent waters, Coast Guard forces will not require a military capability, except for law enforcement purposes (deterrence and disabling fire). With the Navy already laying up *KNOX* Class ASW frigates and placing *PERRY* Class ASW frigates into its Reserves, the Coast Guard's ASW capability is obviously on borrowed time. The loss of Harpoon, in itself, is not significant. What is significant is the continued erosion of Coast Guard military capability and what that means to the Coast Guard's existence as an Armed Force. The Coast Guard may be in the process of losing its military capability, and that without it will inadvertently position itself to become a civilian agency.

In summary there is no longer a requirement for Coast Guard forces to have a military capability. Only the possibility of providing Coast Guard forces for coastal/littoral operations in regional contingencies provides any valid requirement for the Coast Guard to maintain a military capability. This poses a fundamental policy issue. Does the Coast Guard need to maintain a relevant, credible, and useful military capability to underpin its continued status as an Armed Force in the post Cold War era? The short answer is yes. The Coast Guard needs to maintain some level of military utility because the Coast Guard's status as an Armed Force underwrites its unique ability to conduct a wide range of disparate missions in both the domestic

Author's Conclusion




Figure 141: Will the 25MM Chain Gun Become the High End of the Coast Guard Combat Capability?

and national security arenas. Without it the Coast Guard becomes just another domestic agency and lose its multi-mission flexibility.

Recent contingencies operations also show a disturbing trend emerges. Grenada (1983), Persian Gulf Reflagging (1987), Panama (1990), and the Persian Gulf War did not require the presence of Coast Guard cutters. (Coast Guard cutters participated in the post-Grenada nation building activities.) The first three contingencies occurred while the Cold War was still hot. The Coast Guard's military capability on its cutters was not used when DoD was stressed to contain the Soviets, and was not needed during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. These are all signs about the future need for Coast Guard's military capability.

Given the collapse of the Soviet Union and huge reductions in the defense budgets, the non-use of Coast Guard forces in these historical case studies undermines the continued rationale for providing Coast Guard cutters a military capability. It can be argued that it is not just Harpoon, but all combat systems should be removed from Coast Guard platforms. And what effect would such an outcome have on the Coast Guard's status as an Armed Force? Admiral Roland believed that non-participation in Korea and Vietnam would be detrimental to the Coast Guard's existence as a military service. It seems reasonable to conclude that Admiral Roland's

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

assessment about the cumulative danger of not participating in two successive wars is as applicable now as it was then.

The Coast Guard cutter fleet will not be the only Coast Guard force undergoing profound change. The lessening of the requirement for the CONUS-based MDZ commands will reduce the need for Coast Guard Reserves. The number of Reserves was based upon global war, and like their counterparts in the other military services, the number of current Reservists will be reduced. Reservists are still needed for augmentation of Coast Guard search and rescue stations, but not in the present numbers of total members. The Naval Reserve can provide the forces for port security units to deploy overseas to regional conflicts. This would streamline the Navy's management by only having one service involved. Additionally the Navy has the experience and the staff to support overseas deployments.




Figure 142: The Coast Guard's Law Enforcement Capabilities Will Play Significantly in Future National Security Requirements.

These possible developments may collectively lessen the requirement for the Coast Guard to maintain a military capability and consequently calls to question, the Coast Guard's status as an Armed Force. Two other major developments, also not addressed in this study, bear on this potential development. First is the increasing national concern to manage man's use of the environment. After months of fierce internal debate, the President will attend the U.N.

Author's Conclusion

environmental conference in Brazil. Will increased White House attention to world environmental matters and domestic re-election considerations lead to a more emphasis on environmental issues and perhaps, a move to give the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cabinet status or an EPA-led effort to centralize all federal environmental functions into one agency? It would seem that the Coast Guard's multi-mission versatility as an Armed Force with a viable military capability would strengthen its ability to remain intact as an organization and not be reconfigured as the result of Washington politics. It is not highly a remote possibility that the Coast Guard's maritime environmental protection mission will be stripped away. The other development is the role of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) in marine transportation. Should MARAD become the regulator of the U.S. merchant marine fleet in lieu of the Coast Guard?

Overlaid on these developments is the high cost of the all volunteer military force. If the Coast Guard no longer provides a needed military capability and no longer needs to deploy its platforms to regional contingencies, it need not subject its personnel to the requirements of world-wide military assignment. It should be able to provide longer tours with increased geographical stability and greater skill specialization of its personnel. And if this occurs, it could well become subject to efforts to transition from a military service to a uniform, civil service to reduce the high personnel costs associated with military retirements, medical, permanent change of station (PCS) moves, and benefits. A civil service force may have overtime costs, but it does not have 20 year retirements, frequent transfers, and an expensive personnel support infrastructure. Today many emergency organizations - police, fire, and ambulance - along with the FBI, DEA, FEMA, NMFS, MARAD, NOAA, and DoD installation guard forces successfully provide similar type functions as the Coast Guard without being a military service.

Political forces could develop to determine if maritime environmental protection and merchant marine regulation could be civilianized and or transferred to other organizations. The development of these forces for change would very well be encouraged by the Coast Guard's loss of military capability. What is occurring to the Coast Guard is a correlation of events and political forces that left unchecked will set the stage to change fundamentally the Service. Such an outcome described here can only be helped with the loss of one or two of our domestic missions. Without course correction the Coast Guard is approaching the proverbial slippery slope that will lead it to become a civilian agency.

The Coast Guard does have the potential to provide needed military capability that will not only benefit the nation, but will help ensure its role as an Armed Force. The Coast Guard can: (1) Support some coastal and brown water regional requirements to provide a naval warfare capability; (2) Provide a U.S. "naval" presence in the Caribbean and Latin America to support forward deployments by a smaller sized U.S. Navy; (3) Increase its security assistance training to international navies for alliance strengthening; (4) Support reconstitution and regeneration of naval forces; and (5) Expand the range of Flexible Deterrent Options available to the CINCs.




Figure 143: Coastal Patrol Boats - A Coast Guard Core Competency and Comparative Advantage.

All five considerations meet the Navy's test of non-redundant, complementary capabilities. They also meet the Coast Guard's test of building upon its core competencies and comparative advantages.

In conclusion, though there are opportunities, the dangers are not insignificant. The Coast Guard needs to articulate its national security in clear, rational themes, define an acceptable level of military capability, and communicate its role to the American public, the Administration, and Congress. The recommendation by some of the respondents for a new Coast Guard Roles and Mission Study is timely. The study is urgently needed.

Author's Conclusion



Figure 144: USCGC EAGLE Underway With Full Sails.

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U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

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Appendix A

The Survey Questionnaire

Appendix A

Question One

Subject: FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE FOR THE COAST GUARD IN THE 21ST CENTURY

1. Federal statute (14 U.S.C. 2) addresses the Coast Guard's national security role by stating that the Coast Guard:

" . . . shall maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime Defense Zone command responsibilities."

No definition of "specialized service" exists in the federal statutes or in any policy statements. With the apparent end of the Cold War and the relaxation of U.S./Soviet relations, no realistic military threat exists against U.S. ports. DoD's requirement for the Navy's Maritime Defense Zone Commands should significantly lessen.

What "specialized service" could the Coast Guard perform for DoD in the next century . . . is there a gap in DoD's capabilities that the Coast Guard could fill?

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Question Two

Subject: DoD'S CAPABILITY FOR MARITIME LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

2. In the next century it appears the Navy will operate only one type of surface combatant, the Aegis-equipped ship, *BURKE* and *TICONDEROGA* Classes. Once the *PERRY* Class and *KNOX* Class frigates are retired, a surface platform gap will exist between the AEGIS combatant and the Navy's special warfare boats . . . there will be no small combatants.

General purpose, low cost, even expendable surface platforms will give way to high-tech, very large, very expensive, and, most importantly, very few in number AEGIS combatants. The mining of *USS PRINCETON* (CG-59) demonstrates the potential problems of relying solely on AEGIS ships for future low intensity conflicts in coastal scenarios.

Is there a role for the Coast Guard in regional conflicts/low intensity conflicts? If yes, is this role ashore or at sea? If at sea, what type of vessel is appropriate - patrol boat class (around 100 feet) or major cutter class (around 300 feet in length and 1800 tons) or both classes of cutters?

Appendix A

Question Three

Subject: COAST GUARD AS DoD'S COASTAL PATROL BOAT FORCE MANAGER

3. With its assets, expertise, and experience in coastal and patrol boat operations, should the Coast Guard be designated as DOD's force manager and primary provider for patrol boats for low intensity conflict requirements? Why or why not?

U.S. Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century

Question Four

**Subject: UTILIZATION OF COAST GUARD FORCES AND NAVY/COAST
GUARD INTERSERVICE COOPERATION**

4. Coast Guard forces used in the Persian Gulf War were: (1) Reserve port security units, (2) active duty personnel for boarding duties on Navy ships assigned to interdiction missions, and (3) four aircraft to monitor the Gulf oil spills. However, no active duty Coast Guard ships were present.

In addition to the Persian Gulf War, no active duty Coast Guard ships were used in the Grenada rescue and Panama liberation operations. Furthermore, though CINC Central Command formerly asked for four Coast Guard patrol boats in the 1987 Persian Gulf tanker reflagging operations, none were deployed.

Does the non-use of active duty Coast Guard cutters in these recent contingency operations undermine the rationale for providing the Coast Guard a military capability for a national security role? If you believe this non-use does undermine, please explain how.

Appendix A

Question Five

Subject: FUNDING THE COAST GUARD'S NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE

5. The Coast Guard is the only armed force not located in DoD and is placed in OMB's Budget Function 400 (Transportation), not Function 50 (Defense). Congressional Armed Services Committees do not exercise oversight authority of the Coast Guard. However, the Coast Guard's military capability is funded for the most part by DOD, and not the Department of Transportation (DoT).

If DoD continues to fund the major portion of the Coast Guard's military capability, should DoD directly participate in Coast Guard programmatic decisions concerning selection of replacement aircraft and cutters...to ensure a mission/force match and logistics interoperability?

Should DoD formally recognize and include Coast Guard assets as part of an integrated total naval force package when testifying before DoD Congressional oversight committees?

Question Six

Subject: POLICY MECHANISM FOR NAVY/COAST GUARD INTERFACE

6. Policy direction for Coast Guard roles and missions can be provided by the Navy-Coast Guard Board and from meetings between the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Navy as authorized under 14 U.S.C. 145.

Is the present arrangement of Navy-Coast Guard Board deliberations and frequent meetings between the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Navy sufficient?

Appendix A

Question Seven

Subject: THE UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND THE COAST GUARD

7. With the exception of Maritime Defense Zone responsibilities, do the Unified Commands include the Coast Guard in their other contingency plans in response to specific national command authority tasking or for practical reasons, i.e., the Coast Guard has some readily available and useful assets?

If the CINCs intend to use the Coast Guard, should the Unified Commands include the Coast Guard in their submissions for force planning requirements and budget requests to OSD?

Appendix B

Admiral Roland's Doctrine

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ADDRESS REPLY TO:
COMMANDANT
U.S. COAST GUARD
HEADQUARTERS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.



CCS-2
4 MAR 1964

LETTER OF PROMULGATION

CG-378

1. Purpose. CG-378 has a three-fold purpose:
 - a. To set forth a basic Coast Guard philosophy;
 - b. To define Coast Guard objectives in relation to national objectives and assigned missions;
 - c. To provide long-range policy guidelines for use in planning and operations.
2. Applicability. CG-378 is sufficiently broad and general in nature to have validity for the indefinite future. Its merit lies not in originality but in the general assertion of philosophy, objectives and policy. This represents our present best estimate of the Coast Guard's future direction and, as noted in Commandant Instruction 5010.1, is an essential ingredient of the long-range planning system. CG-378 makes no attempt to prescribe what or how, but rather is designed to stimulate individual thought. I believe this volume has an important and continuing message to all personnel of the Coast Guard.
3. Amendments. No specific updating schedule is established. Changes will be published as necessary in consecutively numbered amendments.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "E J Roland".

E. J. ROLAND

Appendix C

The Author

Captain Bruce B. Stubbs entered the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in June of 1966 and was graduated from the Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree and was commissioned as an Ensign, U.S. Coast Guard in 1970. His first assignment upon graduation was as communications officer in *USCGC WASHUSETT* (WHEC 44), homeported in Seattle, Washington. As an ocean station vessel, this cutter's primary missions were weather patrol and search and rescue standby in the mid-Pacific Ocean.

Eighteen months later, Captain Stubbs was selected for a personnel exchange program with the U.S. Navy. He was assigned to a Navy fast frigate, *USS BADGER* (FF 1071), homeported in Long Beach, California. As a Seventh Fleet unit, this frigate deployed to Vietnam and served as a naval gunfire support ship during the 1972 Easter Offensive.

Upon completing his tour of duty with the Navy in July 1973, Captain Stubbs reported to the Staff of the Thirteenth Coast Guard District in Seattle, Washington, as aide and public affairs officer. In July 1976 he became a full time student at the University of Washington where he received a master's degree in business administration.

He left the University of Washington in May 1978 for duty as operations officer in *USCGC MELLON* (WMEC 717), out of Honolulu, Hawaii. *MELLON* principally conducted fisheries law enforcement patrols in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. Two years later, Captain Stubbs was assigned to Coast Guard Headquarters as aide to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Departing Headquarters in June 1982, he served as executive officer in *USCGC COURAGEOUS* (WMEC 613) and *USCGC DILIGENCE* (WMEC 616), homported in Port Canaveral, Florida. These cutters conducted drug and alien interdiction missions throughout the Caribbean Basin.

Leaving Florida in 1984 Captain Stubbs returned to Headquarters as a readiness analyst in the Office of Readiness and Reserve, and subsequently as a program reviewer for the Chief of Staff. In January 1986 he was assigned to the Staff of the National Security Council as a deputy director for special projects. Finishing his White House assignment in May 1987, he joined the Staff of the Air Interdiction Project Implementation Team in the Office of Operations at Headquarters. He assumed command of *USCGC HARRIET LANE* (WMEC 903) in July 1988, homeported in Portsmouth, Virginia. *HARRIET LANE* conducted counter narcotics and alien interdiction patrols in the Caribbean Sea operating area. In August 1990 Captain Stubbs reported to the U.S. Naval War College as a student in the College of Naval Warfare, and was graduated with distinction from this College in 1991. Presently he is assigned as the Senior Coast Guard advisor to the President of the Naval War College.